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Abstract 
This dissertation defends the view that concepts encode causal information and, for the first time, 
applies this view to a range of topics in the philosophy of language and social philosophy. In my first 
chapter (“Cognitive Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts”), I survey the current empirical and 
theoretical literature on causal-essentialist theories of concepts. In my second chapter (“Meaning 
Externalism and Causal Model Theory”), I propose an account of natural kind concepts according to 
which they encode statistical information of features of a natural kind, and represents these features 
as causally related to each other. I show that this internalist model of concepts correctly predicts 
intuitions about Putnam’s twin earth scenario and Kripke’s conceivability cases that historically 
motivated philosophers of language to accept externalist accounts of meaning. The defended theory 
of concepts also informs topics that go beyond traditional issues in philosophy of language. In my 
third chapter (“An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs”), I defend the view that slurs are, too, 
a species of kind terms: slur concepts encode mini-theories which represent an essence-like element 
that is causally connected to a set of negatively-valenced stereotypical features of a social group. This 
explains both the peculiar linguistic behavior of slurs and slurs’ dehumanizing effects. In my fourth 
chapter, I build on this insight, showing that the explicit language in and around pornography depicts 
women as ‘kinds’ or ‘breeds’ that are naturally made to enjoy certain sexual acts, and argue that this 
deterministic picture of women dehumanizes them.  
 
  1 
Introduction 
Concepts are an integral part of cognition. They are involved in categorization, memory, and 
induction. Concepts are used when reasoning about such diverse domains as the actual world, 
mathematical structures, and fictional worlds. Concepts are expressed by words, and can be 
combined in innumerable ways to understand the utterances of our peers. Concepts also permeate 
our social interactions, and how we position ourselves and others in social space. 
For these reasons, philosophers and psychologists have devoted considerable effort to 
develop theories of concepts. One of the most influential traditions in empiricist philosophy and 
cognitive psychology understands concepts as statistical abstractions over sets of features. These 
accounts, however, have been subject to serious philosophical challenges, and it is becoming 
increasingly clear that they are at best empirically incomplete. In this dissertation, I defend an 
account according to which concepts do not only encode statistical information, but also causal 
information. I show that this approach to the structure of concepts has wide-reaching 
philosophical merits, by applying it to a range of topics that have been of concern in the 
philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy. Throughout the dissertation, 
special attention will be given to specific causal structures that concepts can encode, namely, 
essentialist ones. A concept whose causal structure is organized essentialistically represents a 
category member as having an essence of a category, which is causally responsible for the 
outward properties and behaviors that it shares with other category members.  
 The first chapter (“Cognitive Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts”) presents an 
extensive overview of the current empirical and theoretical literature on essentialist theories of 
concepts. I present, in detail, the core claims of cognitive essentialism as a theory of concepts, its 
main empirical paradigms, its conceptual domain, its development, and relation to social 
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cognition. I will also review the evidence and dominant theories of individual essentialism, the 
main problems essentialist theories of concepts are facing, and discuss new directions the 
research on cognitive essentialism is taking. The aim of this chapter is to inform the reader about 
the status of research on cognitive essentialism, thereby supplementing them with crucial 
background knowledge of use for the comprehension and critical evaluation of the views 
developed in the rest of the dissertation. 
My second chapter (“Meaning Externalism and Causal Model Theory”) sets the 
foundational agenda for the rest of the dissertation, and positions it within the philosophical 
tradition of meaning internalism. One of the main insights the philosophical community has 
drawn from Putnam’s famous Twin Earth thought experiments and Kripke’s theory of direct 
reference is that meaning is individuated externalistically—i.e., that it is not exclusively 
determined by psychological states. Applying the psychological framework of Causal Model 
Theory, I propose an account of natural kind concepts according to which they encode 
probabilistic information of features of a natural kind, and represent these features as causally 
related to each other. The formal framework associated with Causal Model Theory, causal 
graphical models, will furthermore provide us with the resources to model what is simply a more 
constrained version of Causal Model Theory: essentialist causal structures. I show that this 
internalist model of concepts correctly predicts intuitions about Putnam’s twin earth scenario 
and Kripke’s conceivability cases that historically motivated philosophers of language to accept 
externalist accounts of meaning. 
The next chapter illustrates that my theory of concepts informs topics that go beyond 
traditional issues in philosophy of language. In my third chapter (“An Essentialist Theory of the 
Meaning of Slurs”) I defend the view that slurs are a species of kind terms. What’s distinctive 
about slur concepts is that they encode mini-theories which represent an essence-like element 
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that is causally connected to a set of negatively-valenced stereotypical features of a social group. 
The truth-conditional contribution of slur nouns can then be captured by the following schema: 
For a given slur S of a social group G and a person P, S is true of P iff P bears the ‘essence’ of 
G—whatever this essence is—which is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features 
associated with G and predicted of P. Since there is no essence that is causally responsible for 
stereotypical negative features of a social group, slurs have null-extension, and consequently, 
many sentences containing them are either meaningless or false. In the chapter, I show how this 
theory explains both the peculiar linguistic behavior of slurs and slurs’ dehumanizing effects.  
In the last chapter (“Pornography and Dehumanization: The Essentialist Dimension”), I 
build on this insight, showing that the explicit language in and around pornography depicts 
women as ‘kinds’ or ‘breeds’ that are naturally made to enjoy certain sexual acts, and argue that 
this deterministic picture of women dehumanizes them. Drawing on moral insights gained from 
intuitions and work on the effects of essentialist cognition, I first argue that any act of subject-
essentialization along a dimension we care about qua persons is an act of subject-dehumanization. 
Second, I draw on various case studies and experimental evidence to show that pornography 
commonly deploys content that essentializes women and contributes to the formation and 
propagation of essentialist information structures. These two steps are sufficient to establish that 
pornography dehumanizes women. 
I will close this dissertation by revisiting the main lessons and insights of the preceding 
chapters and providing a prospective outlook for future research by assessing some of the 
questions that emerge from the views developed here.  
  4 
Chapter 1 
Cognitive Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts 
1. Introduction 
Around 30 years ago, Medin and Orthony first formulated the hypothesis that laid the foundation 
for what was to become one of the most thriving research programs in the cognitive science of 
concepts: psychological essentialism—the view that certain categories have an underlying nature 
that can’t be observed but gives rise to their outward traits and behavior, and is responsible for 
category membership (Medin & Ortony, 1989). In the years to come, an impressive amount of 
research has been devoted to uncovering which—if any—categories are structured in an 
essentialist way, and the ways these structures figure into and can explain our categorization and 
induction behavior. It didn’t take too long for philosophers to lay eyes on the results from 
cognitive psychology, which resulted in various applications of cognitive essentialism to 
phenomena in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, 
experimental philosophy, philosophy of gender and race, and social philosophy. In consequence, 
the topic of cognitive essentialism has become a flagship for fruitful interdisciplinary exchange 
between cognitive scientists and philosophers. 
In a sense, the idea that objects have underlying essences that figure into their identity 
conditions is not philosophically novel. Aristotle took objects to have internal or teleological 
essences that are explanatorily basic for category membership and central for the existence of an 
entity qua that entity. And essences also play an important role in Locke’s Essays: here, an essence 
is “what makes something what it is, and in the case of physical substances, it is the underlying 
physical cause of the object’s observable qualities” (Jones, 2012). In contemporary analytic 
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philosophy, the notion of essence gained new relevance due to Kripke’s work on the semantics of 
natural kind terms. Kripke famously introduced the idea that sentences involving natural kind 
terms can be necessary yet aposteriori; and the idea of essence figured centrally in his argument 
(Kripke, 1980). Water, for example, is essentially H2O, but it is an empirical discovery that it is, 
thus knowable only aposteriori.  
Importantly, however, all these claims were meant to have metaphysical import. Cognitive 
essentialism, in contrast, is merely a set of hypotheses about our concept and belief system, and 
thus does not purport to have metaphysical import (outside of the domain of the cognitive, of 
course). While psychological essentialism might bear on metaphysical essentialism—for 
instance, someone might explain away intuitions that speak in favor of metaphysical essentialism 
by appealing to evidence about essentialist biases in humans—both research agendas ask a 
dissociable set of questions. While cognitive essentialism mainly asks: do we represent things as 
having essences?,  metaphysical essentialism asks: do things have essences?  
In this chapter, and the rest of the dissertation, we will only focus on the first question 
and questions related to it. Thus, we will try to answer questions such as: What are the main 
hypotheses and predictions made by cognitive essentialism? What is the main empirical evidence 
for and against cognitive essentialism? Is cognitive essentialism domain-specific or general? 
What is the developmental trajectory of cognitive essentialism, and is it a bias common to all 
cultures? We will review cognitive essentialism’s main theoretical framework, the classical 
results that have motivated the research program, as well as more recent findings and variations 
of the original proposal. Thus, we will get a comprehensive overview of its main claims as well 
as its theoretical and empirical standing.  
  6 
I will proceed as follows. I start by introducing the ‘classic’ formulation of psychological 
essentialism as it applies to natural kind terms and the main paradigms psychologists have used 
to uncover and track essentialist conceptual structures (§2). I continue by reviewing the evidence 
for essentialist structures in other conceptual domains, where a special emphasis will be given to 
essentialism in the social domain (§3). Next, I discuss the empirical and theoretical status of 
research on individual essentialism—i.e., essentialism about individual entities (§4). After 
presenting some findings against and criticisms of cognitive essentialism about concepts (§5), I 
will close by discussing recent alternative or complementary variations of the original essentialist 
proposal (§6).  
 
2. Psychological Essentialism about Natural Kinds 
2.1 The essentialist hypothesis  
What are the main tenets of cognitive essentialism? Susan Gelman, who contributed massively 
to what we now know about essentialist cognition, describes it as “the view that categories have 
an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its 
identity, and is responsible for other similarities that category members share” (Gelman, 2004, 
p. 404). This highlights that the essence must occupy a causally deep role in our representation of 
a category: the essence is what individuates entities qua members of a category, and causally 
determines their observable features and behavior. However, our representations of essences do 
not have to represent a specific essence of a category or its member. In other words, we do not 
have to have concrete beliefs about what the essence of a category is in order to represent it as 
essentialized. Indeed, the most prominent version of cognitive essentialism, ‘placeholder 
essentialism’, states the opposite: people often believe that a category has an essence, while 
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leaving open what exactly it is (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rips, 2011). Another 
important aspect is the primacy of essences over observable features. It is the essence, not the 
observable surface features, that is responsible for membership in a category. Thus, it is not 
necessary for a member of an essentialized category to display the traits that are typical of the 
category, and normally caused by the essence. However, since the essence is responsible for the 
observable similarities between category members, any category member will always be 
disposed—in virtue of bearing the causally potent essence—to display the features typical of the 
category, also if they are currently unmanifested.1  
At the early stages of research on essentialist representations of categories, researchers 
focused on documenting evidence for essentialism about natural kinds, such as chemicals (water, 
gold), animals (cat, kangaroo) and plants (rose, apple tree) (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Wellman, 
1991; Keil, 1989). But how did scientists determine whether a category is cognitively treated as 
essentialized? In order to answer this question, it is important to clarify what the main markers 
associated with essentialist representations are (see Gelman, 2003; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 
2017; Rips, 2011). First, the essentialized categories are taken to be natural kinds. More 
specifically, they are treated as real and not fabricated, discovered rather than being produced or 
invented, and rooted in nature. Second, the categories are taken to have sharp category boundaries, 
and be homogeneous. Third, the essences are taken to be intrinsic, rather than relational, features 
of category members. Some theorists are also committed to the claim that essences are not only 
intrinsic, but also internal features of category members (cf. especially Gelman, 2003, 2004, see 
also Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Leslie, 2013). Fourth, the essence is represented as innate, 
historically stable, and thus immutable; i.e., hard to transform. Fifth, the essences are seen as hidden 
and unobservable properties that cause objects to be the way they are. Thus, they are causally potent 
 
1 Chapter 2 will provide a formalization of cognitive essentialism in terms of causal graphical models. 
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and have large inductive potential. Categories such as tiger allow for a richer set of inferences than 
green objects in the living room.  
Importantly, while all these beliefs2 are associated with essentialist beliefs, they are not 
to be treated as necessary conditions of cognitive essentialism. Rather, we should think of them 
as markers or symptoms that often go together with essentialist beliefs, and are useful for revealing 
essentialist conceptual structures (Leslie, 2013; see also Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Thus, 
someone might represent a category as essentialized, while not seeing it as historically stable 
(just like someone can, e.g., have a depression without having weight changes).  
In the remainder of this section, I will introduce the main experimental paradigms that 
cognitive psychologists have used to test for the listed markers and uncover essentialist belief 
structures.  
 
2.2 Triad Task and Inductive Potential 
Induction, alongside categorization, is commonly treated as the most important function of 
concepts: 
Induction is the capacity to extend knowledge to novel instances, for example, inferring that a newly 
encountered mushroom is poisonous on the basis of past encounters with other poisonous mushrooms. 
This capacity is one of the most important functions of categories […] Categories serve not only to 
organize the knowledge we have already acquired but also to guide our expectations. (Gelman, 2004, p. 
404) 
Thus, the inductive properties of concepts can be used to yield insights into their structure. One 
of the paradigms cognitive scientists make use of to investigate the inductive potential of 
category representations is the triad task. In the task, experimenters create a clash between 
 
2 “Belief” is used in a very loose sense in this chapter, referring mostly to tacit or unconscious cognitive 
representations. 
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perceptual 
resemblance and 
category membership, 
and subsequently 
probe what people 
choose as the basis for 
their inductive 
inferences. Markman and Gelman (1986, 1987) used the task in what became an influential set of 
experiments. In the studies, children were given picture sets with three items per set which 
belonged to animal or natural substance categories (see figure 1). One of the items closely 
resembled another item perceptually, but was of the same category as the third item. When 
learning new facts about the items, adults (Stanford undergraduates) as well as 3- and 4-year-
olds would project knowledge from (1b) to (c) with higher likelihood than from (a) to (c), although 
the item in (a) is perceptually more similar to the item in (c). So, when asked to draw inferences 
about the leaf-insect, the participants based their inferences on what they knew about the bug, 
not the leaf.3 What can we infer from the results? Most importantly, they show that “category-
based induction cannot be reduced to some general similarity metric” (Gelman, 2003, p. 58). And 
if it is not perceptual similarity we base our inference on, it must be some common unobservable 
property of the items, which exceeds perceptual similarity in its inductive potential. Similarly, 
summarizing the results of the studies, Gelman concludes: 
children drew many novel inferences from one member of a category to another, even when the instances 
appeared very different on the surface and even when only the label told children that they were the same 
kind of thing. These inferences were nonobvious in two respects: the predicates concerned nonobvious 
 
3 The results have been replicated in various studies (e.g., Davidson & Gelman, 1990; Gelman, 1988; Gelman & 
Coley, 1990; Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988) and have also been extended to younger 
children, including 1- and 2-year-olds (Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004; Jaswal & Markman, 2002; Plunkett, Hu, 
& Cohen, 2008; Switzer & Graham, 2017). 
Figure 1. Set of items used in Gelman and Markman’s 1986 and 1987 studies, in 
which overall similarity in shape and color was pitted against shared category 
membership. This set comprised (a) a leaf, (b) a beetle and (c) a leaf-insect. When 
3- to 4- year olds heard labels for these items, they were more likely to extend new 
information on the basis of shared labels than on the basis of overall similarity (cf. 
Gelman, 2004).  
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properties and the category membership was not obvious from outward appearances. (Gelman, 2003, p. 
31). 
 
2.3 Transformation Paradigm and Stability 
Frank Keil first introduced the transformation paradigm in his pivotal (1989) study series, which 
powerfully illustrates how within-category differences are a useful tool to uncover essentialist 
tendencies (cf. Gelman, 2003). In it, he modified various perceptual properties of an object of a 
particular category (the ‘initial category’) as to look like a member of a different category (the 
‘target category’). The subjects were then asked whether the object has changed its category 
membership. For example, in one condition, the subjects were told that a horse was made to 
completely look and behave like a zebra through a series of manipulations, such as operation and 
training by doctors. The relevant task was to decide whether this object was still a horse, or 
changed its category to zebra. The results—which constituted an important steppingstone for 
research on cognitive essentialism—suggested that, for natural categories, kindergartners were 
more likely to judge according to perceptual appearance and behavior,4 whereas second graders 
and adults judged that perceptual appearance didn’t affect category membership. This suggests 
that already young children progressively pay more attention to ‘unobservables’ when making 
category decisions, and regard kind membership as stable and immutable. As Gelman puts it, 
“[m]aintaining category identity over striking observable changes constitutes evidence that the 
categorizer asserts some underlying constancy” (2003, p. 61).5  
 
 
4 See Gelman (2003, p. 63) for an interpretation of these (and other) results according to which already preschoolers 
make essentialist judgements in the transformation paradigm. 
5 Keil used more versions of the transformation paradigm, in which different variables of the experiment were 
manipulated to different degrees (e.g., the changes to the objects were more or less superficial). These affected how 
early children judged the transformations to not affect category change.  
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2.4 Discovery Paradigm, Insides, and the Unobservable 
In the same study series, Keil introduced the related discovery paradigm. Subjects were confronted 
with a scenario in which scientists found out that a member of a given category (e.g., a horse) has 
hidden properties—the insides, parents, and offspring—of another category (e.g., a cow): 
But some scientists went up to this farm and decided to study them really carefully. They did blood tests 
and X-rays and looked way deep inside with microscopes and found out these animals weren’t like most 
horses. These animals had the inside parts of cows. They had the blood of cows, the bones of cows; and 
when they looked to see where they came from, they found out their parents were cows. And, when they 
had babies, their babies were cows. (Keil, 1989, p. 162) 
They were then asked whether the individual was a cow or a horse. By second grade, children 
usually judged the individual to be a cow. As in the transformation paradigm, this indicates that 
participants of a certain age can dismiss superficial properties as criterial for category 
membership in favor of unobservable properties. 
 
2.5 Switched-at-birth and Adoption Task: Innate Potential, the Natural and Causal Determinism  
In the adoption or switched-at-birth task (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Hirschfeld, 1996), children 
are presented with a nature/nurture conflict. The aim is to uncover which of the two is more 
decisive for category-related inductions. In these tasks, participants are presented with biological 
parents of some specified category (‘initial category’) that, after birth, is either switched or 
adopted to be raised by a different family which belongs to a different (target) category. For 
example, an animal whose biological parents are goats is adopted and raised by giraffes. Next, 
participants are asked a set of questions to probe their beliefs about the development of the 
switched target. The aim is to find out whether biological parents or the environment are more 
important for predictions about an animal’s properties. In studies with animals or plants, children 
as young as four years make predictions about an animal’s or plant’s future based on its birth-
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parents, rather than its acquired environment (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). An animal with 
kangaroo parents that is raised by and among goats, for example, is judged by children to have a 
pouch and hop when it grows up. Only very rarely do children base their predictions on 
environmental factors.  
This paradigm tracks the stability we associate with natural kinds: even when the 
environment of an individual changes, its category membership remains stable. Not only that: 
the category membership still has high inductive potential, and determines what the object in 
question is predicted to do and look like. The results also illustrate that we associate natural kind 
concepts with naturalness and innate potential. The natural aspect of a category member as well as 
its status at birth is inductively crucial for essentialized categories. The birth of a biological object 
fixes its natural essence and will be a stable predictor of its properties throughout its life.6  
 
2.6 Typicality Mismatch and Sharp Category Boundaries 
By reviewing some of the main paradigms used to understand essentialist conceptual structures, 
we have also explored the main evidence that natural kind concepts are associated with the 
essentialized markers mentioned earlier. However, we have not yet seen that natural kind 
concepts are more discrete and have sharper category boundaries than other concepts, which was 
one of the markers for essentialized categories. This is because there seems to have been no major, 
influential paradigm for the assessment of category boundaries. The idea that natural kind 
concepts are associated with sharper category boundaries intuitively seems right. We do not 
think that something is in-between gold, kind of an atom, or a semi-fish, while we readily engage 
in boundary-crossing for artifacts (such as a spoon-fork hybrid). This intuition—that natural 
 
6 Cf. Gelman (2003; 2004). 
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kind categories are represented in a more discrete, all-or-nothing fashion—has also been 
mirrored in experimental findings through the use of many different paradigms. I’ll present one 
of the more common paradigms that track the category boundaries and objectivity status 
associated with categories. 
 One paradigm that has been used to test which categories are represented as boundary-
intensified is to compare the category typicality assigned to an object with the assigned degree 
of category membership, to then assess whether there are domain-specific differences. Typicality 
ratings are usually graded—while a robin is a typical instance of the category bird, a penguin is 
less so. At the same time, a penguin is usually judged to be a full member of the category bird. If 
there are substantial differences between different (domains of) categories, it shows that some 
categories are represented as having sharper boundaries than others.  
 Diesendruck and Gelman (1999) specifically tested whether natural kind concepts show 
sharper category boundaries than artifact concepts by asking adults to assess to which degree an 
animal or an artifact is a member of a category and typical of a category. They found that adults 
tended to make much more absolute ratings with respect to category membership for animals 
than for artifacts. They also found that the ‘absoluteness’ of category membership ratings was 
independent of the typicality ratings: no matter which degree of typicality was assigned to an 
animal, it was either judged to be a category member or not. In contrast, artifact typicality and 
category ratings were highly correlated. If an artifact was judged to be ‘kind of’ typical, it was 
also judged to be ‘kind of’ a category member. Thus, relative to artifacts, adults seem to represent 
a sharper divide of belonging to a category or not for natural kind categories such as animals (see 
also Rhodes & Gelman, 2009b; Rhodes, Gelman, & Karuza, 2014).7   
 
7 For more evidence that subjects represent membership in natural kind categories, in contrast to artifact categories, 
as all-or-none, see Coley and Luhmann (2001), Estes (2004), and Hampton (2009). These studies specifically tested 
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3. Beyond Natural Kinds: The Conceptual Domain of Essentialism 
Through application of the paradigms we discussed in the last section and various other ones, 
cognitive scientists have collected evidence that natural kind categories are represented in 
essentialized ways. We now turn to the question of whether other category domains, namely 
artifact categories (scissors, table, car) and social categories (man, American, teacher), are represented 
in essentialist ways. Specifically, we will review how these domains fare with respect to the 
essentialism paradigms mentioned above, and examine other studies that tested whether the core 
markers of essentialism are satisfied in these two conceptual domains. 
 
3.1 Artifact Concepts 
Given the evidence we have from studies applying the paradigms above and others to artifacts, 
cognitive psychologists have often concluded that the domain of artifacts is either not 
represented as essentialized, or essentialized to a degree that is substantially weaker than for 
natural kinds (Sloman & Malt, 2003; see also Gelman, 2003, 2013). To start, let us look at how 
subjects made category decisions about artifacts in the transformation and discovery studies by 
Keil (1989) and the boundary/typicality matching study by Diesendruck and Gelman (1999) that 
we discussed above.  
In both studies, there were notable differences between the judgements participants made 
for natural categories and artifacts. In contrast to animal categories, Keil found that children, 
 
whether the concepts of personal ignorance and expertise are of greater relevance for natural kind concepts than 
artifact concepts. The studies suggest that participants think they would be able to categorize given specimen 
correctly if they had greater knowledge about them for natural kinds, but not artifacts, and, relatedly, that the 
relevant experts would be able to determine whether a given specimen belongs to a category or not for natural kinds 
but not for artifacts. 
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including older children, judge that artifacts are quite mutable. When making the relevant 
manipulations, a coffeepot, say, can change its category membership and turn into a bird feeder. 
Thus, children’s and adults’ representations of artifact category membership seem to be relatively 
unstable and only ‘as deep as skin’: altering surface properties is sufficient to alter the category 
membership of the item (see also Rips, 1989). I’ve already brought up the way artifact and natural 
kind judgements were sharply divided in the study by Diesendruck and Gelman (1999). To 
highlight their results for artifact concepts again: while natural kind members were judged as 
either belonging to a category or not, independently of their typicality ratings, the judgements 
of whether something belonged to an artifact category or not aligned with typicality ratings to 
a much higher degree. This suggests that category boundaries are represented as much less 
pronounced for artifacts (see also Estes, 2004; Hampton, 2009; Malt, 1990; Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009b). In sum, applying some of the paradigms we discussed above to artifacts, we find that 
some of essentialism’s markers—boundary discreteness, causal potential of unobservables—
rather do not apply to artifact representations. 
Findings about the other cognitive markers of essentialism, however, have been more 
mixed for artifact categories. Although Keil’s stability test indicated that the criteria for 
categorization go only ‘as deep as skin’, there has been some evidence that features with causal 
potential are nevertheless more central for category membership in artifact domains than 
perceptual similarities or effect features (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Sobel, Yoachim, Gopnik, 
Metltzoff, & Blumenthal, 2007). Specifically unobservable features, such as function or designer 
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intention, have been suggested to be of higher importance for artifact categorization (Bloom, 
2000; Gelman, 2003, 2013). Importantly, and in contrast to natural categories, the unobservable, 
causal features of artifact categories seem to be realized, sometimes, as relational or external 
instead of internal or intrinsic. Designer intentions, for example, are ‘outside’ the artifact itself 
(Bloom, 2000). But also here the evidence seems to be mixed: Sobel and colleagues (2007) found 
that internal features were rated as more important and more causally central in categorizations 
of novel artifacts. 
The evidence regarding the inductive potential associated with artifact categories is also 
more mixed. Of course, just like living things or natural substances (or pretty much any category 
representation, for that matter), artifacts have inductive potential.8 We draw a number of 
inferences when hearing that something is a cup: it can hold liquids, we can drink from it, etc. 
The (modal) inductive potential of natural kinds, however, seems to surpass the one of artifacts 
consistently (Gelman, 1988, 2003). For example, Gelman (1988) found that elementary school 
 
8 Obviously, even the most non-essentialized categories have inductive potential: from something falling under the 
category white object, we can induce that it is white, that it has mass, etc. The question is how different conceptual 
domains compare with respect to their inductive potential. 
Table 1. Evidence for essentialism across different conceptual domains. From Gelman (2003, p. 138). 
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children that learn new facts about an artifact and a natural kind member are significantly more 
willing to generalize the facts to the whole category in the case of natural kinds than in the case 
of artifacts. And, as we have seen above, the inductive potential of artifacts isn’t modally stable: 
If I think that something was intended to be a pencil, but was manipulated in relevant ways, I 
can still switch its function fairly easily and represent it as a different thing.9   
In sum, we have seen that the evidence for essentialism in artifacts seems substantially 
more mixed than for natural kinds categories (for an overview, see table 1). Does this mean that 
artifact representations are structured in an importantly different way compared to natural kind 
concepts? Not necessarily. Gelman (2003) has argued that the evidence is compatible with a view 
according to which there is only a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, difference between the 
heuristics we apply to categorize artifacts and natural kind terms.10 For now, we will leave this 
question aside, but we will get back to it later when discussing whether essentialism should be 
thought of as a domain-general or domain-specific representational bias. 
 
3.2 Social Kind Concepts 
Let us now move to the domain of social categories. A large amount of evidence suggests that we 
treat many human or social categories as essentialized. As with natural kinds, we behave as if social 
groups are real kinds and have, correspondingly, sharp category boundaries, are somewhat 
“natural”, historically stable, “real” and not constructed, and allow for rich inductive inferences 
about physical and behavioral traits of their members. 
 
9 See Gelman (2003) for a discussion of the point from this paragraph. 
10 See also Gelman (2013), who restricted this defense to artifact individuals, however, claiming that artifact categories 
are not essentialized. In effect, her account then seems to be an account of individual essentialism (see §4 of this 
chapter).  
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  The range of social categories for which essentialist tendencies have been recorded is 
wide. Race and ethnicity (Allport, 1954; Gil-White, 2001; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; 
Hirschfeld, 1996; Ho, Roberts, & Gelman, 2015; Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2016; 
Verkuyten, 2003), gender (Gelman, 2003; Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; Prentice & Miller, 
2006, 2007) caste (Mahalingam, 2003), sexual orientation (Haslam & Levy, 2006), religion 
(Chalik, Leslie, & Rhodes, 2017; Toosi & Ambady, 2011), mental illness (Haslam, 2000; Haslam 
& Ernst, 2002; Howell, Weikum, & Dyck, 2011) and more have been found to be cognitively 
represented in essentialized ways.  
In this section, I’ll give a basic overview of cognitive essentialism with respect to social 
groups. Importantly, there are some variables alongside which our tendency to essentialize social 
group varies. First, there are differences with respect to the extent to which we essentialize 
different social groups, including the ones just listed. Second, there are differences with respect 
to the cognitive development of the essentialist representations of each particular social domain. 
Third, contextual factors, such as the social position of one’s ingroup, can affect essentialist 
judgements about certain groups. Fourth, essentialist biases might differ cross-culturally. Thus, 
this section will also illuminate how essentialist representations of social groups vary across these 
dimensions. 
 
3.2.1 Essentialized Social Groups in Adults  
Let us start by reviewing one of the earlier studies of essentialist representations of human 
categories. In their (2000) study, Nick Haslam and colleagues developed a set of questions that 
assessed different dimensions along which we essentialize groups.11 Specifically, they tested 
 
11 These roughly correspond to the cognitive markers of essentialism specified in §2 of this chapter. 
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whether participants essentialized social groups along the dimensions of naturalness, stability, 
discreteness of category boundaries, immutability of category membership, and necessity of category features. 
They asked participants to rate, on a scale from 1 to 9, to which extent one of the listed 
dimensions applies to a category. The dimension of discreteness, for example, was described to 
the participants as follows: “[s]ome categories have sharper boundaries than others. For some, 
membership is clear-cut, definite, and of an ‘either/or’ variety; people either belong to the 
category or they do not. For others, membership is more ‘fuzzy’; people belong to the category 
in varying degrees.” To give another example, the dimension of naturalness was described to the 
participants as “some categories are more natural than others, whereas others are more artificial”. 
The aim of the study was to cover as many categories as possible. Among many others, some of 
the assessed categories were, e.g., diseases (AIDS patients, cancer patients), dietary groups (meat 
eaters, vegetarians), intelligence groups (smart people, people of average intelligence), races 
(black, white), religions (Catholics, Jews), political groups (liberals, Republicans). The results 
showed that within the 40 social categories that were rated, the categories of gender, ethnicity, and 
race as well as Jews and homosexuals received particularly high ratings, and the categories 
associated with interests, politics, appearance, and social class received the lowest ratings.  
 The study by Haslam and colleagues was one of the first ones that assessed the extent to 
which we essentialize different social categories. Among other things, it revealed that essentialist 
judgements differ across social categories: while gender and ethnicity were strongly essentialized, 
categories associated with interests or social class received low ratings. The experiment by 
Haslam and colleagues paved the way for an impressing amount of research on essentialist 
representations of human categories in cognitive science, leading to various developments and 
refinements of their results. 
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3.2.2 Development of Social Essentialism 
We have seen that adults represent many human categories essentialistically. But why do we 
develop social-essentialist biases, and how does the developmental trajectory of them look like?12 
Different theorists have offered different answers to the first question. Gil-White (2001) and 
Atran (Atran, 1998) hypothesized that children are pre-equipped with an essentialist module 
which originally evolved for reasoning about the biological world. Since social kinds sometimes 
can appear to be structured like distinct biological species, the essentialist processes are 
sometimes (mis-)applied to the social world.  
A different hypothesis has been defended by Rhodes and Mandalaywala (2017), Gelman 
(2003), and Gelman and Hirschfeld (1999). According to them, essentialism is, in principle, a 
domain-general phenomenon that “arises as children construct abstract causal-explanatory 
theories of their environment by relying on several basic conceptual biases and capacities, which 
are all firmly in place in their first few years of life” (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017, pp. 3–4). By 
“several basic conceptual biases and capacities”, they refer to biases and capacities that have been 
argued to be present innately or in very early childhood—e.g., the ability to track objects over 
time (Rips & Hespos, 2015; Spelke, Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein, 1995; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; 
Xu, 2007b), causal-deterministic biases (A. M. Leslie, 1982; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005), 
the capacity to induce from property clusters (Dewar & Xu, 2010) and to distinguish appearance 
from reality (Gopnik & Astington, 1988), and children’s tendency defer to experts (Jaswal, 2010). 
As the biological world triggers most or all of these capacities, psychological essentialism arises. 
For example, looking for a cause for tigers’ property clusters leads them to posit the existence of 
an internal ‘tiger essence’. Over the first few years of life, this process of making sense of the 
 
12 For an extensive overview on the development of social essentialism, which heavily informed the present section, 
see Rhodes and Mandalaywala (2017).  
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world can give rise to a more general, essentialist, theory of the biological domain, leading them 
to assume that new biological categories will also have this structure: 
[…] as children develop intuitive theories to make sense of the world around them, they rely on each of 
the capacities […] to understand why things are labeled the way they are, why individuals tend to have 
particular properties, and why some individuals are grouped together and separately from others in their 
environment. As children develop causal-explanatory framework theories of how domains of experience 
are organized, these capacities—and the explanations for experience that they generate—can be pieced 
together into a fully integrated essentialist theory, as likely happens in the biological domain. (Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017, p. 4) 
According to the defenders of this account, the same mechanism is responsible for social 
essentialist beliefs. Since there are differences in the environmental input children receive about 
the social world, however, their essentialist theory of the social world will differ in important 
respects from their theory about the biological world:13 
Unlike the biological domain, for which children’s experiences with categories […] are highly stable 
across time and contexts, social categorization is highly variable. People are categorized by personal 
characteristics like gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or social status; by psychological features like 
personality traits, preferences, skills, and abilities; by groups based on specific experiences, goals, or 
interests; as well as into arbitrary groups within schools or other organizations. These categories vary in 
their salience and meaning across contexts (both across different cultures, and also across different social 
contexts that a child might encounter in daily life). Thus, children are likely to receive much less 
consistent evidence regarding the structure of the social world (in comparison to evidence regarding the 
structure of the biological world), including inconsistent input regarding the status of categories (even 
labeled categories) within that structure. (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017, p. 4–5) 
For this reason, the interplay between environmental input and children’s conceptual biases 
might lead more often to context-dependent, or only partially essentialist theories about social 
categories. Both accounts make quite similar predictions about the empirical data—namely, that 
essentialist biases of the social world are present in early childhood, and culturally widespread 
(although the precise nature of which social groups are essentialized should vary). However, the 
modularity account predicts that the social groups we essentialize should be those that are most 
‘similar to’ biological species and that social-essentialist beliefs shouldn’t be contextually affected 
 
13 The question that arises here is why the same shouldn’t hold for artifact categories, or other, clearly non-
essentialized categories, such as things on my desk or people crossing Pico Boulevard at 4:14 pm. 
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(by, for example, cross-cultural training), while the account from basic conceptual capacities 
predicts that children need more evidence to develop essentialist biases about the social than 
about the biological domain. In what follows, we will review the status of the evidence about 
these proposals, which will directly contribute to crucial questions about the development of 
social essentialism, such as which social categories children essentialize, when they start 
essentializing social groups, and whether factors such as our group membership influence for 
which groups we develop essentialist beliefs. We start by briefly addressing the question of which 
social groups children essentialize. 
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Table 2. Rhodes and Mandalaywala’s (2017) summary of findings regarding age of emergence and component of 
essentialist beliefs tested by type of social category.  
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Which social categories do children essentialize, and when? 
Essentialism about some social groups seems to emerge quite early in childhood; research 
indicates that social essentialist biases can be observed between 3 and 5 years of age. The list of 
social categories for which social-essentialist beliefs have been recorded in children is wide, and 
includes gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and language. Extensively discussing the findings of 
each of these category types will not be possible here (but an informative overview is provided in 
table 2). Instead, we will focus on two category types that have been of special interest both in 
philosophical and psychological research: gender and race.  
US-children show essentialist biases and beliefs about gender by at least age 4. In fact, 
research indicates that essentialist beliefs about gender emerge earlier than essentialist beliefs 
about any other social categories, and that they persist throughout development into adulthood 
(Del Pinal, Madva, & Reuter, 2017; Eidson & Coley, 2014; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017).14 Children (age 3–5) view gender boundaries as being objective and 
marking different kinds of people (Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, Rhodes, Gelman, & Neumark, 
2013; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; Rhodes, Gelman, & Karuza, 2014; Roberts & Gelman, 2015), 
and they expect the birth gender and sex to determine behavioral and biological properties later 
in life—even when growing up in the opposite gender environment (Gülgöz, DeMeules, Gelman, 
& Olson, 2019; M. G. Taylor, 1996; M. G. Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). In triad tasks (cf. 
§2.2), children judge that a human who is perceptually similar to a boy, but is labeled as a girl, 
will share nonobvious and behavioral properties with other girls (Gelman et al., 1986). Children 
furthermore seem to display essentialist beliefs about gender even when older children and adults 
 
14 The persistence of these bias is often measured only implicitly in adults. 
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in their community display flexible or anti-essentialist views (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a).15 Let 
us go through one instructive set of findings, which uses the adoption task (see §2.5), in greater 
detail.  
In her experiment, Taylor (1996) told children about an infant boy (or girl) that was 
raised by his aunt on an island entirely inhabited by girls and women (or boys and men, 
respectively). The children were asked to infer gender-stereotyped properties about the boy at 
age 10: Would he play with dolls? Or would he like to play football? The study found that the 
youngest participants (age 4) inferred that gender-linked properties were not dependent on the 
environment, but rather fixed at birth. The boy—even if raised by and with girls and women—
would prefer to play football when growing up. In a follow-up study, Taylor and colleagues (M. 
G. Taylor et al., 2009) probed the explicit causal explanations five and ten-year old children 
would give for their predictions, again confirming the presence of gender essentialism. One 
question asked, for example, why a girl raised with boys only would play with a tea set rather 
than a toy truck, to which a10-year-old boy answered, “because usually since she has a girl brain, 
she’d like to play with a tea set” (reported in Gelman, 2003). Interestingly, however, both studies 
also found that while early children have the same beliefs about gender and animals in 
transformation settings (§2.3), their beliefs about gender (but not animals) become more 
differentiated in later stages, indicating that gender-essentialist beliefs can (and do) decline with 
age, and that the development of gender essentialism seems to be influenced by experience and 
cultural input. An important factor that might contribute to this development is that participants 
in these studies were from a socially and politically liberal university town. Correspondingly, a 
study that compared children of various ages from a liberal town to children from a town that is 
 
15 Rhodes and Mandalaywala interpret this data as compatible with the view that gender concepts have special 
constraints in cognitive development. 
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socially and politically more conservative as well as ethnically and racially more homogeneous 
found that essentialist gender beliefs only declined with age in participants from the more liberal 
town, while they appeared to stay stable in the more conservative community (Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009a). Again, these results indicate that cultural influences can importantly shape essentialist 
beliefs about social categories through development.  
 Interestingly, the development of essentialism about race seems to differ considerably 
from the development of gender essentialism. Lawrence Hirschfeld was one of the early authors 
documenting essentialism about race in adults and children as young as three years (Hirschfeld, 
1995, 1996). In his studies, he asked preschoolers whether a racial property class—hair and skin 
color—or a physical property class—clothing style and color—would remain unchanged as a 
person grows up. Even 3-year-olds judged that the properties connected with race were more 
constant than sartorial properties. Importantly, this effect can’t be accounted for by the 
explanation that children represent body features as more stable than non-body features. When 
4-years-olds were asked to choose whether body build vs. hair and skin color would remain the 
same over life span, they too judged significantly more often in favor of racial properties. He 
obtained the same preference for race as the dominant factor compared to other physical features 
for inheritance judgements: when children were asked which properties they would inherit from 
their parents, they predominantly picked racial properties. Similarly, in a switched-at-birth 
paradigm, children judge that a child born to black parents but raised by white parents (or vice 
versa) would later have the skin color of the birth parents.  
Although Hirschfeld’s studies were an important starting point for the investigation of 
essentialist representations about race, they have important limitations. First, the results are 
compatible with it being world knowledge instead of essentialist biases that causes children’s 
responses: children might simply know that our skin or hair color remains stable over a lifetime, 
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while the color of our clothes or our body shape does not (see Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). 
Second, his results are inconsistent with an impressive number of other studies, which do not 
find race-related essentialist effects at age 3, but only at later developmental stages (Diesendruck, 
Goldfein-Elbaz, Rhodes, Gelman, & Neumark, 2013; Gaither et al., 2014; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; 
Pauker, Xu, Williams, & Biddle, 2016; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009, see also table 2). For example, 
other work found that children do view skin color as determined by kinship, but, importantly, do 
not see skin color as an important category membership marker. Instead, they just see it as one 
‘superficial’ physical marker among many others, such as eye or hair color (Rhodes, 2013). 
Rhodes, Gelman, and Karuza (2014) found that children between 3 and 4 had flexible beliefs 
about race category boundaries (but not gender), and Rhodes and Gelman (2009a) found that the 
view that races form objectively distinct kinds of people doesn’t develop until ages 7–10, 
indicating that the development of race essentialism is protracted compared to gender 
essentialism. Again, essentialism about race was only observed in older age groups (10 and 17 
years) from more ethnically homogeneous, and socially and politically more conservative, 
communities. In line with this, other experimental evidence indicates that belief in the stability 
of race varies depending on the child’s community and their own racial background (Kinzler & 
Dautel, 2012; Roberts & Gelman, 2015). US-children have more essentialist beliefs about race 
than children from Israel, for example, while children in Israel appear to have more essentialist 
beliefs about religious and ethnic categories (Diesendruck et al., 2013). And notably, in the US, 
essentialist beliefs about race seem to emerge earlier in African American than in white children 
(Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Roberts & Gelman, 2015).  
In sum, the current evidence indicates that gender essentialism emerges earlier than race 
essentialism, and that the time-course and presence of social-essentialist beliefs can be 
substantially influenced by cultural input. Moreover, while it seems that essentialism about race 
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clearly emerges in childhood, we need more evidence to assess the precise developmental 
trajectory of race essentialism and its contextual influences. Note that the reviewed evidence so 
far also seems to favor domain-general over modular accounts of social essentialism and its 
cognitive origins: contra the modular account, essentialist development seems to be influenceable 
by contextual factors, and there is no evidence that essentialist tendencies develop prevalently 
for domains that are cognitively more similar to biological species. Children also seem to require 
more evidence to develop essentialist beliefs about many social categories compared to natural 
categories. In the section on cultural variability of essentialism (§3.2.4), we will address the 
influence of cultural factors on essentialist beliefs further. 
 
Linguistic Cues 
Before we end the discussion of the development of social essentialism, we need to address the 
question of how children make out which social groups to essentialize and which not. In other 
words: which cues do children use to infer essentialist category structures of social groups? The 
current literature hints at two types of cues, both linguistic in nature, as particularly important 
for this purpose: (especially nominal) labels and generics. 
 Cognitive scientists have repeatedly found that children and even infants extrapolate 
essentialist structures from nouns for natural categories (Dewar & Xu, 2009; Gelman & Coley, 
1990; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004; Hall & Moore, 1997; Switzer & Graham, 2017). Early 
evidence that nouns are also important to generate essentialist expectations for social categories 
came from a study by Susan Gelman and Gail Heyman. Children compared the inductive 
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potential children infer from noun and verb labels (Gelman & Heyman, 1999).16 They either 
heard a story that contained “a carrot eater” (noun phrase; NP), or a story that talked about 
someone who “eats carrots whenever she can” (verb phrase; VP). In the critical part, the children 
answered a set of questions that tested the stability of the properties: e.g., “Will Rose eat a lot of 
carrots when she is grown up”, or “Would Rose eat a lot of carrots if she grew up in a family 
where no one liked carrots?” Children in the NP condition predicted significantly more often that 
the property in question would be more stable over time and in adverse environmental conditions 
than children in the VP condition. Thus, the grammatical form of a noun seems to suggest to a 
child that a category is to be thought of as a kind (Gelman & Heyman, 1999).17 
 However, while nouns are sometimes sufficient to promote the development of  
essentialist category structures for natural kinds (Rhodes et al., 2014), children often seem to 
need stronger cues to associate essentialist structures with social kind concepts (Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017). In particular, research suggests that generics effectively compound the 
effect of nouns. This contrast between the evidence needed to form essentialist beliefs about 
natural and social kinds makes sense, according to Rhodes and Mandalaywala: 
Children’s responses to novel social categories are sensible given the varied structure of the social world—
some social categories marked by labels are important only in very specific contexts (e.g., skin color is an 
important marker of social group membership—race—in the United States, but is not an informative 
group marker in all other countries). Thus, it is reasonable to require additional input—beyond a shared 
noun label—to assume that a particular category reflects fundamental, objective, and stable distinctions 
between people. (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017, p. 5–6) 
 
Rhodes and Mandalaywala further contend that the reason generics support the formation of 
essentialist beliefs is that they communicate regularities about kinds, so children infer that the 
 
16 This evidence will be of particular importance again in chapter 3 and 4, when we discuss the role of nouns for 
conveying essentialist information about social groups. 
17 See also Carnaghi et al. (2008) for related findings in adults. 
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corresponding categories are “coherent and causally powerful enough to support such 
generalizations” (p. 6). 
 One of the studies suggesting that generics provide powerful input for eliciting 
essentialist beliefs about social groups18 was conducted by Rhodes et al. (2012), who found that 
generic language increases children’s essentialist beliefs about social groups, while they do not 
form the same beliefs in the absence of generic language. In the study, four-year olds were 
presented with a novel category of people (“Zarpies”) (which was diverse in many salient 
dimensions, such as gender, age, and race, to control for potential essentialist beliefs that had 
already been acquired). The children heard a story about Zarpies and were presented with 16 
individual Zarpie pictures, each of which displayed a unique property, in an illustrated book. 
Children would hear the property either described with a generic (“Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies 
climb fences.”), non-generic (“Look at this Zarpie! This Zarpie climb fences.”), or non-labeling 
(“Look at this one! This one climb fences.”) sentence. When described non-generically, children 
rejected essentialist beliefs about Zarpies—they didn’t take their behavior to be causally 
determined by being a Zarpie, they didn’t take the associated properties to be fixed at birth, and 
didn’t induce that all Zarpies share the same properties. In contrast, when Zarpies were described 
generically, children (and adults) would essentialize Zarpies substantially more often. The effects 
would furthermore persist several days after hearing the generic descriptions.  
 As before, the fact that children seem to need more evidence to form essentialist beliefs 
about social categories than they need for natural categories supports the domain-general 
account of the development of social essentialism. Note, however, that it is quite unlikely that 
children rely only on the cues reviewed here—nouns and generics—to make out which social 
 
18 To clarify: generics also elicit essentialist beliefs about natural kinds. 
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categories to essentialize. Thus, the question of which perceptual input children use to develop 
essentialist knowledge structures about the social world seems to a large extent still unanswered. 
 
3.2.3 Social essentialism, stereotypes, and prejudice 
For many years now, researchers have documented that social essentialism stands in an 
important relationship to stereotyping attitudes and prejudice. Many claim that this line of 
research has originated in Gordon Allport’s work, who hypothesized that essentialism about 
social groups occurs predominantly in humans harboring prejudice. As he put it, “[t]he ‘soul of 
the ‘Oriental,’ ‘Negro blood,’ Hitler’s ‘Aryanism,’ ‘the peculiar genius of America,’ ‘the logical 
Frenchman,’ ‘the passionate Latin’—all represent a belief in essence. A mysterious mana (for 
good or ill) resides in a group, all of its members partaking thereof” (Allport, 1954, p. 174). 
Research in cognitive psychology seems to confirm Allport’s hypothesis in many respects. An 
impressive amount of studies supports the view that social essentialism is correlated with 
prejudice and (especially negative) stereotyping, which will be of special importance in chapters 
3 and 4 of this dissertation (Bastian & Haslam, 2006, 2007; Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004; Haslam 
& Ernst, 2002; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Hodson & Skorska, 2015; Howell et al., 2011; Jayaratne et 
al., 2006; S.-J. Leslie, 2017; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998; 
Mandalaywala, Amodio, & Rhodes, 2018; Mandalaywala & Rhodes, 2014; Meyer & Gelman, 
2016; Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010; Pauker, Xu, et al., 2016; Pillow, Allen, Low, & Vilma, 
2019; Pillow, Pearson, & Allen, 2015; Prentice & Miller, 2006, 2007; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 
2017; M. G. Taylor et al., 2009; Weiss, 2018; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; Yzerbyt, Corneille, & 
Estrada, 2001; Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013).  
  32 
Rhodes and Mandalaywala suggest that the association between essentialism and the 
endorsement or representation of stereotypes is directly predicted by cognitive essentialism. 
According to them, “essentialism entails expectations of within-category homogeneity, thus 
stronger essentialist beliefs seem likely to lead to greater willingness to assume that category 
members will all share the same traits” (2017, p. 12). Precisely this seems to be the case for many 
social category domains—including gender, mental illness, age, race, sexual orientation, and 
ethnicity. For groups that belong to these domains, the greater the essentialist representation 
you have of a social category, the more likely it is that you endorse, implicitly or explicitly, 
stereotypes of it.19 However, as with essentialism, studies suggest that the emergence of racial 
stereotypes associated with essentialism is context-dependent. Pauker et al. (2016) studied the 
degree of race salience and essentialism, as well as ingroup and outgroup stereotyping in children 
between 4 and 11 from two different contexts: Hawaii and Massachusetts. While ingroup 
stereotyping increased with age in both groups, outgroup stereotyping only increased in the 
Massachussets group. Correspondingly, children from Massachussets reported more essentialist 
thinking.  
A similar association has been found between essentialism and prejudice20 towards social 
groups. Williams and Eberhardt (2008) found that adults with essentialist conceptions of race 
showed greater prejudice towards outgroup members from minority groups and had less diverse 
social networks. Similarly, participants who were primed with (fake) essentialist science articles 
on racial differences were less interested in becoming friends with racial outgroup members. 
 
19 As has often been pointed out, the connection between essentialism and negative prejudice and stereotyping has 
important yet intricate exceptions. Particularly, essentialist attitudes about categories associated with sexual 
orientation (e.g., the category of male homosexuals) have been found to correlate with positive stereotype 
endorsement (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Haslam et al., 2000). However, entitativity about sexual orientation categories—
a sub-type of essentialism according that tracks the components of inductive potential, homogeneity, and 
discreteness—is indeed correlated with negative stereotypes towards the relevant categories. 
20 Prejudice is usually defined, roughly, as the negative affective component associated with a social group, such as 
feelings of dislike and disgust. 
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Interestingly, the relationship between essentialism and prejudice seems to already exist in 
childhood. Mandalaywala and Rhodes (2014) found that essentialism leads to increased implicit 
and explicit prejudice towards members of a minority racial group in white 5 and 6-year old US-
children. Mandalaywala, Amodio, and Rhodes hypothesize that the reason essentialism promotes 
social prejudice is because it increases the endorsement of social hierarchies; essentialist lay 
theories suggest that social hierarchies reflect a “natural social structure” and people 
consequently devalue social groups with lower status (Mandalaywala et al., 2018).21 Support for 
their hypothesis comes from an interesting set of findings by the same authors. First, racial 
essentialism is associated with increased prejudice towards black people in both white and black 
adult participants, which suggests that prejudice is not only a function of your own group 
membership, but of pre-existing social hierarchies. Second, increasing essentialism in participants 
resulted in stronger endorsement of social hierarchies in both white and black participants. The 
endorsement, in turn, mediated the effect of essentialism on prejudice against black people.  
 
3.2.4 Social Essentialism Across Cultures 
One might think that the evidence with respect to essentialism listed here—both in the domain 
of natural kinds, but especially in the domain of social kinds—is simply a by-product of the way 
we—people in the US or the Western world more generally—decided to carve up the social 
world around us, and that other cultures might not display these biases towards social groups. 
But contra this suspicion, there is strong evidence that essentialism about social groups is a cross-
cultural phenomenon. To date, essentialist beliefs about some social groups have been observed 
 
21 See also Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron (1997), who defend a similar hypothesis. For an alternative view, see 
Zagefka and colleagues (2013), who report evidence that essentialist attitudes are associated with (a) a higher threat 
perceived by immigrants and an increased demand of adapting to mainstream culture, and (b) the belief that adapting 
to mainstream culture by immigrants isn’t possible due to essential differences. The fact that minority members have 
no chance of fulfilling the expectations of the national ingroup results, according to the authors, in prejudice.  
  34 
in each culture studied. These include (but are not limited to) Turkey, Brazil, the Yukatek Maya 
culture, China, South Africa, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, India, Ireland, Madagascar, Israel, 
Guatemala (Davoodi, Soley, Harris, & Blake, 2020; Gelman, 2003; Gil-White, 2001; Haslam, 
Holland, & Karasawa, 2014; Mahalingam, 2003; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Although 
(unsurprisingly) not every extant human culture has yet been studied, the trend supports the 
hypothesis that essentialism towards social groups, in some form or other, is a cross-cultural 
phenomenon (see also Gelman, 2003; Haslam et al., 2014 for further discussion). 
 For example, Torguud pastoralists in Western Mongolia displayed essentialist thinking 
in a switched-at-birth paradigm (Gil-White, 2001). When asked to predict the ethnicity of a 
hypothetical child adopted by a different ethnic group, adults tended to report that ethnic identity 
is determined by descent rather than behavior and outward appearances. Similarly, when 
participants were asked in conversations whether descendants of Uryankhai, who are commonly 
thought of as having magical powers, would have the same powers when raised in a different 
culture, they answered: “The child doesn’t know that his real parents are Uryankhai … he would 
be able to, but he wouldn’t know it” (Gil-White, 2001, p. 528).  Thus, inner, innate potential rather 
than environmental information seems to serve as the basis for category inductions. 
However, while essentialism about social categories seems to be present in many, if not 
all, cultures, theorists generally agree that the object of social-essentialist biases still varies 
considerably among different cultures. Obviously, the social groups that exist or are salient 
differs considerably within different cultures and communities, so which groups will be 
conceptualized essentialistically will differ accordingly. Children from Northern Ireland, for 
example, have more essentialist beliefs about the Catholic and Protestant religion than children 
from Boston (Smyth, Feeney, Eidson, & Coley, 2017), and we have seen in the last section that 
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children in the US have more essentialist beliefs about race than children from Israel, while the 
latter have more essentialist beliefs about religious-ethnic groups (Diesendruck et al., 2013).  
Note again that even if the content of essentialist representations seems to depend on 
cultural input, this doesn’t mean that essentialist belief structures per se are culturally 
communicated. As Rhodes and Mandalaywala point out, the fact that essentialist biases emerge 
early and without direct instruction suggests that children have “general conceptual biases to 
expect that some social groupings reflect essentialist kinds” (2017, p. 9).22 In this vein, 
Diesendruck contends that “culture provides the content of the beliefs, and the mind provides the 
form in which the beliefs are represented” (Diesendruck, 2001).  
 
3.3 Domains: Taking Stock  
In this section, we examined the forms cognitive essentialism can take beyond natural kind 
essentialism. Particularly, we have explored the question of whether, to which extent, and in 
which ways we essentialize artifact and social categories. We have seen that the evidence that we 
essentialize artifacts is mixed: while we exhibit some essentialist markers of essentialism, others, 
like category stability and immutability, are only mildly or not at all realized. In contrast, 
essentialism about social kinds seems to be fairly pronounced and, in some cases, emerge in early 
childhood. Does this mean we should conclude that essentialist representations are domain-
specific (i.e., they apply to natural and social, but not to artifact and other categories) and adopt 
the modular hypothesis by Gil-White and Atran?  
 
22 Note that this view, as well as the fact that essentialism about social groups occurs cross-culturally, is consistent 
with both the view that we have a ‘module’ that disposes us to conceptualize social groups essentialistically, and the 
view that essentialism springs out of other innate yet domain-general conceptual biases. 
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Not necessarily. When discussing the cultural variation of social-essentialist biases, we 
noted that while the tendency to essentialize social groups is present across cultures, the content 
of the biases will vary as a function of cultural input. Similarly, the present evidence, including 
the difference in intensity between artifact, social, and natural kind essentialism, is consistent 
with a view according to which essentialism is, in principle, domain-general; however, its content 
will crucially depend on environmental input.23 Evidence for this view comes from the fact that 
we find some essentialize-like processes across all conceptual domains, including artifact 
categories. And as in the example of cultural variation, this might be a result of the differing 
input we get about the different domains. For example, as we saw before, a child might use their 
basic conceptual capacities to form an essentialist theory about tigers: in the absence of external 
explanations for tigers’ commonalities, she might posit an internal causal essence, and form the 
‘over-hypothesis’ that tigers generally share observable and unobservable properties. As a 
consequence, “[t]he process of making sense of the biological world in this manner can lead 
children to construct a more general framework theory of the domain” (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 
p. 4). In the case of artifacts, however, there is an external explanation of the shared property 
clusters of a category, so an internal essence does not need to be posited. Similarly, the extremely 
varied structure of the artifact world and the lack of input indicating that artifacts mark stable, 
objective, and fundamental kinds explains why the child doesn’t construct a full-fledged 
essentialist theory or meta-theory24 about artifact categories. However, since children can still 
 
23 Along these lines, Gelman remarks that that “it is deeply telling that essentializing-like processes are found across 
domains” (Gelman, 2003, p. 139), and defends the view that essentialism is a domain-general, rather than domain-
specific, mechanism, manifesting itself in a general conceptual bias. 
24 I.e., a meta-theory to the extent that members of the category type ‘artifacts’ are generally structured 
essentialistically, something that is arguably the case for the biological domain (Dewar & Xu, 2010). 
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apply a causal-explanatory framework to the workings of artifact categories, artifact categories 
might still exhibit some of the markers of cognitive essentialism.25 
 
4. Essentialism about Kinds vs. Individuals 
The transformation task teaches us that we can think of a raccoon as surgically altered to look 
like a goat, doing what a goat does, yet still judge it to be a raccoon. This demonstrates that the 
hypothesized essences are modally powerful: essentialist representations are a useful way of 
tracking kind members throughout many possible transformations. Interestingly, thinking of 
individuals seems to follow exactly this, essentialist, pattern. Consider Freddie Mercury. Over 
the course of his life, Mercury changed many of his properties: size, weight, his name, haircut, 
personality, clothes, number of cells in his body, and so on. Nevertheless, over all these changes 
and transformations, it at least seems like there was one individual that stayed numerically 
identical, that we were able to track over time and all his changes: Freddie Mercury.26 We do not 
only think that Freddie Mercury stayed a member of the kind human; we think Freddie Mercury 
stayed Freddie Mercury: the same individual. And just like we explain the stability of kind 
membership over transformations by appealing to an essence, we might wonder, now, whether 
some kind of individual essentialism explains our ability to track individual objects qua individual 
objects over time. In this section, we will explore the following questions: Which factors lead us 
to judge an individual identity to stay the same—or keep its ‘essence’—despite outward changes? 
What is the relationship between (individual) object tracking and cognitive essentialism? Do 
 
25 The same point holds (to a weaker extent) for social categories, and has been made by Rhodes and Mandalaywala 
(see sec. §3.2.2). 
26 Of course, this phenomenon is a common topic of interest in the debate on personal identity over time. 
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essentialist judgements for individuals differ depending on which category the individuals belong 
to?  
 In what follows, we will begin by reviewing some of the extant experimental evidence 
about our representation of individuals. Gelman (2003) pointed out that evidence on the topic is 
relatively sparse. Indeed, it seems like not much has changed since Gelman’s remark. Research 
and theory formation on individual essentialism still seem to be in their early stages, and, 
especially in contrast to research on natural and social kind categorization, there doesn’t seem to 
be a consensus on the relevant behavioral patterns to be explained, paradigms, or established 
theoretical background. The aim of this section is to give the reader a sense of the current state 
of the research, including the available empirical evidence and the major rival hypotheses about 
individual object cognition. I will start by presenting some of the relevant general evidence about 
individual essentialism. Next, I will introduce the dominant views of how we conceptualize 
individuals, and will close the section by discussing the relationship between individual and kind 
essentialism. 
 
4.1  Empirical evidence  
One of the earliest studies investigating our representation of individuals was conducted by Hall 
(1998). He confronted children and adults with a ship of Theseus scenario, in which he presented 
them with a series of photos depicting a novel object that loses each of its parts one at a time. At 
each step, the parts are replaced with a new part, and subsequently, a person reassembles the old 
parts into a similar whole. The task of the participants was to decide whether the new-parts 
object or the old-parts object was identical to the original. Participants chose the object with the 
new parts as being identical to the original. However, this effect was substantially stronger when: 
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(a) the object in question was an animal rather than an artifact, (b) human intervention didn’t 
cause the loss of parts rather than when it did, and (c) the participants were 7-year-olds or adults, 
rather than 5-year-olds. When the object was an artifact, the participants were 5-year-olds, or 
human intervention caused the detachment, participants judged the reassembled object to be 
identical to the original object, or they split their votes between the two candidates. Thus, while 
total decomposition and reassembly is fatal for kinds, it is not so for artifacts. On the other hand, 
total replacement of matter is not fatal for natural categories. Hall interprets these findings as 
suggesting that  
[…] knowledge about specific kinds of objects and their canonical transformations exerts an increasingly 
powerful effect, over the course of development, upon people’s tendency to rely on continuity as a criterion 
for attributing persistence to objects that undergo change. (p. 28) 
 
A radical transformation paradigm of a different sort has been implemented in an 
experiment by Rips, Blok, and Newman (2006). They told their participants of an imaginative 
apparatus that was capable of copying all of an object’s particles, transfer them to another 
location, to then re-assemble them maintaining the original structure. The old particles of the 
object were destroyed in the copy process. The participants then decided whether or not the 
object made of the copied particles is the same one as the original (e.g., for lion Fred, they decided: 
is the copy still Fred?). In 90% of the cases, participants judged that the copied object is still the 
same as the one they started out with. When the copied particles were taken from a different 
object (e.g., a different lion or tiger) the positive responses decreased to less than 50%. Again, 
this suggests that an object can survive the complete destruction of its matter or substance while 
maintaining identity. Similarly, Nichols and Bruno (2010) found that a person can, in view of their 
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study’s participants, survive complete destruction of their matter if the person’s memories persist 
in other bodies, including a robot body.27 
Rather unsurprisingly, preschoolers also evaluate the spatiotemporal history, rather than 
the appearance, of an individual object as important for its identity. For example, they know that 
the history of an object (e.g., the experiences of a doll) will give rise to knowledge about events 
that are not shared with a second doll, even when it’s qualitatively identical (Gutheil, Gelman, 
Klein, Michos, & Kelaita, 2008). In fact, infants already use spatiotemporal information for object 
individuation at 10 months and younger (Xu, 1999; Xu & Carey, 1996), before they use kind or 
property information for object-individuation and -tracking. The importance of the historical 
path for object individuation has also been observed by Sternberg, Chawarski, and Allbitron 
(1998), who found that humans associate unobservable historical essences with individuals. For 
example, participants judged that a man who acts and looks like John F. Kennedy, but served as 
prime minister of Britain, is not John F. Kennedy. More generally, when considering items with 
anomalous historical paths, participants never judge that the lookalikes can be the actual person, 
suggesting that, as in the case of natural kinds, unobservable elements are crucial for the 
individuation of individuals. Gelman (2003) interprets results of this kind as speaking in favor of 
a version of psychological essentialism that holds for individual objects, since “historical paths 
are nonobvious properties that take precedence over outward features, and historical paths have 
causal implications […] By privileging historical paths, people say in effect that an underlying, 
hidden reality determines identity” (p. 151).28  
 
 
27 See also Rips (2011) and Rips et al. (2015) for discussions of these findings. 
28 Gelman also believes that a quite general form of essentialism holds for individuals and relies on anecdotal 
examples to illustrate the phenomenon—for example, our use of formulations such as  “journeying the core of your 
very being”, or eulogies that capture the “essence of the individual”, which illustrates the belief in some unobservable 
‘nature’ of an individual that makes the individual what it is (Gelman, 2003, p. 151). 
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4.2 Sortal and causal theories  
Now that we have taken a look at the (sparse) relevant empirical evidence, we can ask: what are 
the best theories that explain our intuitions, and, in effect, give us an explanation of what provides 
the ‘glue’ that holds different forms and stages of an individual object, for us humans, together? 
The theories of individual object persistence that have been on offer so far can be divided into 
two categories: sortal theories (Xu, 2007b), and continuity theories, which can be further divided 
into spatiotemporal (Bloom, 2000), and causal theories (Rips, 2011; Rips et al., 2006). In what 
follows, I’ll offer a brief presentation of each. 
According to the sortal view, judgements of individual persistence crucially depend on 
kind (or sortal) representations (see Hall, 1998; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009; Rhemtulla & Xu, 2007; 
Xu, 2007b, 2007a; Xu & Carey, 1996; Xu, Cote, & Baker, 2005). While spatiotemporal or causal 
information might be recruited to make judgements about individual identity, the judgements 
also critically depend on the availability of a basic-level kind concept for the individual. For 
example, in order for objects seen at different times to be identical to each other, they must both 
fall under the same basic kind concept (e.g., CAT). The kind concept furthermore provides the 
relevant conditions of when an individual stays numerically identical over changes. Evidence for 
the sortal views comes from studies such as Hall (1998) (reviewed above), in which identity 
judgements differed depending on whether the items were natural kind members or artifacts. 
 According to the spatiotemporal theory, what explains identity intuitions is that an object 
observed earlier forms a connection through space and time to an object observed later. The 
causal continuity view claims, more generally, that it is the uninterrupted persistence of causal 
principles which is responsible for our judgements of object persistence. For example, if there is 
evidence that an object is a causal outgrowth of an object at an earlier time, they are judged to 
be the same object. Lack of similarity or spatiotemporal information can, according to this view, 
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provide important evidence about causal continuity (Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2006; Rips et al., 
2006). Evidence for this and against the sortal view comes, for example, from the previously 
mentioned study by Rips et al. (2006). Causal continuity accounts predict that judgements about 
persistence depend on whether the object(s) before and after the operation by the science-fiction 
machine are seen as causally connected. Since causal processes more easily produce closely rather 
than distantly related objects, the view predicts that as the transformation increases in severity, 
people should be less likely to judge the pre- and post-transformation object to be the same. The 
sortal view, in contrast, predicts that persistence judgements depend on membership in the same 
basic-level category pre- and post- transformation. Against the sortal view, the authors found 
that participants are willing to judge individuals as persisting through transformations despite 
change in basic-category membership.29 In favor of the causal continuity view, the authors 
observed that ratings decline as a function of the radicality of the transformation. In the condition 
in which the post-machine object was identical to the original one, the ratings were highest (cat 
to identical looking cat), substantially lower in the cross-basic condition (e.g., cat to dog), and 
lowest in the cross-domain condition (e.g., cat to chair). 
 However, the causal continuity account doesn’t come without problems either. First, we 
have seen earlier that Hall (1998) found that judgements about object persistence in a Ship of 
Theseus scenario systematically varied depending on kind membership: Adults and 7-year-olds 
judged the object with the new parts to be the same as the original when they were kind members 
and not artifacts; when they were artifacts, they judged the object with the old parts to be 
identical to the original one. Rips and Hespos (2015) try to account for these data by appealing 
to the fact that humans know that natural kinds naturally have causal forces that make them 
change over time while artifacts don’t, and they know that one of the causal forces shaping artifact 
 
29 See Rhemtulla and Xu (2007) for a critical (sortalist) response to their study. 
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individuation is human causation. Even if one of the driving factors behind the judgements is 
causal continuity, knowledge of the causal properties of each element still seems to depend on 
sortal knowledge, even according to Rips and Hespos’ construal. And that these judgements 
partially depend on sortal concepts is all the sortal account claims. 
Second, Rhemtulla and Hall (2009) collected data that seem to be prima facie inconsistent 
with the predictions made by the causal continuity account. They conducted a study series which 
made an important addition to Rips et al.’s (2006) study: in addition to an identical-looking, cross-
basic, and cross-domain condition, they introduced different within-basic (but non-identical) 
conditions. A pictorial illustration of such a condition can be found in figure 2. Throughout their 
series of three experiments, they found repeatedly that “[…] participants rated objects that were 
altered in a way that maintained basic-level kind to be less likely to retain their proper name than 
those that were altered in a way that changed basic-level kind” (my emphasis, p. 292). This is 
quite surprising and counter-intuitive: we have just seen that if the causal continuity account is 
correct, persistence ratings should decrease monotonically as a function of severity of 
transformation. But a within-basic transformation is less severe than a cross-basic transformation. 
  44 
The authors interpret their observations in the following way. First, summarizing the 
literature on similarity-processing, they 
note that  
A counterintuitive finding in that literature is 
that people find it easier to detect certain 
differences between two objects when the 
objects under comparison are similar than 
when they are dissimilar; for example, people 
list more differences between two similar 
objects such as a sneaker and a sandal than 
between two dissimilar objects such as a 
sneaker and a paper clip […]. To interpret this 
effect, researchers in this area have proposed 
that the act of comparing two objects involves 
an attempt to align structured representations; 
when this effort succeeds, the comparison 
results in the highlighting of both similarities 
and differences between the objects. In a 
comparison such as sneaker–sandal, the two 
objects are similar, both conceptually […] and 
perceptually […]. As a result, people find it 
easy to align representations of the objects in 
terms of a common structure (e.g., the shared 
basic-level kind and/or shape). The comparison 
thus serves to highlight many so-called 
alignable differences […]. In a comparison like 
sneaker–paper clip, however, the two objects 
are dissimilar because they share neither basic-
level kind membership nor shape. People thus 
find it harder to align representations of the 
objects in terms of a common structure, so they 
find fewer alignable differences. (p. 298–299)30  
 
The authors apply the observations from 
this literature to their findings: because within-basic items are easier to align, differences are 
easier to detect than cross-basic items, accounting for the counterintuitive results. 
Second, they situate their findings into the framework of sortal theories. According to 
them, we often judge things to stay identical despite changes within or across basic-category 
 
30 See especially Gentner and Markman (1994). 
Figure 2. Sample trial of Rhemtulla and Hall’s (2009) 
first experiment. The transformation maintains basic-
level kind membership (in this case, dog-dog). 
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membership—e.g., when a dog grows in the course of his lifetime, or when a caterpillar turns to 
a butterfly. The authors propose that these cases fit best together with the sortal theory:  
[…] people understand the cause of the transformation to be inherent in the object undergoing the 
change, arising from the kind to which it belongs, perhaps from its essence. […] Our proposal leads to 
the prediction that people should have clear intuitions that living things persist through certain 
spontaneous changes (e.g., growth, ripening, metamorphosis), because they undergo such changes by 
virtue of being the kinds of things they are. (Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009, p. 300) 
Although they advocate a sortal theory of individuals, then, their account is importantly different 
from the standard sortal accounts. Namely, if a transformation is not seen as following from being 
the kind of thing it is, people will be less likely to judge it to remain identical throughout change. 
These are exactly the cases in which we default to using similarity processing resources, which 
is what happened in their within-basic condition.  
Before we close, I’d like to present another, more recent experiment by Leonard and Rips 
(2015) that poses some empirical challenges to the sortal account and attempts to directly 
respond to Rhemtulla and Hall (2009). In their study series, they confronted participants with a 
scenario in which an individual item—e.g., a cup Sippy—has been shattered to pieces (see table 
3).They then ask participants whether Sippy is still a cup after it shatters, and whether Sippy still 
exists after it shatters. Contrary to what is predicted by the sortal account, most participants 
answered that Sippy is not a cup anymore, but still exists. Since shattered pieces do not count as 
objects in the psychological sense, but only substances or ‘stuff’ (Rips & Hespos, 2015), subjects 
judge Sippy to persist even though neither the sortal CUP nor OBJECT applies to it. The same was 
true for natural kind objects (e.g., an individual carrot that goes through a juicer). In another part 
of the series, the researchers applied a Ship of Theseus paradigm. In the vignette, an object (e.g., 
table Timmy) gets disassembled and is moved to a new location, and then gets reassembled to 
look exactly like the object at the original location. Contrary to the sortalist prediction that the 
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disassembled table is not the same individual, participants judge that the disassembled table is 
still Timmy while explicitly denying that the disassembled parts are an object or a table.  
The conclusion of Leonard and Rips’ findings seems to be that sortals are not crucial 
cognitive components for individual concepts. However, one of their experiments from the same 
series seems to be in tension with this conclusion. In it, they tested whether participants would 
judge that cup Sippy still exists after the shattered parts are getting vaporized. The purpose of 
this experiment was to rule out that 
participants simply choose the ‘still exists’ 
answer because of task demands or framing 
issues. Participants usually answered that 
Sippy does not exist anymore after being 
vaporized. While this does seem to rule out 
the stated worry, it is far from clear how a 
causal continuity account (favored by 
Leonard and Rips) would account for this result. In fact, it seems like the result is evidence against 
a causal continuity account: after all, a relationship of causal continuity holds between cup and 
vapor as much as between cup and shattered pieces. In addition, the results that speak against 
the sortal account still leave open how (if at all) the causal continuity view can account for the 
findings by Rhemtulla and Hall (2009)—Leonard and Rips say nothing to dissolve the issues 
arising from the fact that participants judge within-basic transformation to disrupt identity. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Sample scenario and questions in the artifact 
condition of Leonard and Rips’ (2015) first experiment. 
From Leonard and Rips (2015, p. 93).  
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4.3 Summary and outlook 
What the present section shows is that far more research needs be done to systematically assess 
our judgements about persistence in a variety of contexts and adjudicate between the different 
hypotheses about cognitive object individuation. The debate between sortalists and causal 
continuity theorists of object individuation judgements, for example, is far from settled: we have 
seen that the experiments speaking in favor or against either view seem far from conclusive. 
However, the present section has also demonstrated that judgements about individual identity 
are sometimes closely alike our judgements about kind essences, supporting the view that we 
think of individuals along the lines of an ‘individual essentialism’. In this vein, the two competing 
hypotheses about object individuation judgements can be understood within an essentialist 
framework. According to the causal continuity framework, this continuity is precisely the 
unobservable ‘essence’ that accounts for identity over outward change; according to the sortal 
view, the kind an individual belongs to crucially determines the essence of the individual. 
 This leads us to an important question that we haven’t yet addressed: what is the 
relationship between individual and group essentialism? Although assumptions about this 
relationship occasionally transpire in the literature, no or little work has been done so far that 
systematically investigates this relationship.31 One of the ways this question can be fleshed out 
is what the relationship individual and kind essences is that we associate with individuals and 
group members. Rips (2001, 2011) narrows the answer to this question down into three 
possibilities, leaving open which one the theoretically and empirically most plausible one is: (a) 
that a unique essence is causally responsible for, e.g., each individual lion’s membership in the 
 
31 In this vein, Newman and Knobe (2019) ask whether the essence that is responsible for the identity of someone 
qua individual is the same essence that is responsible for the identity of someone qua category membership, and 
point out that this question has barely been discussed in the literature on essentialism.  
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lion category, for its lionlike properties, and for its identity as the same lion or the same object 
in different possible situations; a distinct essence is responsible for each individual tiger’s tigerlike 
properties, for its membership in the tiger category; and so on (i.e., group and individual essence 
are identical), (b) that one lion essence is responsible for each individual lion’s membership in the 
lion category and for its lionlike properties, a distinct essence is responsible for each individual 
lion’s status qua individual, etc., or (c) that one unique essence is causally responsible for one 
individual lion’s membership in the lion category, for its lionlike properties, and for its identity 
as the same lion or the same object in different possible situations; that another unique essence is 
causally responsible for another’s individual lion’s membership in the lion category, for its 
lionlike properties, and for its identity as the same lion or the same object in different possible 
situations; etc. While each of the three opportunities seems to run against some difficulties, more 
research needs be done to address this question systematically. Needless to say, an answer to this 
question will have important bearing on how group and individual essentialism are cognitively 
implemented. 
 Another way this question can be fleshed out is how the cognitive mechanisms behind group 
and individual essentialism relate to each other. Are both forms of essentialism at least 
structurally identical, or do they arise from different conceptual biases and mechanisms? Again, 
although this question has not yet been studied extensively, Gelman (2003) offers a speculative 
assessment. According to her, individual and kind essentialism are, roughly, conceptual biases of 
the same kind.  
Does individual essentialism constitute merely a minor wrinkle on kind essentialism—the same 
phenomenon though varying in scope—or instead is it a substantively different sort of thing? I suspect 
that essentializing of individual people recruits much the same cognitive mechanisms as essentializing of 
natural kinds. The attribution of an immutable hidden energy or invisible force is remarkably similar 
across these examples. However, kind essentialism takes one crucial step beyond individual essentialism. 
With kind essentialism the person assumes that the world is carved up into preexisting natural categories. 
Individual essentialism seems not to require any such commitment to kind realism. The naive realism of 
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essentialism would be lost if we were to lump together individual and kind essentialism. (Gelman, 2003, 
p. 152) 
In addition, she takes individual essentialism to be a cognitive precursor of kind essentialism: 
Indeed, kind essentialism seems in some ways an extension of the insights about individual identity […]. 
Just as an individual remains the same over outward variations, so too are members of a kind the same as 
one another despite outward variations. Just as the identity of an individual is decided by consulting the 
historical record, so too is the identity of a living kind decided by consulting its origins (namely, 
parentage). […] (Gelman, 2003, p. 319) 
It is not clear whether the assessment of the contrast between the realism associated with kind 
and individual essentialism we find it Gelman’s first quote is correct. After all, individual 
essentialism also commits us to a quite distinctive way of carving up the world into preexisting 
natural units, namely into individuals that stay individuals and loci of important generalizations 
despite a number of qualitative instabilities over time. Arguably, then, if Gelman’s assessment is 
otherwise roughly correct, there might be no real structural difference between kind and 
individual essentialism. More research comparing the mechanisms in play in individual and kind 
essentialism needs be done to let us determine whether it is roughly correct, however.  
 
5. Objections 
An important question we haven’t addressed yet is whether there are any empirical or 
foundational problems with psychological essentialism. The present section gives an overview of 
some of the main issues that have arisen for essentialist theories of concepts. I will first present 
some troubling experimental data for essentialist theories of concepts. After that, I will turn to 
Michael Strevens’ philosophical criticism of psychological essentialism as a theory of concepts. 
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5.1 Experimental counterevidence: Natural kind concepts, H2O, and dual character concepts 
In 1975, Putnam introduced to the philosophical literature on meaning and reference the now 
famous Twin Earth thought experiment, in which he invites us to imagine a liquid that is called 
“water” by Twin Earth’s inhabitants, has all properties associated with water, yet consists not of 
H2O, but a substance we abbreviate as XYZ (Putnam, 1975). According to Putnam, this substance 
is intuitively not water. This intuition has been extremely important for philosophical theories 
of meaning and reference, but it has also been an important data point for empirically informed 
theories of concepts. In particular, this supposedly shared judgement has been seen as evidence 
that people regard deeper causal properties—in other words, an essence—as the central criteria for 
natural kind membership. In the case of water, the central criterion is taken to be H2O. In her 
famous paper “Water is not H2O”, Barbara Malt (1994) reported that experimental subjects 
respond in ways that seem to be in tension with the Putnam intuition and, correspondingly, with 
intuitions predicted by advocates of psychological essentialism. 
In her experiment, Malt asked subjects to judge how much H2O they think is in liquids 
called “water” and liquids that are not called “water”. Psychological essentialism predicts that the 
presence or absence of H2O should correspond to whether something is or isn’t water. Contrary 
to this prediction, Malt found that neither the simple presence or absence, nor the proportion of 
estimated amount of H2O accounted well for whether something was judged to be water. For 
example, tea was judged to consist of H2O to 91% but isn’t taken to be water, while pool water 
was judged to be water, yet was judged to only to contain 81% of H2O. Note, however, that this 
evidence is only problematic for a version of essentialism according to which the presence of the 
essence is not only necessary, but also sufficient for category membership. An alternative version 
which we will explore in the next chapter, according to which the presence of the essence is only 
necessary, would be compatible with Malt’s results.   
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Malt isn’t the only one who reported experimental evidence seemingly inconsistent with 
essentialist hypotheses. In a recent study, Tobia, Newman, and Knobe (2020) report that, contra 
Putnam, people do not have the intuition that Twin’s Earths “water” isn’t water, suggesting that 
people do not even deem the presence of H2O necessary. Instead, they find that people exhibit a 
‘dual character’ pattern about natural kinds—i.e., they agree with the claim that the twin liquid 
is water, but also with the claim that it is not. More precisely, they assent to these two distinct 
claims when confronted with the Twin Earth scenario in experiments: 
1. There is a sense in which the liquid is water. 
2. Ultimately, if you think about what it really means to be water, you would have to say 
there is a sense in which the liquid is not truly water at all.  
While Tobia et al. take the core finding of their study to be that “people’s intuitions about 
natural kind concepts show a dual character pattern” (p. 21), they also interpret their results as 
lending support to the hypothesis that natural kind concepts are dual character concepts  (Del 
Pinal & Reuter, 2017; Knobe, Prasada, & Newman, 2013; Reuter, 2019): they are associated with 
two different, separate sets of criteria that determine category membership, which result in two 
different, independent categorization processes. Paradigmatic dual character concepts are 
scientist, artist, mother, friend, and rock music. In each case, we can imagine that someone satisfies 
all concrete conditions associated with a category (analyzing data, doing experiments, etc.) but 
fails to satisfy an abstract value associated with it (being invested in the quest for truth), and thus 
is, in a sense, a category member, but also fails to be one in another sense (e.g., fails to be a ‘true 
scientist’).  
A major question about the results is their relation to other otherwise robust findings in 
cognitive psychology. We have seen that decades of research on psychological essentialism 
supports the generalization that we do not classify something as belonging to a kind if we have 
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evidence that it does not possess the associated ‘essence’. Against this background, it is unclear 
what to make of Tobia et al.’s results. Relatedly, an even more pressing question is how Tobia et 
al.’s results relate to some of the authors’ own earlier work on dual character concepts (Knobe et 
al., 2013). Remarkably, the result of the (2013) study was that natural kind categories do not 
exhibit a dual character pattern. Let us take a brief look at the 2013 study to see how it compares 
with Tobia et al.’s results. 
Using the classic vignettes from Keil (1989) (see §2.3), Knobe and colleagues (2013) 
presented participants with descriptions of objects that displayed the superficial characteristics 
of a given category, but lacked the underlying causal factors of that category—e.g., an animal 
that looked and acted like a racoon but had skunk insides, skunk parents and skunk children. 
Next, participants were asked whether they agreed with these statements: 
(i) There is a sense in which the animals are racoons. 
(ii) Ultimately when you think about what it really means to be a raccoon, you would 
have to say that these animals are not truly raccoons.  
It is easy to see that this condition is almost identical to the experiment discussed above—instead 
of the natural category water and H2O, they just used the natural category raccoon and, e.g., 
raccoon insides. They compared the judgements associated with (i) and (ii) with the judgements 
about dual character concepts (e.g., scientist) and controls, and hypothesized that “for the natural 
kind properties, they should focus on the hidden essence and ignore the concrete observable 
properties. The dual character concepts, however, should involve an attention to both types of 
information” (Knobe et al., 2013, p. 247). This is precisely what they found: the natural categories, 
in contrast to their hypothesized dual character concepts32, were not associated with a dual 
 
32 The hypothesized dual character concepts were those whose terms were judged by participants as felicitously 
combining with the modifier “true”, and included SCIENTIST, FRIEND, CRIMINAL, LOVE, TEACHER, MOTHER.  
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character pattern. Instead, participants gave very low ratings for the statement made in (i), but 
very high ratings for (ii). Thus, entities without the essence of a natural kind were judged to not 
be members of a given kind. Their hypothesized dual character concepts, in contrast, received 
very similar ratings for (i) and (ii). The authors concluded that “for natural kind concepts, 
participants appeared to be employing a single, unified set of criteria for category membership” 
(p. 248) and replicated the result in another experiment.  
What should we make of the fact that these studies yield inconsistent results? Of course, 
that a finding is not replicated in a later study is always a live possibility and by no means 
worrisome. The nature of empirical inquiry requires us to have a neutral stance towards data, 
whether or not they conform with data we previously collected. From this perspective, we can 
simply take Tobia et al. (2020) to report to us a different set of data that, as a matter of fact, 
simply happens to stand in contrast with an earlier set of findings. However, Tobia et al. (2020) 
give the impression that they take the later results to have more evidential weight than their past 
finding, since they (a) advocate the hypothesis that natural kind concepts are dual character 
concepts despite the existing counterevidence, and (b) leave their past contrasting findings 
undiscussed. For now, further research is needed to give a more decisive answer to the question 
of whether or not natural kind concepts exhibit a dual character pattern, but there seems to be 
no prima facie reason to assign higher evidential weight to the results from the 2020 study. 
 
5.2 Michael Strevens’ Causal Minimalism 
Cognitive essentialism hasn’t only faced empirical problems. Michael Strevens has prominently 
offered important theoretical criticisms of essentialist accounts of concepts (Strevens, 2000, 
2019). In this section, I will give an overview of the main criticism of cognitive essentialism he 
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develops in his (2000) paper, which sparked a vivid, fruitful debate between him and various 
cognitive scientists (Ahn et al., 2001; Sloman & Malt, 2003; Strevens, 2001).33  
In a nutshell, Strevens’ basic claim is that there is no need to posit a representation of 
‘essences’ as part of our conceptual structure in order to explain the relevant empirical data. An 
atomic concept of the category in question (say, an atomic concept TIGER) and the relevant 
representation of causal connections to other features (say, STRIPES) is sufficient for this purpose. 
In Strevens’ words: 
Essentialism succeeds in explaining the inferences, I argue, because it attributes to the child belief in 
causal laws connecting category membership and the possession of certain characteristic appearances and 
behavior. This suggests that the data will be equally well explained by a non-essentialist hypothesis that 
attributes belief in the appropriate causal laws to the child, but makes no claim as to whether or not the 
child represents essences. (Strevens, 2000, p. 149) 
He calls his preferred, simpler explanation of the relevant data the ‘minimal hypothesis’. 
 In order to develop his argument, Strevens reconstructs three versions of essentialism 
that aim to explain human inference patterns about natural kinds (“k-patterns”), and contrasts 
them with his own non-essentialist minimal hypothesis. To keep things short, we will here only 
consider what he calls ‘pure essentialism’ (from p. 151): 
Pure Essentialism 
• Some naïve theories posit the existence of essences though they may not represent 
what sorts of things essences are. 
• Essences are represented as what define the categories of a theory, in the sense that 
possession of the essence is represented as necessary and sufficient for category 
membership, In the example, it is believed that an organism is a tiger if and only if it 
has a certain essence. 
 
33 Strevens makes further objections in his 2019 book, which we will not discuss here. In short, he argues that 
psychological essentialism entails that it is psychologically impossible to think of natural kind members without 
representing them as having essences. But philosophers of biology who reject essentialism about biological 
categories do precisely that.  
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• Essences are represented as being causally responsible for certain observable 
properties; in the example, the essence causes the tiger’s stripes, size, and so on 
The next step of his strategy is to cite relevant behavioral phenomena that are treated as evidence 
for the essentialist hypothesis, and show that essences in fact play no role in the explanation of 
the data. For example, the essentialist explanation of childrens’ behavior in the triad task by 
Gelman and Markman (1986) (see §2.2) is that after seeing a ‘kaibab’ (an animal which looks like 
a rabbit, but is squirrel) children (a) represent it as being a squirrel since they are told it is one, 
(b) infer that the kaibab has the squirrel essence, and (c) infer, from their belief that the squirrel 
essence causes bug-eating, that squirrels eat bugs. The inferences in (b) and (c) reflect the second 
and third principle of Pure Essentialism. Strevens points out, however, that the appeal to essences 
is of no importance for the inference to go through: “What is important in accounting for the K-
patterned projections is that children believe that something about being a squirrel causes an 
animal to eat bugs” (p. 156). His minimalist hypothesis that does not appeal to essences is 
sufficient to explain the data. Importantly, Strevens’ claim isn’t only that essences aren’t needed 
to explain the relevant data. Essences, he points out, can’t explain the data at hand, since “[a] 
naïve theory structures inference not in virtue of its elements (such as essences or essence 
placeholders) but in virtue of the connections between those elements” (Strevens, 2000, p. 155). 
Thus, there seems to be no reason to posit the representation of essences. 
 Detailed criticisms and responses to Strevens’ argument can be found elsewhere (Ahn et 
al., 2001; Strevens, 2001). Here, I’d like to call attention to one worry that I haven’t yet 
encountered in the literature. Strevens repeatedly emphasizes that, instead of essences, it is 
sufficient that individuals simply represent something about the tiger, say, as causing it to have 
stripes—without having any opinion of what that something is. Arguably, however, this way of 
seeing things simply collapses into a form of cognitive essentialism. Particularly, proponents of 
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the placeholder version of cognitive essentialism might simply respond that this is precisely what 
cognitive essentialism claims: we represent that something about the tiger, while not knowing 
or having no opinion of what it is, causes the tiger to have stripes. This ‘something’ is precisely 
what essentialists call the ‘essence, and we seem to associate this ‘something’ with causal 
properties.  
 
6. New Directions: Variations of Cognitive Essentialism 
Over the decades, several crucial theoretical assumptions have governed research on cognitive 
essentialism—among them, prominently, that we represent essences as having causal potential, 
or that essence placeholders stand for ‘scientific causes’ such as DNA or atomic weight. Recently, 
research on cognitive essentialism has ventured into new directions by beginning to question, 
refine, or even replace some of these basic assumptions. Before closing this chapter, we will take 
a critical look at some of these new theoretical developments. 
 
6.1 Rose and Nichols’ Teleological Essentialism 
The usual picture associated with psychological essentialism is that people represent categories 
as associated with essences, which are causally responsible for the properties that members of a 
category share. This essence is often represented as a placeholder, which sometimes, after 
acquiring the relevant knowledge, gets replaced by a scientific essence (such as DNA or atomic 
weight). Rose and Nichols (2019) propose an alternative to this picture: “the idea that the 
placeholder for essences is sometimes elaborated by scientific essences should be replaced with 
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the view that the placeholder for an essence is elaborated by a telos” (Rose & Nichols, 2019, p. 
15). 
The Aristotelian notion of ‘telos’ refers to the function or purpose of a thing and is what 
defines a category. In virtue of being the function or purpose of a thing, it also constitutes the 
final cause of an object.34 Lions are for going to the zoo, clouds are for raining, mountains exist to 
give animals a place to climb. Following Aristotle, Rose and Nichols think of the category essence 
as the end of the creature; the end, however, can still be seen as the cause of its other properties 
(along the following lines: because clouds are for raining, they consist of water). In support of their 
hypothesis, they present a series of experiments showing that the telos associated with a category 
substantially affects human categorization judgements. Let’s take a look at their findings. 
In order to probe how telos affects categorization judgements, Rose and Nichols made 
use of Keil’s classic transformation paradigms (see §2.3), in which the telos of the object in 
question35 (e.g., make honey or pollinate flowers for bees; spin webs or catch insects for spiders) 
was systematically manipulated. In the first scenario—like in Keil’s original scenario—a scientist 
performs certain operations on animals that made them look, superficially, like a different animal 
(e.g., a bee ends up looking like a spider). The following information about their telos was then 
provided: 
After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special operation didn’t pollinate 
flowers or make honey. Instead, it only spun webs to catch insects and eat them. 
So, the animal’s telos was described as having changed in these scenarios. For another set of 
participants, the telos stayed the same. The authors found that, when the bee is transformed to 
 
34 See fn. 37. 
35 They assessed what people take to be the telos of objects in a pre-study by asking participants, for example, “What 
is the true purpose of bees?”  and “What is the true purpose of spiders?”. 
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look like a spider, participants say that the thing is a spider when the telos is spinning, but is judged 
to still be a bee when the thing is still pollinating flowers. Thus, the results suggest that the telos 
guided participants’ judgements about category membership. 
In their study series, Rose and Nichols performed various further manipulations that 
suggested that telos plays a crucial role in participants’ categorization judgements. For example, 
when the insides of the animals were affected—e.g., the insides of a bee were surgically removed 
and replaced by spider insides—whether or not the thing was judged to be a bee also greatly 
depended on whether it had the bee or spider telos. Similarly, they found that telos affected 
participants’ judgements in adoption tasks (cf. §2.5 in this chapter), in which participants were 
told that a bee was put into a spider cage right after it hatched from its egg, and in cross-
fertilization scenarios.36  
 At first sight, then, it seems that all experiments confirmed the hypothesis that the 
essence associated with a category is its telos—its purpose, aim, or ultimate cause. However, after 
a second look, multiple problems with the set-up of the study, its interpretation, and its 
explanatory reach in light of other results become apparent.  
 The first major problem of the experiment is its design. The aim of the authors was to 
keep the design of study 1, for example, maximally close to Keil’s (1989) original paradigm, but 
it is questionable whether they succeeded. Remember: Keil (1989) tested the extent to which 
manipulations of superficial features affect participants’ categorizations. In contrast, Rose and 
Nichols’ manipulated both the superficial features and the hypothesized essence (i.e., telos) in their 
experiment. The other conditions are similarly non-analogous. A proper test of the hypothesis 
 
36 In this (quite complicated) experiment, bees that were altered to look like spiders were fertilized by either spiders 
or bees. When the egg was fertilized by a spider, it was more likely that people predicted the offspring to be a spider 
when the offspring had a spider telos; when it had the bee telos, it was more likely to be predicted to be a bee. 
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that telos constitutes the essence should be analogous to Keil’s experiment, however, and consist 
in the manipulation of the superficial features only, the insides only, the telos only, in order to 
assess which of these three manipulations has the biggest effect on categorization judgements. If 
their hypothesis is correct, telos manipulation should have the biggest effect on categorization, 
regardless of whether other components of the animal in question are manipulated. As a result, 
Rose and Nichols have not tested the hypothesis they aimed to test. 
Rose and Nichols’ interpretation of the results, according to which “people tacitly regard 
essences in terms of a telos” (2019, p. 2), is also worrisome. Again, the alternative hypothesis is 
that people regard essences in terms of a ‘scientific essence’—say, H2O—which is represented as 
causally connected to other features—such as being liquid, transparent, flavorless. Importantly, 
according to this picture, humans will obviously rely on effect features to infer whether the essence 
of a category is present or not. So if you observe something that isn’t liquid, transparent, or 
flavorless, this will often lead you to induce the absence of H2O since normally, H2O makes things 
potable, liquid, transparent. In the experiments under discussion, the participants have been told 
that surgeries have been performed on animals that go so far as to change animals’ normal 
behavior. Participants just might take this as evidence that the essence has, too, undergone a transformation 
during the surgery. In other words, since numerous effect features that are normally caused by a 
bee-essence are not present anymore, participants infer that the bee essence, too, must have been 
changed. After all, participants have not been told that the bees still have the property that 
usually makes them pollinate flowers. This interpretation of the results, however, is completely 
compatible—even predicted—by the classical version of ‘scientific essentialism’, and Rose and 
Nichols have done nothing to rule it out.  
Finally, it is not clear how to evaluate Rose and Nichols’ study in light of a number of 
other classical results from the history of cognitive science. For example, over many years, a 
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number of cognitive scientists—notably, Woo-kyoung Ahn and her colleagues—have repeatedly 
found that effect features are substantially less important for category decisions than cause features 
(Ahn, 1998; Ahn, Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 2000; Ahn & Kim, 2000; Ahn, Kim, 
et al., 2000; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998) (see also chapter 2 of this dissertation). The telos of an 
object is, as we have seen, the goal, end, or purpose of a thing.37 And purposes or goals sound very 
much like the effect certain things have: if the purpose of my pen is to write, I expect one of the 
effects of my pen to be writing. Thus, the pressing question arises how Rose and Nichols’ results 
relate to the multitude of experiments that report that effect features are less important for 
categorization tasks. Not only do their results indicate that effect features are important for 
category decisions, they indicate that they are the most important ones, since they constitute the 
essence of a category. For Rose and Nichols’ account to be complete, they need to give us an 
explanation of the prima facie incompatible results by Ahn and her colleagues (among others). 
So far, they’ve left this discrepancy unaddressed.  
In fact, this objection applies more broadly. Psychological essentialism, and with it the 
idea that essences can be thought of as ‘scientific essences’, has been the common form of 
psychological essentialism for several decades. Hundreds of studies operate under precisely this 
conception of essentialism—varying genes, insides, atomic elements, and so on. Thus, the 
evidence for psychological essentialism is supposedly also evidence for the thesis that Rose and 
Nichols attempt to reject. In order for their theory of teleological essentialism to be minimally 
complete, then, they need to explain (or explain away) the vast amount of studies that speak in 
favor of a different hypothesis.  
  
 
37 Rose and Nichols also classify telos as an object’s ultimate cause, but insofar as this cause is, simultaneously, its 
goal, end, or purpose, all of which refer to effects, I take the locution of ‘cause’ in ‘ultimate cause’ to be metaphorical.  
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6.2 Knobe and Newman’s General Essentialism 
In a recent paper, Newman and Knobe (2019) defended the idea of ‘general essentialism’—i.e., a 
general mechanism of essentialism under which many different forms of essentialism are 
theoretically subsumable. What all these forms of essentialism have in common, and what 
characterizes general essentialism, is “the tendency to try to explain observable features in terms 
of a further unifying principle” (Newman & Knobe, 2019, p. 2). Part of what’s novel and 
potentially controversial about their proposal is not only the idea of a general essentialism 
mechanism, but also that there are many different forms of essentialism to begin with.  
What are these different forms? Newman and Knobe propose that we can at least 
distinguish between two kinds of essentialism. The first is the familiar causal conception of 
essentialism, of special importance for understanding natural kind categorization, according to 
which categories are associated with essences that cause kind members to have the properties 
distinctive of it. The second kind of essentialism, in contrast, does not involve the notion of 
causation. To illustrate the phenomenon behind the second kind, consider the concept SCIENTIST. 
While it is associated with certain superficial characteristics (e.g., running experiments and 
writing papers), we might think that there is something about being a scientist that goes beyond 
these superficially observable properties—some deeper value or ideal which constitutes the 
essence of what it is to be a scientist, such as the impartial quest for truth. Correspondingly, 
people judge in experimental settings that a person who doesn’t possess any superficial features 
of a scientist, but realizes the deeper value, is, in a sense, a true scientist (Knobe et al., 2013). 
Newman and Knobe claim that this phenomenon belongs to a specific form of essentialism—
‘Platonic essentialism’—, in which different features of a category are represented as bound 
together by “the fact that they are all ways of embodying the same deeper value” (Newman & 
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Knobe, 2019, p. 4). Correspondingly, the paradigmatic concepts that fall under this form of 
essentialism are value-laden concepts such as SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, or ART.   
As I already announced, Newman and Knobe think that some general cognitive 
essentialist mechanism unifies both kinds of essentialism. According to them, this is because in 
both cases, 
[…] [people] posit something further that unites [the superficial properties] and explains how they are 
connected. This further thing allows them to answer the question: “What is it about these specific features 
that binds them together, so that it makes sense to associate all of them with this same concept?” (p. 5) 
 
The main strategy they adopt to substantiate their proposal is to point to empirical similarities 
between the two (allegedly essentialist) cognitive patterns they are interested in. Specifically, 
they argue that both causal and Platonic essentialism operate analogously when it comes to 
category membership intuitions, generic language, individual concepts, and social categories. 
Although we will not review evidence they put forward in detail here, I want to note that it is 
not clear whether any of the evidence they cite unproblematically speaks in favor of their 
hypothesis. For example, with respect to category membership intuitions, we have already 
discussed and criticized the authors’ evidence that concepts of both forms of essentialism are 
associated with a dual character pattern (see §5.1).  
 Setting these issues aside, however, the authors’ advanced claim seems to be continuous 
with the hypotheses by Gelman, Rhodes, and Mandalaywala that we encountered earlier. 
Namely, the hypothesis that essentialism is a domain-general rather than domain-specific or 
modular mechanism that springs from general, possibly innate, conceptual tendencies we have. I 
noted earlier that depending on environmental input we get about different conceptual domains, 
cognitive essentialism might manifest itself differently in natural, social, and artifact categories. 
From this perspective, Newman and Knobe’s claim can simply be read as the proposal to view 
also value concepts as falling under the reach of cognitive essentialism and the general conceptual 
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tendencies that give rise to it. Whether the proposal will turn out to be empirically successful 
will show itself in the future, but the hitherto unexplored question of whether and to which extent 
cognitive essentialism applies to the domain of value concepts is certainly of extreme theoretical 
interest. 
 
7. Conclusion and Remaining Questions 
The aim of the current chapter was to provide an extensive overview of the current empirical and 
theoretical literature on essentialist theories of concepts. We’ve familiarized ourselves with the 
core claims of cognitive essentialism as a theory of concepts, its main empirical paradigms, its 
conceptual domain, its development, and relation to social cognition. We also reviewed the 
evidence and dominant theories of individual essentialism, some of the main problems essentialist 
theories of concepts are facing, and we explored some of the new directions research on cognitive 
essentialism is taking. Thus, in various ways, the chapter served as an important springboard for 
what is to come in the next chapters. First, knowledge of the relevant empirical and theoretical 
background is of direct use for comprehension of the main claims I’m advancing in further chapters. 
Second, knowledge of the relevant empirical and theoretical background is of direct use for the 
critical assessment of the claims I’m putting forward in the next chapters.   
The chapter also pointed out various questions that haven’t been settled by research on 
cognitive essentialism. Thus, there’s still important work, both theoretical and empirical, for 
philosophers and cognitive scientists to do. Here is a small selection of some of these open 
questions: 
- What is the relationship between essences associated with individuals and kinds? 
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- Are all (lexical) concepts essentialized to some extent, including, for instance, artifact 
concepts? 
- What are the contextual factors influencing especially social essentialism and stereotype 
development, and what are good intervention strategies? 
- What normative issues arise from practices of social essentialism? 
- What is the relationship between language—especially lexical semantics—and the study 
of cognitive essentialism? 
The next chapters of this dissertation will put the theoretical reach of cognitive essentialism’s 
research program to the test by utilizing its framework to develop answers to questions in 
philosophy of language, mind, and social philosophy that have been of traditional and current 
interest. Thereby, the next chapters will also provide partial answers to some of the questions 
that remained unanswered in this overview and the current literature. Showing that the 
framework of cognitive essentialism and its variations does important explanatory work in 
various domains will provide direct evidence of the applicability, fruitfulness, and explanatory 
depth of cognitive essentialism as a theory of the structure of concepts. 
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Chapter 2 
Meaning Externalism, Natural Kind Terms and Causal Model 
Theory 
Abstract 
One of the main insights the philosophical community has drawn from Putnam’s Twin Earth thought 
experiments and Kripke’s modal arguments for a theory of direct reference is that meaning is individuated 
externalistically. In this chapter, I propose an account of the structure of concepts that correctly predicts 
the Putnam-Kripke intuitions, while preserving an internalist conception of meaning. After presenting 
and systematizing the Putnam-Kripke data, I propose and defend a Causal Model Theory of conceptual 
structure, on the basis of which we can model the linguistic behavior of natural kind terms and predict 
the key Putnam-Kripke intuitions. 
 
1. Introduction 
At least since Putnam’s famous Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam, 1975), and Kripke’s 
Naming and Necessity (Kripke, 1980), philosophers of language largely agree that linguistic 
meaning is individuated externalistically. In this chapter, I present an internalist account of the 
nature of concepts that can systematically account for the intuitions elicited in the Putnam-
Kripke cases. This account conceives of concepts as causal models. As will become apparent later, 
the defended Causal Model Theory of the conceptual structure of natural kind concepts is simply 
a more general version of the essentialist theory of concepts presented in the last chapter. 
In Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiments, Putnam asks us to imagine a planet that 
is like Earth in all respects but the constitution of the stuff they call “water”. Instead of water, 
Twin Earth contains twin water, which is identical with respect to all its superficial properties 
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to Earth’s water—it is potable, clear, fills the rivers and oceans. However, twin water’s 
microphysical structure is not H2O, but a chemical composition we abbreviate as XYZ. Putnam 
observes that intuitively, the meaning of “water” on Earth and Twin Earth differs, even if we 
hold fixed all internal variables. Thus, the metaphysical nature of the external kinds we intend to 
refer to will contribute to the reference, hence the meaning, of the corresponding terms. 
Putnam’s thought experiment echoes essentialist intuitions about the meaning of natural 
kind terms that have also been made famous in Kripke (1980). According to Kripke, the meaning 
of “gold” isn’t something like yellow, valuable metal. For if it was, we would conclude that there is 
no gold if we learned that the yellow color of the stuff we call “gold” has been the effect of an 
illusion; the meaning of “gold”, after all, specified the referent as yellow. This, however, seems 
wrong: even after such a discovery, “gold” would still refer to the stuff, 𝑔. Thus, the meaning of 
“gold” only depends on what gold is, and not on this or that description speakers associate with 
it. But this means, again, that the meaning of natural kind terms depends on the nature of the 
corresponding natural kinds. 
Let us summarize the main thesis of meaning externalism as follows (see also Briscoe, 
2006; Farkas, 2003): 
Meaning Externalism. The meaning of words is individuated by or essentially depends on items 
in the world external to the subject. 
Putnam’s and Kripke’s insights, which largely shaped the philosophical consensus about 
the nature of meaning for the past 40 years, are in sharp contrast with the internalist program, 
active in academic linguistics and famously advocated by Noam Chomsky, according to which 
the study of language, including linguistic meaning, is a sub-branch of psychology, and linguistic 
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meaning is, correspondingly, individuated psychologically (Partee, 1979).38 The metaphysical 
status of the things around us is irrelevant for a complete description of the meaning of words:39 
Meaning Internalism. The meaning of words is individuated by or essentially depends on 
psychological properties internal to the subject only. 
Advocates of semantic internalism have offered a variety of moves against the Putnam-
Kripke intuitions. One strategy is to maintain that intuitions about technical terms, such as 
“meaning” and “reference”, should not guide our beliefs about the nature of meaning or reference. 
After all, intuitions are generally irrelevant when it comes to other technical vocabulary of the 
sciences, such as “c-command”, “phoneme”, “photosynthesis”, “mass” or “gravity” (Chomsky 
2000). Another move is to simply deny the intuitions altogether, reckoning Putnam and Kripke 
as mistaken in taking them for granted.40 
In this chapter, I aim to defend semantic internalism by adopting a different strategy. 
Although recent research shows that, pace Putnam, his Twin Earth intuitions are generally not 
shared (Tobia et al., 2020; cf. chapter 1), I here simply assume that Putnam’s intuitions are correct 
and any successful model of natural kind terms should be able to account for them. What I will 
show is that the resulting intuitions are not incompatible with internalism about meaning. Thus, 
I here assume the worst-case scenario for meaning internalists—that the intuitions Putnam and 
Kripke appeal to are uncontested—and show that this still doesn’t suffice to establish meaning 
 
38 We here ignore the question of whether the position of Chomsky and other I-language advocates allows that 
meaning, even if construed internalistically, is a useful object of scientific study in the first place. 
39 Famously, Tyler Burge and his followers argue that also psychological properties are individuated 
externalistically (Burge, 1986, 1989, 1993). If this is true, linguistic meaning will be individuated externalistically 
even if it is exclusively individuated by psychological properties. Because the focus of this chapter is on externalist 
arguments about linguistic meaning, we will here put aside the issue of psychological anti-individualism. Instead, we 
simply assume that psychological properties are individuated internalistically, and ask whether the arguments 
provided by Putnam and Kripke successfully establish an externalist conception of meaning. 
40 For attacks on meaning externalism, see Bach (1987), Bilgrami (1995), Chomsky (1995), Searle (1983), and Segal 
(2000).  
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externalism. I do this in a couple of steps. First, I assume that to understand a natural kind term, 
we have to grasp a natural kind concept associated with it. I will treat this claim as a truism and 
simply take it for granted. Then I show that an independently defensible account of the structure 
of natural kind concepts predicts the Putnam-Kripke intuitions and the patterns of natural kind 
terms. Since this account of conceptual structure is internally realizable, it follows that at least 
one internally realizable and independently plausible way of modeling conceptual structure 
successfully accounts for the Putnam-Kripke intuitions. This account conceives of concepts as 
causal models. 
In the course of the chapter, I’ll assume the familiar Kaplanian distinction between the 
character and content of a term, and use it to explain our Twin Earth intuitions (Kaplan, 1989). 
In particular, I will assume that natural kind terms, like indexicals, have context-sensitive, 
variable characters and constant contents. Variations of this approach have been defended by 
numerous other philosophers who advocate ‘causal descriptivist’ or ‘two-dimensional’ views of 
linguistic meaning (Chalmers, 2004; Haas-Spohn, 2018; Jackson, 1994, 1998a, 1998b, 2004; 
Kroon, 1987). Thus, my approach is subsumable under this group of views.41 However, my view 
also has important features that distinguish it from this cluster of views. Most importantly, my 
proposed account for natural kind concepts is psychologically realistic. Specifically, it is an account 
that is supported by a considerable amount of empirical research, and, in contrast to extant 
internalist theories of the Putnam-Kripke intuitions, doesn’t rely on actualized descriptions that 
are only implausibly employed by and implemented in natural language users.42 
 
41 This does not mean that I am in agreement with all the central tenets commonly defended by two-dimensionalists. 
For example, I do not take the set of metaphysically possible worlds to be the set of epistemically possible worlds. 
However, most of these details do not matter for the purposes of this dissertation, so I won’t go into them further. 
42 For objections to two-dimensionalism along these lines, see Block and Stalnacker (1999), Byrne and Prior (2006), 
and Soames (2005). 
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I proceed as follows. After presenting and systematizing the Putnam-Kripke data, I move 
on to present the main tenets of Causal Model Theory, on the basis of which I model the structure 
of natural kind concepts. I then show that Causal Model Theory fully accounts for the Putnam-
Kripke intuitions, thus blocking the inference from the data to meaning externalism.  
 
2. The Data 
2.1 Putnam and Twin-Earth 
In The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ (1975)43, Putnam aims to challenge the “two unchallenged 
assumptions” he takes to govern semantic theorizing (135–136): 
1) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state. 
2) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of “intension”) determines its extension (in 
the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension).44 
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiments (henceforth: TEE) (and its varieties, such as 
the elm/beech example) are supposed to show that these assumptions “are not jointly satisfied 
by any notion, let alone any notion of meaning” (136), since “it is possible for two speakers to be 
in exactly the same psychological state (in the narrow sense), even though the extension of the 
term A in the idiolect of the one is different from the extension of the term A in the idiolect of 
 
43 Page numberings in this section refer to this paper. 
44 Recall that Putnam does not offer a definition of “intension”; in his discussion, he makes clear that his use of 
“intension” parallels its historical use in analytic philosophy as simply synonymous to the term “meaning”; 
particularly, he takes the term to historically refer to whatever distinguishes a term’s extension from its meaning. 
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the other” (139). Thus, and in contrast to the conjunction of (1) and (2), “extension is not 
determined by psychological state” (139). 
Let us bring TEE before our eyes once again in order to examine the intuitions more 
carefully. As mentioned before, Twin Earth contains a substance that, on the face of it, seems to 
be just like Earth’s water. This substance, however, is composed of a different chemical formula 
we abbreviate as XYZ. Now, Putnam observes, 
If a spaceship from Earth ever visits Twin Earth, then the supposition at first will be that “water” has the 
same meaning on Earth and on Twin Earth. This supposition will be corrected when it is discovered that 
“water” on Twin Earth is XYZ, and the Earthian spaceship will report somewhat as follows: 
“On Twin Earth the word ‘water’ means XYZ.” 
Taking for granted shared intuitions on part of his readership, Putnam concludes that “The 
extension of “water” in the sense of waterE is the set of all wholes consisting of H2O molecules 
[...]; the extension of water in the sense of waterTE is the set of all wholes consisting of XYZ 
molecules” (141). 
To rule out that the difference is due to our meaning-constitutive knowledge that our water 
is H2O and not XYZ, Putnam introduces a second vignette in which he turns the clock back to 
about 1750: 
The typical Earthian speaker of English did not know water consisted of hydrogen and oxygen, and the 
typical Twin Earthian speaker of English did not know “water” consisted of XYZ. Let Oscar1 be such a 
typical Earthian English speaker, and let Oscar2 be his counterpart on Twin Earth. You may suppose that 
there is no belief that Oscar1 had about water that Oscar2 did not have about “water.” If you like, you may 
even suppose that Oscar1 and Oscar2 were exact duplicates in appearance, feelings, thoughts, interior 
monologue, etc. Yet the extension of the term “water” was just as much H2O on Earth in 1750 as 1950; 
and the extension of the term “water” was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 as in 1950. Oscar1 
and Oscar2 understood the term “water" differently in 1750 although they were in the same psychological 
state, and although, given the state of science at the time, it would have taken their scientific communities 
about fifty years to discover that they understood the term “water” differently. Thus the extension of the 
term “water” (and, in fact, its “meaning” in the intuitive preanalytical usage of that term) is not a function 
of the psychological state of the speaker by itself. (141) 
Oscar and Twin Oscar are psychologically identical twins, none of which know about the 
composition of water or twin water, but our intuitions clearly tell us, according to Putnam, that 
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they understand the term “water” differently. Since the conclusion Putnam draws from the 
intuitions—that “meaning ain’t in the head”—is supposed to generalize, it is important that the 
intuitions, too, are generalizable. Thus, it is important to single them out systematically. From 
our reactions to Putnam’s scenarios, we can crystallize the following two behavioral 
generalizations: 
- For a kind term ‘t’ in a natural language 𝐿, we refrain from classifying an object or 
substance 𝑜 as 𝑡 if we believe that 𝑜 exhibits a difference in microstructure from objects 
we usually classify as 𝑡. 
It follows that 
- For a kind term ‘t’ in a natural language 𝐿, we can refrain from classifying an object or 
substance 𝑜 as 𝑡 also if it contains all superficial properties we usually associate with 𝑡. 
Thus if a group of speakers use 𝑡! to refer to 𝑜! and another group of speakers use 𝑡" to refer to 𝑜", and we know or believe that 𝑜! and 𝑜" have a different microstructure, then we will conclude 
that 𝑡! and 𝑡" have different meanings. 
 
2.2 Kripke and Modal Intuitions 
In Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke observes that “certain general terms, those for natural 
kinds, have a greater kinship with proper names than is generally realized” (134).45 According to 
Kripke, just like names directly refer to the objects they designate, natural kind terms directly 
refer to the kinds they designate. To establish this, he uses a modal strategy: we think of some 
kind object or substance, imaginatively modify a number of its properties, and decide whether 
 
45 All page references in this section refer to Kripke (1980). 
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the object or substance still belongs to the same kind we started with. If so, we have made a case 
that the term ‘sticks’ with the kind, regardless of associated properties. Strategies of this kind are 
often referred to as conceivability tasks. They differ from the classification task Putnam asks us to 
engage in. In Putnam’s TEE, we are presented with a substance with certain properties, and are 
asked to classify it as water or non-water. 
To give a concrete example of Kripke’s conceivability strategy and get a better grip on 
the data, let us quickly go through one of Kripke’s modal arguments: 
Could we discover that gold was not in fact yellow? Suppose an optical illusion were prevalent, due to 
peculiar properties of the atmosphere in South Africa and Russia and certain other areas where gold mines 
are common. Suppose there were an optical illusion which made the substance appear to be yellow; but, 
in fact, once the peculiar properties of the atmosphere were removed, we would see that it is actually blue. 
Would there on this basis be an announcement in the newspapers: ‘It has turned out that there is no gold. 
Gold does not exist. What we took to be gold is not in fact gold.’? (118) 
The answer to this question seems to be ‘no’. Thus, what the conceivability task reveals is that 
we can suppose that something is in fact not yellow, yet is still gold: 
 It seems to me that there would be no such announcement. On the contrary, what would be announced 
would be that though it appeared that gold was yellow, in fact gold has turned out not to be yellow, but 
blue. The reason is, I think, that we use ‘gold’ as a term for a certain kind of thing. (118) 
We can systematize the intuition Kripke wants to illustrate with his gold-scenario:46 
- For a natural language term ‘t’ in a natural language 𝐿, we can conceive that a referent of 
‘t’ does not possess a property we commonly associate with ‘t’, and still be the referent of 
‘t’. 
A plausible explanation for this intuition seems to be, again, that meaning is individuated 
externalistically. The reason why we can conceive of this scenario is because we understand that 
 
46 Note that Kripke also makes use of Putnam-style classification strategies. For example, he prompts us to imagine 
that we discover that the animals we call ‘cats’ are in fact reptiles, and observes that we wouldn’t, intuitively, classify 
these objects as cats. Since we already discussed this strategy in the last section, it is not necessary to go through 
Kripke’s examples of this kind. 
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the primary determinant of a term’s meaning is the referent’s metaphysical status, and not any 
of our associated descriptions. Hence, we understand that meaning is determined by the 
metaphysical individuation conditions of the external objects a term refers to. 
In the next section, I will show that the results of Kripke’s conceivability strategy are 
predicted by causal model of concepts that preserves an internalist notion of meaning. Before I 
do that, however, I would like to shed some independent doubts that Kripke’s conceivability 
strategy establishes what it is often taken to establish. For it seems that a test that operates with 
conceivability seems to be unsuited for determining the meaning of a term altogether, given that 
the meaning of that term is individuated externalistically. 
Assuming that Kripke aims at establishing some form of meaning externalism, it seems 
peculiar that he makes the case for his direct theory of reference by appealing to a conceivability 
test. As this test operates with our intuitions, it tracks epistemically, not metaphysically, possible 
worlds. But if the meaning of natural kind terms is individuated externalistically, our intuitions 
about whether something would still be the referent of “gold” if it wasn’t yellow really shouldn’t 
matter. After all, it could, unbeknownst to us, belong to the metaphysical individuation conditions 
of gold that it be yellow. If this is the case and meaning externalism is true, the non-yellow stuff 
we took to be gold would not be gold, pace our essentialist intuitions.47 
Plausibly, the reason Kripke is licensed to use the conceivability strategy might be that 
he just takes for granted some essentialist metaphysical story about the individuation of natural 
kinds such as gold, and assumes us to do so as well. Conditional on gold not being individuated 
through yellowness, but through its atomic structure, he asks us: can you conceive that something 
 
47 In this case, the meaning of natural kind terms would furthermore be descriptivist. Cf. Leslie (2013) for a similar 
point, and an argument that many scientific kinds are individuated in a way that corresponds to descriptivism. 
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be gold and not yellow?, observes that we can, concludes that the meaning of “gold” doesn’t include 
“yellow”, and that the meaning we assign to “gold” corresponds to the assumed metaphysics. 
Crucially, however, Kripke’s methodology will still be problematic. For so far, Kripke’s 
‘test’ underdetermines whether our intuitions really reflect the metaphysical assumption we 
conditionalize on, or our (epistemic) preconception of “gold” that just corresponds to the 
assumption he introduces. To test for this, we need a ‘control condition’: a condition in which our 
epistemology (or folk-beliefs) of natural kinds and the metaphysical assumption come apart. If 
we introduce such a condition, however, it is not clear whether the conceivability test is 
successful. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that gold in fact has individuation conditions 
corresponding with descriptivism: it is individuated through phenomenal surface properties, such 
as being yellow and shiny. If it helps, you can even imagine a metaphysical oracle that knows all 
metaphysical truths and reports that, contrary our essentialist intuitions, something is gold only 
if it is yellow, shiny metal. Now, imagine, as in Kripke’s example, that the stuff we call “gold” is 
in fact blue, and our impression of it being yellow was a product of an illusion. If meaning 
externalism is correct, in this scenario, our intuition should be that there is no gold. However, 
this seems incorrect. Instead, it seems that our intuitions are in alignment with our epistemic, 
essentialist preconception of what referent of “gold” is: just as in Kripke’s scenario, we would 
insist that there is gold, as long as it has the microphysical structure we associate with gold. 
Thus, not only are the intuitions predicted by a model of concepts that is compatible with 
meaning internalism, as I will show in the next section, but there are independent methodological 
problems of Kripke’s arguments for a direct-reference account of meaning. Given that the 
internalism-externalism debate is of both philosophical and scientific importance, it seems of key 
importance that the arguments used to adjudicate between them are methodologically clean and 
careful. 
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3. Concepts as Causal Models 
After Eleanor Rosch’s impressive findings demonstrating a large range of typicality effects on 
human categorization, research on the nature of concepts has largely focused on feature-based 
theories of conceptual categories, such as prototype and exemplar theories (Laurence & Margolis, 
1999; Murphy, 2004; Rosch, 1999; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). These 
accounts, roughly, model concepts as statistical abstractions over sets of features. However, it 
was soon clear that this focus overlooks a key feature of categories and their corresponding 
representations: that many conceptual features do not merely co-vary, but are represented as 
causally related. As the last chapter has already illustrated, a vast number of experiments has since 
demonstrated that postulating causal components into the structure of concepts is indispensable 
for explaining our categorization behavior. The Causal Model Theory of conceptual structure 
claims, correspondingly, that probabilistic features associated with a category representation are 
represented as standing in causal relationships to each other. Moreover, rigorous formal-
computational models of the postulated structures have been developed, called causal graphical 
models, making precise how causal networks can be represented and tested in light of behavioral 
data (Danks, 2014; Pearl, 1988, 2009; Rehder, 2003b, 2017; Rehder & Hastie, 2004; Spirtes, 
Glymour, & Scheines, 2000). From this perspective, cognitive essentialism can be understood as 
a more constrained version of Causal Model Theory. But Causal Model Theory, through its 
association with the framework of causal graphical models, gives us the tools to model formally 
what stayed only conceptual under cognitive essentialism. 
The aim of this section is to offer a concrete, internally individuated, computational 
implementation of conceptual structure in terms of Causal Model Theory to account for the 
Putnam-Kripke intuitions. For this, I first introduce the formal elements of Causal Model 
Theory. After this, I present empirical evidence motivating Causal Model Theory as an 
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independently plausible theory of the structure of concepts. I will then use the formal model to 
model the Putnam-Kripke cases, and demonstrate that it predicts our intuitions in a surprisingly 
precise way. 
 
3.1 Main Principles of Causal Graphical Models 
To formally represent causality relations, causal graphical models use directed acyclic graphs.48 
Like all graphs, these consist of nodes and edges. In our model, the nodes are simply features that 
can be on (1) or off (0); and the edges represent a causal relationship between two nodes. Unlike 
some other graphical models, the edges of directed acyclic graphs are directed (𝑋 → 𝑌), which is 
useful to represent the asymmetry of causal relations. Moreover, these graphs are acyclic: if they 
start with a node, 𝑋, the path emerging from 𝑋 can’t end in 𝑋. Causes can be direct and indirect: 
 
48 For a complete description of Bayesian networks of causal graphical models, see Pearl (1988). 
Figure 3. Simple causal graph. 
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in the causal graph 𝑋 → 𝑌 → 𝑍, 𝑌 is the direct cause of 𝑍, while 𝑋 is the indirect cause of 𝑍. The 
set of direct causes of a node 𝑋 in a causal graph is called the set of 𝑋’s parents. If a cause node 
doesn’t have a cause itself, it is called a root cause. Most causal graphical models, including ours, 
include a quantitative component to represent numerical information about the graph and make 
precise quantitative predictions about a given domain of application. 
We will here follow the approach to graphical models and their parametization as 
presented in the work by Bob Rehder (Rehder, 2003b, 2003a, 2017). Thus, we here assume that 
the causal links are generative (they make their effects more likely) and independent (each causal 
link operates autonomously). Our feature variables can take the values 0 (‘off’) and 1 (‘on’), and 
our model will include three additional probability parameters, 𝑏, 𝑚 and 𝑐. Consider the graph 
in figure 3. Here, 𝑐 represents the marginal probability of the root cause feature variable 𝑋.49 𝑚 
 
49 Specifically, 𝑐 represents the probability that the feature is present conditional on the presence of the category the 
feature is a feature of. 
Figure 4. Causal graph of water. 
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is the ‘strength’ of the causal link; the probability that the causal mechanism between 𝑋 and the 𝑌s operates successfully when 𝑋 is present. Finally, 𝑏 represents the probability that an effect 
variable—in this case, one of the 𝑌s—is brought about by a background cause other than 𝑋. 
Given a couple of assumptions governing causal models, and elementary probability theory, these 
parameters determine the probability that the model will generate any combination of the 
features 𝑋, 𝑌!, and 𝑌" (cf. appendix). 
For a concrete application, consider the graph in figure 4, depicting a toy model of water. 
In this example, H"O is our root cause, associated with a marginal probability 𝑐: the probability 
that, given that something is water, it has the feature H"O. H"O is connected to the effect features 
potable, clear, and liquid via causal links. The causal links are each associated with a parameter 
value 𝑚: the probability that the effect feature is brought about by H"O. Finally, the features 
potable, clear, and liquid are also each associated with a value 𝑏 that represents the probability that 
water’s, say, potability has not been brought about by H"O—i.e., the probability that it has been 
brought about by a different background cause. 
We will rely on some formal results from the appendix when modeling the Kripke-
Putnam intuitions, but it is more important to understand what the formal apparatus captures 
conceptually. For our purposes, the key is making clear the roles of the parameters 𝑐 and 𝑚. Since 𝑐 receives a probability value between 0 and 1, it will be strictly possible that an object or 
substance has been generated by the causal model for a category but doesn’t possess the feature 
associated with 𝑐, namely, if the value for 𝑐 is smaller than 1. If the value for 𝑐 is 1, such a 
configuration will not be possible. As we will see, the value of 𝑐, together with the presence or 
absence of a root cause, will be crucial for our explanation of TEE. 𝑚 represents the probabilistic 
nature of the causal link operating between nodes. If the value of 𝑚 is less than 1, it will be 
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possible for the causal mechanism to be imperfect. This means that it will be possible for a 
member of a category to possess a root cause feature which fails to generate the effect features. 
As we will see, this aspect of causal graphical model will be crucial to account for Kripke’s 
conceivability strategy. 
 
3.2 Evidence 
Why should we believe that Causal Model Theory is an adequate characterization of conceptual 
representation in the first place? Notably, there is substantial empirical evidence for the 
predictions made by Causal Model Theory. A vast amount of studies support the view that 
category judgements are generated by computing the likelihood that the features of a given object 
have been generated by a causal model corresponding to the category (for a review, see Rehder, 
2017). There seem to be two main phenomena with respect to which Causal Model Theory is 
explanatorily superior to its alternatives: (a) conceptual coherence effects—i.e., effects of 
combinations of features on category membership decisions over and above the evidence provided 
by individual features—and (b) effects on individual feature weights—i.e., the way in which 
individual feature weight (i.e., the marginal probability of a feature) is influenced by the position 
it has in a causal network (Rehder, 2017). Let us briefly review the evidence for (a) and (b) in 
more detail. 
Coherence. Coherence effects refer to the phenomenon that “objects are considered more 
likely category members (all else being equal) to the extent they are consistent with (i.e., cohere 
with) the category’s inter-feature causal relations” (Rehder, 2017, 350). This makes sense: if the 
doctrine of causal model theory is correct, subjects should pay more attention to constellations of 
causally-related features, instead of features considered in isolation. 
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In an experiment by Rehder and Hastie (2001), participants learned the features of novel 
(i.e., invented) categories on four binary dimensions (where the feature could either be present or 
absent). One feature was described as the common cause of the other three features. For example, 
for a category depicting a star called ‘myastar’, the feature ionized helium caused the features hot 
temperature, high density, and large number of planets. The participants received explicit mechanical 
descriptions of how the ionized helium explained the other three features. Next, the participants 
were presented with the 16 test items that can be generated by the four binary dimensions of the 
features and rated, on a 100-point scale, how likely each object was a category member. The 
results were telling. For test items in which the cause feature ionized helium was present, the 
likelihood was a function of the presence of other features. However, when the cause feature 
wasn’t present, adding effect features was virtually irrelevant for an increase of feature 
probabilities! In fact, adding an effect in contrast to having no effect feature even led to a 
probability reduction. Generally, test items were rated lower than others when they lacked cause 
features, also if they had more typical features (e.g., the presence of three effect features received 
lower probability ratings than one cause and one effect feature). 
Not only can this coherence effect be easily explained by the causal model framework.50 
On an intuitive level, it also makes sense that the presence of effect features when their causes 
are absent makes an item less coherent, which should result in a decrease or only marginal 
increase in category membership ratings (see Rehder 2017). Correspondingly, in control 
conditions in which there was no causal link between features, likelihood ratings were a pure 
function of amount of present features. Importantly, Rehder and Hastie fit the data to the model 
 
50 Cf. equation [1] in the appendix, which will yield smaller values if the 𝑐 feature is not present (resulting in a 
multiplication by 1 − 𝑐), but the value of 𝑐 is relatively high. 
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they derived in accordance with the formal framework of Causal Model Theory; the fit of model 
to behavioral data was remarkably good.51 
Feature Weights. Relations between features of a category also affect categorization 
insofar as they alter the importance of individual features. According to Causal Model Theory, a 
cause will have a higher feature weight than its effect, unless the strengths of the causal link and 
the effect’s background cause are too strong (see appendix for details). This effect—i.e., that cause 
features are generally weighed as more important than effect features—is also referred to as 
causal status effect. 
Multiple studies found a causal status effect in both adults and children (Ahn, Gelman, et 
al., 2000; Ahn, Kim, et al., 2000; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Kim & Ryan, 2009; Luhmann, Ahn, & 
Palmeri, 2006; Rehder, 2015; Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Rehder & Kim, 2010; Sloman et al., 1998). 
As a concrete example, presented novel categories to participants, where the category features 
were related in a causal chain (𝑋 → 𝑌 → 𝑍): A kind of bird, roobans, typically eats fruit (𝑋), which 
causes them to have sticky feet (𝑌), which in turn makes them capable of climbing trees (𝑍). 
Participants then rated on a scale from 0 − 100 the category membership of exemplars missing 
a feature. Items with missing 𝑋 properties were rated lower than exemplars with missing 𝑌s, 
which in turn were rated lower than items with missing 𝑍s. Thus, the feature weight depends on 
the location of a feature in the causal network, as predicted by Causal Model Theory. 
 
 
 
51 Of course, this is not the only evidence in favor of coherence effects in categorization. In fact, the evidence for 
coherence effects is abundant (Hampton, Storms, Simmons, & Heussen, 2009; Hayes & Rehder, 2012; Rehder, 2003b, 
2015; Rehder & Hastie, 2004; Rehder & Kim, 2010; Wisniewski, 1995), see also Rehder (2017) for an overview. 
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4. Putnam, Kripke, and Causal Models 
Now that we are acquainted with the basics of Causal Model Theory, we are in a position to test 
whether its predictions, when construed as an account of the structure of natural kind concepts 
and their corresponding terms, apply to the Putnam-Kripke cases. 
 
4.1 Putnam 
As we have already seen, Putnam’s TEE involves a classification task. We are presented with 
information about an object or some stuff, twin water, and are asked whether this category falls 
or doesn’t fall under the category water. In Putnam’s first scenario (post 1750), the intuitions is 
that twin water will not be classified as water. 
Is this what Causal Model Theory predicts? In very simplified form, the causal graph 
corresponding to our concept of water can be represented by the graphs in figure 5a.52 Figure 5b 
doesn’t depict a concept, but rather the information about an item or stuff we are presented with; 
in our case, the stuff is twin water. According to our concept water, the root cause node H"O and 
a number of water-typical effect features are connected through a directed edge (figure 5a). Twin 
water, we are told, consists of the same effect nodes, but instead of the H"O cause, it has XYZ. 
 
52 The reader is free to add a desired number of effect nodes to the graph; as they will see, the results will be 
unaffected. 
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Let us now derive the probability that, according to Causal Model Theory, an instance of twin 
water is generated by the causal model of water. Since twin water does not have H"O as its root 
cause, we will assign the value 0 to the variable H"O: 𝐻"𝑂 = 0. The values of the effect variables 
Figure 5. Causal models of Earth water (a) and twin water (b). 
a 
b 
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will all be set to 1. Let us make the following assumptions about the parameter values 𝑐, 𝑚 and 𝑏: 
𝑐	 = 	1.0		
𝑚#$! 	= 	𝑚#$" 	= 	𝑚#$# 	= 	0.8		
𝑏$! =	𝑏$" 	= 	 𝑏$# 	= 	0.2	
The crucial part is that we set the value of 𝑐 to 1.0. Mirroring the setup of TEE, we here 
assume that we take the presence of H2O as necessary (but not sufficient) for something to be 
water.53 Now, what is the likelihood that a substance without H2O has been generated by the 
causal model for water, using our equations [1] to [3]? Well, since the value of 𝑐 is 1.0, it does 
not matter what the value of the other parameters is—if we plug the values of the parameters 
into the equations, the joint probability that 𝑃(𝐻 = 0, 𝑃 = 1, 𝐶 = 1, 𝐿 = 1) will always be 0 (cf. 
 
53 Thus, this set-up is not subject to the criticism from Malt (1994). 
Figure 6. Pre-1750 concept WATER. 
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equation [1] in appendix). Thus, the model predicts that we will not classify twin water as water, 
which is precisely the intuition we have in TEE. 
The first scenario of TEE can therefore be successfully explained by Causal Model 
Theory. But what about Putnam’s pre-1750 scenario? In it, neither Earthians nor Twin Earthians 
have yet found out that the stuff they call “water” consists of H2O. Pre-1750, Earth’s inhabitants 
do not know about the presence of H2O in water, yet know (by assumption) that there is some 
particular unobservable in their local environment, assumed to be identical over time. This 
unobservable is assumed to cause the observed properties in their local water samples and will 
turn out to be H2O (see figure 6). As described by Putnam, the same beliefs are shared by the 
respective twin inhabitants. Here is where the Kaplanian character/content distinction I assumed 
at the beginning of the chapter becomes important: we can also say that the concept contains 
contextual parameters for the history of the language community the speaker belongs to and the 
speakers’ local environment. 
Although the mental constructs of Earthians and Twin Earthians are identical, the 
unobservable feature of their respective local water samples differs. Because the root cause 
elements have previously been anchored in their local environments, as third person observers 
in the thought experiments, we know that there will be possible worlds in which the uses of Oscar 
and Twin Oscars come apart: namely, when they have evidence that the unobservable of a new 
sample of water is not identical to their local water sample on which the feature node was 
historically anchored. This explains the intuition that Oscar and Twin Oscar understand the term 
differently. This further explains why the extension of “water” in the Earth and Twin Earth case 
differs. Note that the root cause value of 𝑐 will, in both cases, again be 1.0. This means that, just 
as in our last example in which the root cause was H2O, if the root cause—i.e., the unobservable—
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isn’t present, the likelihood that the sample has been generated by our causal model for water 
will be 0. 
Importantly, the fact that one feature is contextually or temporally anchored does by itself 
of course not yet entail any form of meaning externalism. As has been pointed out many times 
before (Block, 1987; Yli-Vakkuri & Hawthorne, 2018), defendants of meaning internalism do not 
claim that truth, falsity, or the extension of internally specified meanings can be read off from 
mental states. Rather, they claim that cognitive properties specify when something is true, false, 
or belongs to the extension of a term. In the current example, then, mental states specify that 
something falls under the concept water only if it is constituted by the same unobservable as the 
stuff on which the term was historically anchored. What the unobservable of the local water 
sample is will depend on the world. 
 
4.2 Kripke 
Since I have shown how Causal Model Theory accounts for the two central classification cases 
of TEE, let us now turn to Kripke’s conceivability strategy. Recall that he asks us, in effect, 
whether we can conceive that something does not possess any of the properties we associate with 
gold, yet still be gold. Both Kripke and his readers seem to be of the opinion that we can. 
We will assume that our concept of gold looks analogous to our concept of water: a root 
cause—either ‘atomic number 79’ (A) or simply ‘unobservable property of local gold samples’ will 
be connected, via directed edges, to a number of properties (e.g., ‘yellow’ (Y), ‘consistency’ (C), or 
‘oxidation rate’ (O)). Moreover, we will, as before, assume the following parameter values: 
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𝑐	 = 	1.0		
𝑚#$! 	= 	𝑚#$" 	= 	𝑚#$# 	= 	0.8		
𝑏$! =	𝑏$" 	= 	 𝑏$# 	= 	0.2	
Before we apply Causal Model Theory to Kripke’s conceivability argument, we need to 
clarify how we operationalize conceivability. Following standard probabilistic possible world 
semantics (Lassiter, 2017; Santorio & Romoli, 2017), we will operationalize the conceivability 
(i.e., epistemic possibility) of an event as a probability higher than 0. In other words, if the 
probability of an event to happen is not 0, there are some epistemically accessible possible worlds 
in which the event takes place. 
Plugging the values of Kripke’s scenario into equations [1] to [3], we see that the 
probability 𝑃(𝐴 = 1, 𝑌 = 0, 𝐶 = 0, 𝑂 = 0) is roughly 0.005. Since this is higher than 0, we 
correctly predict that it is epistemically possible that something doesn’t have any of the associated 
properties of gold, yet still be gold, which just means that we can conceive that something is gold 
yet doesn’t have any of the associated surface properties. Thus, our hypothesized mental 
representation of gold predicts, again, the intuitions in one of the key arguments for linguistic 
externalism. 
We have now seen that we can give a full explanation of the generalizations associated 
with the Kripke-Putnam scenarios, but in a way that doesn’t require us to revert to externalist 
explanations of the nature of meaning. Causal Model Theory has sufficient explanatory resources 
to explain the core cases. 
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5. Conclusion 
Since the late 20th century, philosophers of language commonly take meaning to be individuated 
externalistically. This consensus goes back to the externalist arguments given by Putnam and 
Kripke. In this chapter, I showed that their main arguments do not favor externalism over 
internalism. I presented an account of the structure of concepts—Causal Model Theory—which, 
given the state of current evidence, we have good reasons to accept. Furthermore, this account 
successfully predicts the Putnam-Kripke intuitions while preserving an internalist conception of 
meaning. 
In effect, then, my argument is a rejection of Putnam’s claim that assumptions (1) and (2) 
from above “are not jointly satisfied by any notion, let alone any notion of meaning”. One of my 
moves to establish this depended on a Kaplanian distinction between character and content: the 
meaning of water, on both Twin Earth and Earth, has contextual parameters, which explains 
why the extension of the term can change on the different planets, while the concept itself or a 
more fine-grained intension stays the same. As mentioned earlier, this approach to meaning has 
been taken on by other accounts of meaning, such as two-dimensionalism or causal descriptivism. 
In contrast to those accounts, the approach undertaken here is psychologically realistic and 
provides us with a direct explanation of our linguistic behavior. 
In fact, this last point deserves some further notice. One of the core aims of this chapter 
is to demonstrate that one internalistically-realized account of the structure of concepts is 
compatible with the Putnam-Kripke intuitions. However, formulating the goal this way has set 
the bar rather low: in principle, infinitely many internalist or descriptivist meaning hypotheses 
are compatible with the Putnam-Kripke intuitions. What we need is an account of the structure 
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of concepts the motivation of which is principled, and not merely stipulated to save internalist 
accounts of meaning. I think I have provided such an account with the Causal Model Theory. 
In contrast to the externalist agenda, the conception of meaning we are left with—one in 
which we merely focus on individualist aspects of humans, yet do not have to study any aspects 
of the world in order to illuminate the meaning of words (a task, which, plausibly, should be left 
to physicists, chemists, etc.)—is seamlessly integratable with other domains of the science of 
language. 
 
Appendix 
To formally represent causality relations, causal graphical models use directed acyclic graphs.54 
Like all graphs, these consist of nodes and edges. In our model, the nodes are simply features that 
can be on or off; and the edges represent a causal relationship between two nodes. Unlike some 
other graphical models, the edges of directed acyclic graphs are directed (𝑋 → 𝑌), which is useful 
to represent the asymmetry of causal relations. Moreover, these graphs are acyclic: if they start 
with a node, 𝑋, the path emerging from 𝑋 can’t end in 𝑋. Causes can be direct and indirect: in the 
causal graph 𝑋 → 𝑌 → 𝑍, 𝑌 is the direct cause of 𝑍, while 𝑋 is the indirect cause of 𝑍. The set of 
direct causes of a node 𝑋 in a causal graph is called the set of 𝑋’s parents. If a cause node doesn’t 
have a cause itself, it is called a root cause. Most causal graphical models, including ours, include 
a quantitative component to represent numerical information about the graph and make precise 
quantitative predictions about a given domain of application. 
 
54 For a complete description of Bayesian networks of causal graphical models, see Pearl (1988). 
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We will here follow the approach to graphical models and their parametization as 
presented in the work by Bob Rehder (Rehder, 2003b; 2003a; 2017). Thus, we here assume that 
the causal links are generative (they make their effects more likely) and independent (each causal 
link operates autonomously). Our feature variables can take the values 0 (‘off’) and 1 (‘on’), and 
our model will include three additional probability parameters, 𝑏, 𝑚 and 𝑐. Consider the graph 
in figure 7. Here, 𝑐 represents the marginal probability of the root cause feature variable 𝑋.55 𝑚 
is the ‘strength’ of the causal link; the probability that the causal mechanism between 𝑋 and the 𝑌s operates successfully when 𝑋 is present. Finally, 𝑏 represents the probability that an effect 
variable—in this case, one of the 𝑌s—is brought about by a background cause other than 𝑋. 
Importantly, causal graphical models are governed by two principles: the Causal Markov and the 
Faithfulness assumption. 
 
55 Specifically, 𝑐 represents the probability that the feature is present conditional on the presence of the category the 
feature is a feature of. 
Figure 7. Simple causal graph. 
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Causal Markov Assumption Any variable is independent of its noneffects conditional on its 
direct causes. 
Faithfulness Assumption The only independencies are those implied by the Markov 
assumption. 
These principles ensure that the graphical component and the numerical component of the model 
cohere and express the same dependence and relevance relations. They also capture the relevance 
relations we want the graph to express: a direct cause matters for its effect node even if we account 
for all other nodes in the graph (otherwise, they should be independent in the numerical 
component and not adjacent in the graph). Given these principles and assumptions of elementary 
probability theory, these parameters determine the probability that the model will generate any 
combination of the features 𝑋, 𝑌! and 𝑌". 
How can we determine the joint probabilities? Because of the Causal Markov Assumption, 
the joint probability of given variables will factor into the following rule of product 
decomposition for any causal model (see Danks, 2014; Pearl, Glymour, & Jewell, 2016; Rehder, 
2017): 
(1)    𝑃(𝑓!. 𝑓", . . . , 𝑓%) = ∏ 𝑃&'!..% (𝑓&|𝑝𝑎(𝑓&)) 
where 𝐹 = {𝑓!, 𝑓", . . . 𝑓%} stands for the features of a given category, and 𝑝𝑎(𝑓&) stands for the 
parents of 𝑓& in the category’s causal model. Thus, for the causal model in fig. 1, the joint 
probability distribution over the variables is: 
𝑃(𝑋, 𝑌!, 𝑌") = 𝑃(𝑋)𝑃(𝑌!|𝑋)𝑃(𝑌"|𝑋) 
And we can represent the values of the conditional probabilities as a function of the parameters 𝑏 and 𝑚: 
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(2)  𝑃(𝑓& = 1|𝑝𝑎(𝑓&)) = 1 − (1 − 𝑏&)∏ ()$∈+,()%) 1 −𝑚/&)/%0()$) 
where, as before, 𝑚/& is the strength of the causal link between feature 𝑗 and parent 𝑖, 𝑏& is the 
effect of background causes (causal influences exogenous to the model) on feature 𝑗, and 𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑓/) 
is an indicator function that yields 1 if feature 𝑓/ is present and 0 otherwise. For example, for our 
common cause network in figure 1 we get the generating function: 
(3)   𝑃(𝑌/ = 1|𝑋) = 1 − (1 − 𝑏$$)(1 − 𝑚#$$)/%0(#) 
With equations [1] and [3], we can get the joint probabilities of all feature configurations for 
our model, and are able to test the predictions of the model. To illustrate, let us quickly run 
through an example. Let us assume that 𝑋 and 𝑌! in our model are present (so 𝑋 = 1 and 𝑌! = 1) 
while 𝑌" is absent (so 𝑌" = 0). Let us further assume the following parameter values: 
𝑐	 = 	0.75		
𝑚#$! 	= 	𝑚#$" 	= 	0.8		
𝑏$! =	𝑏$" 	= 	0.2	
We can then calculate the joint probability as follows: 
(1 − (1 − 𝑏$!)(1 − 𝑚#$!))(1 − 𝑏$")(1 − 𝑚#$")𝑐# ≈ 0.1 
Thus, the joint probability 𝑃(𝑋 = 1, 𝑌! = 1, 𝑌" = 0) is roughly 0.1. This means that, assuming 
the above values of the parameters 𝑐, 𝑚 and 𝑏, the likelihood that the causal model in figure 1 
generates an object that has the 𝑋 and 𝑌! feature, but lacks the 𝑌" feature, is roughly 0.1.56 
 
56 This value can either be used as a monotonically-related proxy for a posterior probability value, as is often done 
in statistics, or used to directly infer category membership via application of Bayes’ rule. 
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Relations between features of a category also affect categorization insofar as they alter 
the importance of individual features. According to Causal Model Theory, the weight of 
individual features (i.e., their marginal probability) can be derived by the joint distribution of a 
given causal graphical model (Rehder 2017): 
According to Causal Model Theory, the weight of individual features (i.e., their marginal 
probability) can be derived by the joint distribution of a given causal graphical model (Rehder 
2017). A cause will have a higher feature weight than its effect, unless the strengths of the causal 
link and the effect’s background cause are too strong (see equation [4]). This is the causal status 
effect. 
(4)    𝑃(𝑓 = 1) = 1 − (1 − 𝑏&)∏ (/∈+,()%) 1 −𝑚/&𝑃(𝑖)) 
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Chapter 3 
An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I develop an essentialist model of the semantics of slurs. I defend the view that slurs are a 
species of kind terms: Slur concepts encode mini-theories which represent an essence-like element that is 
causally connected to a set of negatively-valenced stereotypical features of a social group. The truth-
conditional contribution of slur nouns can then be captured by the following schema: For a given slur S 
of a social group G and a person P, S is true of P iff P bears the “essence” of G—whatever this essence is—
which is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features associated with G and predicted of P. 
Since there is no essence that is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features of a social group, 
slurs have null-extension, and consequently, many sentences containing them are either meaningless or 
false. After giving a detailed outline of my theory, I show that it receives strong linguistic support. In 
particular, it can account for a wide range of linguistic cases that are regarded as challenging, central data 
for any theory of slurs. Finally, I show that my theory also receives convergent support from cognitive 
psychology and psycholinguistics. 
 
1. Introduction 
On New Year’s Eve 2016, the Cologne Police Department proudly reported via Twitter that it 
was currently screening hundreds of “nafris” at the main train station in Cologne.57 The label 
‘nafri’, used by the police to refer to North Africans, had its (public) linguistic debut in this tweet, 
which was immediately followed by national moral outrage. Later, when justifying the 
department’s choice of words, the police chief claimed that “[i]t is undeniable that there is an 
accumulation of criminal acts by persons from North African areas, and we needed to find a 
 
57 The original German tweet reads: “#PolizeiNRW #Silvester2016 #SicherInKöln: Am HBF werden derzeit 
mehrere Hundert Nafris überprüft. Infos folgen”. Cf. http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/silvester-kontrollen-
in-koeln-was-bitteschoen-ist-ein-nafri-a-1128172.html, downloaded 01.01.2017. 
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police-internal term for that”.58 So what were people so upset about? The police department 
introduced a term that functions to convey a causal link between membership in the social 
category of North Africans and criminal behavior. In other words, they introduced a term that 
negatively essentialized its targets: It doesn’t only attribute criminal behavior to the group, it also 
says that members of the group have this trait in virtue of some North-African “nature”. It is as if 
‘nafri’ says: “there is something about North-Africans that makes them criminal”. This, as I will here 
argue, is the key semantic characteristic of slurs. As I see it, slurs are kind terms encoding an 
“essence” of a social group, which is taken to explain a number of negative features attributed to 
the group. In effect, then, the police department introduced a slur for people from North African 
countries into the German language community, and people were rightly upset about it. 
The main aim of this chapter is to introduce to the philosophical debate an essentialist 
theory of slurs that has, to my knowledge, not yet been given adequate consideration. The main 
thesis of this chapter is that slurs59 are a species of failed kind terms; they are terms which, although 
introduced with the intention of designating kinds, fail to do so. All recognized properties of slurs 
are derivable from this simple semantic base; no additional linguistic entities need to be posited 
to account for the special features of slurring vocabulary. Although the primary goal of this 
chapter is to motivate an essentialist semantics of slurs rather than to defeat theoretical 
alternatives, it is worth mentioning that I take my essentialist model to have a central virtue that 
 
58 German original: “Eine Häufung an Straftaten von Personen aus dem nordafrikanischen Raum lasse sich aber 
nicht bestreiten, und dafür müsse dann polizeiintern auch ein Begriff gefunden werden.” 
(http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-01/koeln-silvesternacht-polizei-nafri-tweet-racial-
profiling, downloaded 01.01.2017). 
59 One question that has come up in the literature on slurs is how to delineate the class of slurs, and, relatedly, how 
to distinguish slurs from other pejoratives (see, e.g., Anderson & Lepore, 2013; Bach, 2018; Croom, 2011; Jeshion, 
2013a; Popa-Wyatt, 2016). My answer to this question has direct consequences for the scope of my theory. Although 
I agree with other theorists that there is a clear distinction between paradigmatic slurs and paradigmatic non-
slurring pejoratives (e.g., so-called “individual pejoratives” like ‘jerk’ or ‘asshole’), I disagree with them by holding 
that these two classes lie on a continuum rather than being clearly definable. Correspondingly, the boundary of the 
scope of my theory is fuzzy. In the section on derogatory variation, I will explain how the mechanics of my model 
explain that there are middle cases that are not clearly classifiable into either category.  
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makes it stand out from competing theories, namely that it can account for the acknowledged 
desiderata of an adequate semantics of slurs while receiving strong support from empirical work 
in cognitive psychology, especially the work on cognitive essentialism encountered in chapter 1.  
In what follows, I assume a theory of natural kind terms according to which they encode 
an essence of a kind, k, that is explanatorily connected to a set of stereotypical features associated 
with k. This way of carving out the semantics of natural kind terms differs slightly from the 
classical Kripkean framework of natural kind terms. Since I take descriptive information about 
stereotypical features to be part of the lexical entry of kind terms, I am committed to a conception 
of lexical representations as informationally rich. However, instead of debating foundational 
issues in lexical semantics, I will here simply assume this framework and show what some of its 
fruits are.60  
 I begin by giving a detailed outline of my theory. Next, I introduce key linguistic 
desiderata of a theory of the meaning of slurs, and show that my theory meets all of them. Finally, 
I present evidence from cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics for my essentialist account.  
 
2.  Slurs as Failed Kind Terms 
2.1 The View 
The main thesis of this chapter is that slurs are akin to natural kind terms. Under the framework 
of natural kind terms that I am assuming, natural kind terms are introduced to designate an 
essence that is explanatorily connected to a set of stereotypical features of a kind. Slur terms are 
 
60 In fact, my results will be the same under a framework of natural kind terms according to which they rigidly 
designate an essence and do not encode any stereotypical features. Since these are used to descriptively fix the 
reference upon introduction of the kind term, the reference of slur terms will still be empty, but the alleged referents 
will still be presupposed to possess an “essence” with negative causal-dispositional potential.  
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distinctive because they designate61 an essence that is explanatorily connected to a set of negative 
stereotypical features of a social group. Thus, slurs are a species of kind terms and to be treated 
semantically on a par with terms such as ‘water’, ‘gold’, or ‘tiger’. Scott Soames (2007) describes 
natural kind terms such as ‘water’ as introduced by the following schema: 
The term ‘water’ is to designate the unique substance of which (nearly) all members of the class of its 
paradigmatic samples are instances. Substances are explanatory kinds instances of which share the same 
basic physical constitution, which in turn explains their most salient characteristics—in the case of water 
samples, the fact that they boil and freeze at certain temperatures, that they are clear, potable, and 
necessary to life, etc. Hence, the predicate ‘is water’ will apply (at a world-state) to precisely those 
quantities that have the physical constitution which, at the actual world-state, explains the salient features 
of (nearly) all paradigmatic water-samples. (Soames, 2007, p. 2) 
‘Water’ hence, designates whatever underlying physical characteristic—call it “essence”—is shared 
by all ‘water’-members and explains and gives rise to the paradigmatic features of water. 
Similarly, I maintain that the N-word is used to designate a “blackness essence”—whatever that 
is—which is causally responsible for and explains negative features stereotypically associated 
with being black. ‘Faggot’ is true of those people who share the “gay essence”—whatever that 
is—which is causally responsible for and explains stereotypical negative features associated with 
gay persons.62 In general, slur concepts encode mini-theories which represent an essence-like 
element that is causally connected to a set of negatively-valenced stereotypical features 
associated with a social group (see chapter 2). The truth-conditional contribution of slur nouns 
can then be captured by the following schema: For a given slur S of a social group G and a person 
 
61 Throughout the chapter, I do not use ‘designate’, ‘refer’, and cognate expressions as success terms. As has already 
become clear, the view defended in this chapter is that slurs have null-extension, and thus do not designate or refer 
to anything. 
62 After the term has been introduced into a language community, it is possible that some stereotypes associated 
with a slur change. For example, at the time of introduction of ‘faggot’, the “gayness essence” wasn’t taken to explain 
the feature of carrying HIV, a negative stereotypical feature now associated with the slur, since the slur predates the 
discovery of the virus. In these cases, we simply discover more features to be caused by the essence (just as with other 
natural kind terms), and update the concept accordingly. Insofar as the updated concept is sufficiently similar, 
concept identity is preserved (see section 1.3). Note, however, that the focus of this chapter is on lexical, not 
diachronic, semantics. Diachronic phenomena, such as acquisition, lexical transition from non-slurring to slurring 
meaning, meaning identity over time, or appropriation have to be addressed in a separate paper. 
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P, S is true of P iff P bears the “essence” of G—whatever that essence is—which is causally 
responsible for stereotypical negative features associated with G and predicted of P.  
Importantly, the claim is not that there are essences of the kind mentioned. Although 
slurs are introduced with the intention of designating natural kinds, in most cases, they actually 
fail to do so. In contrast to ‘water’, ‘gold’ or ‘tiger’, there obviously will be no underlying, unified 
causal explanation for the set of (often inaccurate) stereotypical features that is supposed to be 
explained by the essence (see also Appiah, 1985; 1996; Zack, 2002). More concretely, there is no 
such thing as a “gayness essence” which disposes male homosexuals to carry HIV or dress 
stylishly. There is no such thing as a “blackness essence” which causes black people to deal drugs 
or receive welfare. Thus, the semantic contents of slurring words are empty. 
I will now break down the structure of slur concepts into three core elements that, 
according to the view I am advocating here, together constitute a theory-like representation 
encoded in those concepts.63 The central element of a slur is the causal component: the intrinsic 
“hidden unobservable” that explains and gives rise to the superficial, stereotypically observable 
features and actions of members of the social category in question (cf. chapter 1). It is this causally 
deep component that we call the “essence”. These “essences” are to be thought of as the intrinsic, 
“underlying natures that make them the thing that they are” (Medin, 1989, p. 1476), or as an 
object’s “underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an 
object its identity, and is responsible for other similarities that category members share” 
(Gelman, 2004, p. 404). Importantly, the essence can, but does not have to be, represented as 
being biologically grounded. In fact, it does not have to be known what exactly the essence is. As 
 
63 In the course of the chapter, I often use the terms ‘term’ and ‘concept’ interchangeably. This is because I take the 
view for granted according to which terms inherit their linguistic meaning directly from internally individuated 
lexical concepts, which I understand as the smallest constituents of thought and primary bearers of meaning. 
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cognitive psychologists Medin and Ortony put it, essentialism can be thought of as “a 
‘placeholder’ notion: one can believe that a category possesses an essence without knowing what 
the essence is” (Medin & Ortony, 1989).64   
The second component comprises stereotype features of the reference group that, in 
contrast to ordinary natural kind terms, must be represented as negative. These features provide 
a heuristic for the identification of individuals of the essentialized group. That is, the observable 
surface features—which are, in the eyes of the racist, xenophobe, or homophobe, dominantly 
negative65—deliver a reliable indicator for the presence of the causally powerful essence. And 
since they are caused by the essential property in question, it is assumed that members of the 
class have an inherent disposition to exhibit those features. Thus, it is assumed that most, but 
not necessarily all, individuals of an essentialized group share one or another subset of those 
features. But what’s decisive for belonging to the essentialized group is the presence of the shared 
underlying “essence” or “hidden nature”. This nature causally disposes the subject to exhibit the 
negative surface features, whether or not they actually display them at any given moment.  
 
64 Thus, the notion of ‘essentialism’ that I operate with is the one that is used in the literature on psychological 
essentialism (Gelman, 2003; Haslam et al., 2004; Medin & Ortony, 1989), which, in the philosophical literature, is 
sometimes referred to as “quintessentialism” (S.-J. Leslie, 2013). 
65 The negativity-aspect of the theory raises an important question: What does it take for a feature to be negative? 
Generally, I take a quasi-subjectivist stance on this matter: A feature is negative when it is represented as negative 
by a sufficient number of subjects. Under this conception, negativity is highly context-sensitive. Even if a feature is 
generally seen as positive or neutral, it can become negative in certain contexts. For example, while +HAVING HIGH 
SAT SCORES or +DRESSING STYLISHLY are, in and by themselves, positive qualities, they are evaluated as threatening 
and negative when combined with certain social outgroups as in the first example, or certain genders as in the latter. 
Similarly, many encoded features, such as skin tone or facial configuration, will be objectively absolutely valence-
free, but can either be encoded as proxies for other negative features and thus themselves become represented as 
negative, or be irrationally encoded as negative in the first place. 
 A reviewer also pointed out to me that the negativity-aspect of my proposed semantics might create a 
problem in accounting for sentences such as “I’m hopeless at fashion. I wish I knew some fag who could just tell me 
how to dress to attract the ladies”, which should come out infelicitous under my account, since it is used to ascribe 
and explain properties the speaker takes to be positive. However, I do not think this is correct. We often use negative 
properties of others to our favor, as in: “I’m in love with this woman, but she has a husband. I wish I knew some 
criminal, bad person who could help me get rid of my problem.” This is perfectly coherent, despite the fact that 
+CRIMINAL or +BAD are negative properties and the speaker represents them to be negative—the speaker just uses 
these negative properties to his favor. For a persuasive response to a similar objection by Camp (2013), see Jeshion 
(2018). 
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 As the first and second component don’t stand in an accidental, but in a causal-
nomological relation to one another, we need a third semantic component to capture this special 
relation. This element is a representation of this very causal, law-like relationship. This 
relationship is crucial for the informational organization of the category that is represented in 
our concept, since it relates the essence and the stereotypical features of the social reference group 
in a way that is not merely arbitrary or correlational, but grounded in causal laws.  
The immensely derogatory, toxic power of slur terms and their distinctively racist (or 
xenophobic, homophobic, sexist, etc.) content directly derives from the outlined semantics. When 
the racist, xenophobe, or homophobe applies a slur, he thereby makes the target in question—
and anyone who “shares the same essence”—part of the mini-theory, subjugating her to a form of 
causal determinism and thereby depriving her of human autonomy and self-determination. How 
Figure 8. Model of lexical entry of a slur. 
essence 
group 
essence 
causal law negative stereotypical 
features 
Negative stereotype 
 
1. Contemptible evaluation by offender 
2. Derogatory / dehumanizing evaluation 
by target 
Normative 
evaluation 
Negative stereotype 
Negative stereotype 
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the targets are disposed to act is, in the eyes of the slur user, determined and consequently 
importantly constrained by the causally potent essence. Members of the targeted group are thus 
not evaluated by their individual acts or in relation to their environmental circumstances, but by 
(pre-)determined membership in a group.66 Crucially, the attributed essence is seen as disposing 
their bearers to act badly, or to exhibit negative features. Thus, by carrying the relevant “group 
essence”, a black or gay person is always predisposed to, for example, exhibit certain traits or 
behaviors—even if all available evidence indicates otherwise. Taken together, it is easy to see 
how the application of an essentialized slur term is derogating, demeaning, and dehumanizing to 
the target and the entire social group she is a member of (cf. figure 8).67 
Consider again the analogous behavior of other concepts corresponding to kind terms, 
e.g., the natural kind concept KANGAROO. We learned in chapter 1 that young children think that 
kangaroos that grow up with goats will nevertheless be good at hopping. We act as if kangaroos 
are just made to hop (Gelman, 2004; Gelman & Wellman, 1991). So just as a kangaroo cannot lose 
its “kangaroohood” if it is raised in a goat family, and is dispositionally “made” to hop even if it 
doesn’t do so (cf. for an empirical overview Gelman, 2003; 2004), so are the members of the social 
groups in question not evaluated by their individual circumstances or self-determined acts and 
decisions. This is precisely what is responsible for the dehumanizing power of slurs, as the 
attribution of “essences” that pre-determine the target’s dispositions, character traits, attitudes, 
and behaviors creates a picture of the target according to which she lacks the full spectrum of 
 
66 See Basu (2019) for a recent argument that epistemically representing others in a way that treats them as scientific 
objects—i.e., essentializes them—constitutes a case of wronging. 
67 We will develop a more thorough account of the relationship between essentialism and dehumanization in chapter 
4. 
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human autonomy and self-determination that we associate with personhood (see chapter 4 of this 
dissertation).68  
 
2.2 Some Helpful Contrasts 
One of the most important things to emphasize is that on my view, slur terms are not synonymous 
with their neutral counterparts. In fact, my account of slurs doesn’t appeal to the meaning of their 
neutral counterparts at all. ‘Gay’, ‘Jew’, or ‘Hispanic’ are governed by conventions that crucially 
differ from ‘faggot’, ‘kike’, or ‘spic’. Much research confirms that race concepts are highly 
essentialized, an issue we will later cover in more detail. But although ‘gay’, ‘Jew’, or ‘Hispanic’ 
can be represented as socially essentialized categories that “share a common nature” and facilitate 
(especially negative) generalizations (cf. Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005; Gelman, 2003; Haslam 
& Levy, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Hirschfeld, 1996; Leslie, 2017; Pauker, 
Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010; Prentice & Miller, 2007), the meaning of the nouns that refer to 
those categories is still much more innocuous, both with regard to its causal determinism and 
the stereotypes they encode.  
First, even if we say that slurs’ neutral counterparts are sometimes essentialized, I 
contend that the essence referred to by, say, ‘chink’ is not identical to the essence of ‘Chinese’. Also 
under the assumption that ethnic labels sometimes function as kind terms, the kind they 
designate differs from the kind their closest slur-relative designates. I merely chose “Chinese 
essence” as a label for the essence placeholder that unifies, in the eyes of the racist, the alleged 
 
68 Remember that although slurs are a species of kind terms, they possess a feature that distinguishes them from 
classic natural kind terms such as ‘water’, ‘gold’, or ‘tiger’. In the case of ‘water’, the essence in question is 
explanatorily connected to the salient features of paradigmatic instances of water; “that they boil and freeze at certain 
temperatures, that they are clear, potable, and necessary to life” (Soames, 2007). The valence of the salient features 
is completely irrelevant. In the case of slurs, in contrast, the essence must be connected to negative stereotypes of the 
social group in question.  
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referents of the slur; I could as well have called it “chinkness essence”. Second, even persons 
whose representation of races or ethnicities is very essentialized do not have to conceptualize 
these racial essences as causally linked to negative properties in order to be competent with the 
race or ethnicity terms. They can believe in a “hidden nature” of races while not believing that 
the features caused by this nature are mostly negative. Thirdly, the convention governing racial 
terms generally permits higher degrees of causal innocence than the linguistic conventions 
governing slur terms. This means that it is not necessary in order to be competent with the terms 
‘Chinese’, ‘Arab’, or ‘homosexual’ to encode that instances of these kinds share a causal essence 
that pre-disposes them to behave in negative ways. It is possible to refer to people with an Arab 
background in a neutral manner that does not essentialize them. In fact, many contexts require 
even the racist or homophobe to be aware of a non-essentialist convention that is endorsed in the 
case of racial, ethnic, or sexual vocabulary.69  
To explain the mechanics of my view, it is helpful to draw contrasts to some other 
superficially similar views. My account bears similarities to the hybrid family-resemblance 
account by Adam Croom (2011; 2014a; 2015) and the perspectival account by Elisabeth Camp 
(2013; 2018). According to Croom, slurs contain both an expressive and a descriptive component, 
the latter of which consists of a list of weighed prototypical features. Since the prototypical 
features encoded by slurs and their neutral counterparts differ, it follows that they are not truth-
conditionally equivalent. Although my account, like Croom’s, treats slurs as informationally rich, 
there are a number of important differences between them. Under my account, slurs do not 
 
69 Consider, for instance, the conventions governing legal contexts. Here, occurrences of social group terms such as 
‘homosexual’ have a purely descriptive meaning whose referents can be determined by a fixed set of criteria. In this 
case, it would be something akin to ‘everyone that has same-sex preferences or engages in same-sex behavior’. As a 
result, a racist or homophobe would have to comprehend the neutral-descriptive meaning attached to the neutral 
counterparts in order to be competent with the terms. In contrast, to fully master a slur word, “successful application” 
requires one to tacitly understand the causal story between some essence and negative stereotypes that I here 
outlined. In contrast to the convention of their neutral counterparts, the convention governing slurs does not leave 
open the possibility of a causally-neutral application. 
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merely encode feature lists; rather, they encode information in a way that is causally organized. In 
particular, slurs relate prototypical features nomologically to causally powerful essences.70 As we 
will see in the next sections, the causal elements explanatorily differentiate my account from 
Croom’s, for they lead to a number of distinct linguistic and psychological predictions about 
phenomena such as derogatory variation, essentialism about social groups, or nominalization. 
Most importantly, the causal elements play a crucial role in ensuring that slurs will come out as 
empty, as there is and will be no “deep essence” that explains features associated with a group, 
even if the stereotypes, due to effects of structural disadvantages, might accurately represent certain members 
of oppressed groups.71  
According to Camp’s perspectival account of slurs, “slurs make two distinct, coordinated 
contributions to a sentence’s conventional communicative role: a truth-conditional predication of 
group membership, and endorsement of a derogating perspective on that group” (Camp, 2018, p. 
30). In virtue of the second speech-act, a speaker signals their allegiance to a perspective72 
according to which the target’s group membership is explanatory of many of her other properties, 
and predicts the display of negative stereotypical properties. This second speech-act is similar in 
spirit to the semantics I propose here.  
 
70 For defenses of causally-structured models of concepts and criticisms of purely feature-based models of conceptual 
representation, see Danks, 2014; Gelman, 2003; Murphy, 2004; Rehder, 2017; Sloman, 2005; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 
1998, and chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
71 Notice another difference: To explain the relationship between neutral counterparts and slurs, Croom posits a 
“conceptual anchor”, individuated by the prototype property with the largest feature weight. These features have a 
“grounding role” insofar as they “serve as salient anchors for the semantic or conceptual content of slurs” (Croom, 
2015, p. 35). Although properties corresponding to the neutral counterpart will often have high inductive weight 
and thereby explain the relationship between slurs and paradigmatic targets, these features, on my account, do not 
“ground” or “anchor” the meaning of slurs, just like +WET does not ground the meaning of ‘water’. 
72 Camp characterizes a perspective as “an intuitive tool for structuring thoughts: a disposition to notice, explain, 
and respond to some part of the world in certain ways. Perspectives in general may, but need not, include any 
particular propositional or attitudinal commitments; and they are partly, but only partly, under voluntary control” 
(Camp, 2018, p. 30). 
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Despite these similarities, there are key differences between our accounts. Perhaps most 
importantly, I only posit one, purely predicative, speech-act to explain the semantics of slurs. As 
the pure truth-conditional attribution of neutral counterpart group membership doesn’t play any 
role on my account, Camp’s first, predicational speech-act comes out as explanatorily redundant 
on my account. As a result of this difference, the accounts diverge with regard to some key 
linguistic predictions, which we will assess in the next section. As with Croom, one of the crucial 
predictive differences is that predications of slurs always come out false under my account, 
whereas they often come out as true for the predicative speech-act component of Camp’s 
account.73  
But also the second, perspectival speech-act does not do what slurs do under my construal. 
According to Camp’s characterization of this second speech-act,  “slurs are akin to other 
expressions [like ‘tu’/‘vous’ or slang expressions for parents, food, or genitals], part of whose 
conventional function is not merely to refer or predicate, but to signal the speaker’s social, 
psychological, and/or emotional relation to that semantic value” (Camp, 2013, p. 335); thus, slurs 
contribute “a (broadly) expressive, perspectival element to the conversation” (my emphasis; Camp, 2018, 
p. 48). The latter quote is instructive: The second speech-act is broadly expressive, because it is 
about the speaker’s perspective on a referent. In contrast, although they can reveal something 
about my perspective—just as calling a chair “sofa” can reveal something about my perspective 
on the chair—slurs are not about perspectives on my account. In my view, slurs’ meaning is 
predicative in the full-fledged, traditional sense. What slurs say of you is that you have some 
group essence that disposes you to display bad features; thus, a slur-predication will be either 
 
73 Another difference is that Camp explicitly rejects that slurs, generally, conventionally encode stereotypes. 
However, because she suspects that some slurs do encode stereotypes, I will treat this difference as not too important 
(see Camp, 2013). 
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true or false of you. It is precisely because of the purely predicative function that slurs come out 
as empty.  
 
2.3 Objections 
Before we move on, let me respond to a salient objection against the proposed model, 
namely that it is too informationally demanding for competent language speakers. Two worries 
of this type seem particularly concerning. First, two people can plausibly employ a slur in 
communication without talking past each other, although each of them associates different 
stereotypes with it. Second, someone can be competent with a slur without knowing the 
stereotype associated with it. In the slurs literature, these worries have been spelled out by Robin 
Jeshion and Elisabeth Camp (Camp, 2013; Jeshion, 2013b). However, it is important to bear in 
mind that they are in fact versions of familiar, more general worries about rich views of lexical 
meaning that often come up outside of the slurs debate, such as in discussion of inferential role or 
prototype theories of concepts (Fodor, 1998; Fodor & Lepore, 1992; Rey, 1983). 
The main goal of this chapter is to assume a specific account of lexical meaning as richly 
structured and argue that it helps us explain certain patterns that are unique to slurs. The 
background semantic framework I assume is a live option in current debates about the nature of 
meaning and conceptual structure.74 So although I will briefly respond to the objections that have 
come up against treating slurs along these lines, the appropriate locus for a full response to these 
 
74 Issues regarding the richness of conceptual structure and its intersection with linguistic competence constitute an 
object of ongoing, vivid discussion in philosophy and the cognitive sciences (see Block, 1987; Del Pinal, 2016; 2018; 
Fodor, 1998; 2005; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 2014; Gärdenfors, 2000; Harman, 1993; Jönsson, 2017; Kamp & Partee, 1995; 
Knobe, Prasada, & Newman, 2013; Lakoff, 1987; Leslie, 2015; Marconi, 1997; Prinz, 2012; Putnam, 1975; Soames, 
2015; Taylor, 2009). 
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objections is in another paper discussing the general viability of this approach to meaning and 
concepts.  
A number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have presented convincing replies to 
the first worry (see, e.g., Chomsky, 2000; Harman, 1993; Marconi, 1997; Smith, Medin, & Rips, 
1984). Their strategy emphasizes that, holding the level of competence fixed, similarity of 
conceptual content is all we need to explain the stability of meaning between different speakers, 
and, for that matter, communicative success. More concretely, if the mental concepts that two 
speakers associate with a word are sufficiently similar, we would expect that information 
exchange, in most cases, proceeds smoothly.75 Appealing to high similarity instead of strict 
identity also explains the fact that we sometimes miscommunicate or are in disagreement about 
the extension of a given term in borderline cases. If the meaning of every word type was strictly 
identical between each competent speaker, these phenomena would become a mystery. Thus, 
modeling meaning stability in terms of content similarity allows for communicative success and 
exceeds the descriptive accuracy of a strict identity view. This point can directly be applied to 
slurs. Due to similarity of content, communication will proceed “smoothly” in most cases. Only 
in rare borderline cases, communication between two subjects might be unsuccessful. 
Let us turn to the second worry. Is it possible to be competent with the meaning of a slur 
and not have knowledge of any associated stereotype? According to Jeshion, someone can 
coherently and competently utter 
 
75 This point is quite important and often neglected in discussions of conceptions of meaning that appeal to 
stereotypes. It belongs to the operationalization of a stereotype that it is highly stable: Something is a stereotype only 
if it is highly stable in a population. If there was no cross-subject stability, we would not call a given property a 
stereotype. Relatedly, if stereotypes allowed for high variability, we would not get reliable and replicable effects in 
experimental paradigms and hence wouldn’t be able to find any stereotype effects in controlled settings—but we do. 
Also detrimental phenomena such as the stereotype threat would not be very worrisome if the associations triggered 
were as variable across subjects as is suggested by the objection. 
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(1) “I disdain those queers; anyone who would do that is sick. But I do not endorse those 
[stereotypes] as the right way of thinking about queers. I have no idea who does it, what 
they are like, and I don’t care. I just think those queers should be locked up.” (Jeshion, 
2013b, p. 322) 
 
Assuming that the intuition Jeshion capitalizes on is generalizable,76 the essentialist 
theory has the resources to account for it. The speaker in (1) has to do quite some work and 
introduce a variety of qualifications to get their intended, minimal meaning of ‘queer’ across. 
Although the speaker rejects many stereotypes, one surface property that the speaker regards as 
highly negative is left, which they make salient through “anyone who would do that is sick”. 
According to my theory, the context of utterance makes it clear that the speaker means to pick 
out someone who bears the “queerness essence”, which makes the person inherently sick and 
causally explains the property of same-sex behavior, which, in the eyes of the speaker, is clearly 
negative.77 And although we can make sense of this contextually modified case in a way fully 
compatible with the essentialist theory, the standing meaning of ‘queer’ will still be one that fully 
corresponds to the semantics I propose—i.e., one in which more than only the minimal stereotype 
is communicated. 
 
76 As has been pointed out before (Camp, 2013), it is unclear how uniform the intuitions about (1) are, and thus 
whether our theory should accommodate this data point. I, for one, have extreme difficulties making sense of (1), 
especially if schematically replaced with other slurs. Here’s one reason that might explain my difficulty. It seems to 
be a true generalization that slurs emerge in communities that interact with the people they are slurring. This is why 
slurs are often fairly meaningless to people who are from cultures or communities that are not in touch with the 
slurred group in question. But if this is true, it will also be true that, due to interaction with slurred groups, these 
communities and competent users within them will have stereotypes of these members. It is therefore fairly difficult 
to imagine that anyone who is competent with a slur could utter something like (1). Notice that Jeshion herself goes 
on to explain that “[m]uch racism and bigotry is rooted simply on finding others ‘different’—often because of 
physical characteristics” (p. 322). +DIFFERENT or +PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTIC C, however, are stereotypical 
properties of the same status as the stereotypes Jeshion dismisses as semantically encoded (e.g., +SEXUALLY 
PROMISCUOUS). 
77 And possibly a number of other negative properties that the speaker leaves open. 
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Drawing on Putnam’s division of linguistic labor (Putnam, 1975), we can furthermore 
appeal to partial linguistic competence and deference to experts to accommodate Jeshion’s worry. 
Can we say of Putnam that he is linguistically competent with the word ‘elm’, even if his 
associated prototypes of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ are identical? In some sense, yes: He knows that ‘elm’ 
is a natural kind term and designates some “elm essence” that explains common properties of 
elms. He will not be at total loss in linguistic discourse about elms, and he will have an idea about 
the reference of the term when elms are nearby. He himself will also be able to apply the term 
correctly in many circumstances. However, Putnam also knows that there are degrees of 
competence, and that there are ‘elm’ experts in his linguistic community whose referential and 
inferential competence with the term exceeds his. Thus, Putnam is disposed to take the ‘elm’ 
expert as a linguistic authority when the circumstances require, and revise his concept in 
accordance with the expert’s more fine-grained one. Although Putnam can be said to be 
competent with the word ‘elm’, he certainly does not have the expert’s degree of linguistic 
competence. 
This point can be applied to (1). Suppose that a speaker is ignorant about the stereotype 
speakers associate with the slur. All she knows is that it is used towards people with the surface 
property +HOMOSEXUAL. Can we say that she is competent with the slur? Again, in some sense, 
yes. Since she knows that the term is a slur, she knows that it denotes an essence that must 
explain the feature +HOMOSEXUAL and some other features. Thus, in many circumstances, she 
will be able to use the term appropriately, including to draw the right inferences from it and pick 
out its intended referents. But again, since competence comes in degrees, we wouldn’t say that 
the speaker is fully competent: There will be situations in which she will be confused about the 
referent of the word—for example, in cases in which the intended referent of a more competent 
user does not engage in same-sex behavior, but exhibits other stereotypes that license inference 
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to the essence. Since the speaker also knows that there are “experts” of the term in their linguistic 
community, she will be disposed to update her entry for the slur if she takes her interlocutors to 
be linguistic authorities.  
 
3.  Slurs in Natural Language  
Having presented the view, I will now demonstrate its explanatory reach. Slurs exhibit unique 
linguistic patterns that have proven difficult to capture. However, since these data are 
acknowledged as explanatorily central for a successful theory of slurs, any adequate account must 
have the resources to explain them. The data include: (1) G-extending, (2) G-contracting, and (3) 
G-referencing uses of slurs (Croom, 2015; Jeshion, 2013a), (4) non-derogatory, non-appropriated 
uses of slurs (Hom, 2008; Jeshion, 2013a), (5) intuitions about null-extension and falsehood (Hom, 
2008; Hom & May, 2013; Richard, 2008; Sennet & Copp, 2015), (6) projection behavior (Anderson 
& Lepore, 2013; Camp, 2013; 2018; Cepollaro & Stojanovic, 2016; Jeshion, 2013b; Potts, 2007) 
and (7) derogatory variation of slurs (Bolinger, 2017; Hom, 2008; Jeshion, 2013a; Nunberg, 2018; 
Popa-Wyatt, 2016). In what follows, I will go through these linguistic phenomena and 
demonstrate that the essentialist theory can handle them in a direct, non-stipulative way.  
 
(1) G-extending Uses of Slurs 
Imagine the following sentence as uttered by a high school student to describe his classmate 
John, who doesn’t like sports and has interests in art:  
(2) “John is not gay, but he is still a faggot.” 
Similarly, we can imagine someone dissenting with (3a), yet assenting with (3b): 
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(3) a. “John is gay.” 
     b. “John is a faggot.” 
The first thing to notice here is that intuitively, it seems to be perfectly possible to utter (2) (or 
to disagree with (3a) yet accept (3b), for that matter)—intuitively, it does not express any 
contradiction.78 However, if ‘gay’ and ‘faggot’ were truth-conditionally equivalent, as is defended 
in many prominent accounts on slurs, (2) should express a semantic contradiction that can only 
be “rescued” pragmatically. For example, Anderson and Lepore’s minimalist analysis treats slurs’ 
semantic content to be exhausted by the truth-conditional content of the neutral counterpart 
(Anderson & Lepore, 2013). Also Jeshion’s expressivist account treats slurs’ truth-conditional 
contribution to be equivalent to the truth-conditional contribution of the neutral counterpart; an 
expressive element of contempt is added to account for the derogatory properties of slurs 
(Jeshion, 2013a). And as we saw earlier, according to Camp, one of the speech-acts slur users 
engage in is a pure predication of membership in the neutral counterpart group (Camp, 2013; 
2018). Thus, in all these cases, it would not be possible to be in the extension of ‘faggot’ without 
being in the extension of ‘gay man’.79 The second thing to notice is not only that (2) is usually 
not perceived as a contradiction, but we also have immediate, clear intuitions about the 
information it conveys. Namely, that John is not in the extension of men with a homosexual 
orientation, but—probably because he shares salient stereotypical features associated with gay 
 
78 Note that G-extending uses of ‘faggot’ are extremely common. As sociologist C. J. Pascoe notices in her study on 
masculinity and sexuality in high school, “[a] boy could get called a fag for exhibiting any sort of behavior defined 
as unmasculine (although not necessarily behaviors aligned with femininity): being stupid or incompetent, dancing, 
caring too much about clothing, being too emotional, or expressing interest (sexual or platonic) in other guys” 
(Pascoe, 2012, p. 57). 
79 The same point applies to the analyses in Bach (2018); Cepollaro & Stojanovic (2016); Hom (2008); Hom and May 
(2013; 2015); Hornsby (2001); Nunberg (2018); Potts (2004); Schlenker (2007); Sennet and Copp (2015); Whiting 
(2013); and Williamson (2009), because they either include the meaning of the neutral counterpart into the truth-
conditional meaning of a slur, or treat slurs and neutral counterparts as truth-conditionally equivalent (conditional 
on the existence on a neutral counterpart term—see Nunberg, 2018). 
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persons, such as talking about “female” topics, being physically “weak”, or dressing stylishly—is 
in the extension of ‘faggot’.  
My essentialist theory can handle the examples in (2) and (3) quite smoothly. Consider 
the homophobe uttering (2). Since in my theory, slurs are not synonymous with their neutral 
counterparts, a contradiction is not predicted. This would only be so if the application of the slur 
would entail the application of ‘having homosexual preferences’. But attribution of the slur term 
does not imply attribution of the neutral counterpart term. Recall figure 8: +NEGATIVE 
STEREOTYPE X is only a surface feature of the underlying “group essence” cause.  Thus, the deep 
and hidden “gay essence” and the superficially instantiated feature of homosexual preferences 
have crucially different causal roles. While it certainly has important stereotypical weight, it is 
possible to cancel the feature of homosexual preferences, as long as the non-changing “gay 
essence”, in the eyes of the slur user, “stays present”. This is precisely what happens in (2). The 
homophobe’s concept of ‘faggot’ encodes a mini-theory, according to which the unobservable 
causal property of a “gay essence” causes and explains observable, negative features. These 
stereotypical features, in turn, are the observational heuristics the homophobe uses to “spot” the 
“gay essence”. Since John presumably exhibits enough of those features, the speaker uttering (2) 
“efficiently” expresses that John, although not in the extension of gay people, shares some 
gayness “essence” that causes him to exhibit negative traits correlated with gayness and thus 
falls under the extension of the slur.  
 Jeshion (2013a) dubs cases as the ones in (2) and (3)—in which the slur is applied to a 
target that doesn’t belong to the group paradigmatically associated with the slur—“G-
extending” uses of slurs.80 Some theorists have tried to explain away G-extending uses by 
 
80 In her extremely insightful analysis of the linguistic behavior of slurs, Jeshion (2013a) introduces the distinction 
between G-referencing, G-extending, and G-retracting uses of slurs. 
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stipulating that they are non-literal (e.g., Anderson & Lepore, 2013; Jeshion, 2013a); therefore, a 
theory of slurs need not account for these uses. However, none of these theorists has offered an 
argument that shows that these uses are non-literal. The usual move is to point to other cases of 
metaphorical language-use and assume that these cases and G-extending uses of slurs are 
parallel. However, whether these uses are parallel is precisely what is at stake—I haven’t yet seen 
a defense of this claim that establishes, and not simply assumes, that they are.81 In fact, it is no 
surprise that these theories advocate the non-literalness solution; otherwise, G-extending uses 
would falsify their theories. And although it is not my claim that this strategy is in principle 
unavailable to debunk the data in (2) and (3), it is important to note that the essentialist theory 
provides us with a plausible explanation that takes the data at face value and captures them 
without having to rely on moves that treat G-extending uses as non-literal.82 
 Note also that G-extending uses of slurs as the one in (2) are commonplace in the 
everyday language of slur users.83 Their meaning is available immediately and effortlessly, so 
there is prima facie strong motivation for taking these highly conventional uses to be literal.84 
Additional evidence comes from constructions with modifiers and qualifiers such as ‘true’, ‘real’, 
and ‘deep down’: 
(4) “Although Leyla isn’t a socialist, she’s still a true/real commie.” 
(5) “Although Jack isn’t Italian, he’s still a true/real dago.” 
 
81 The cleanest test I can think of in which two quite uncontroversially truth-conditionally equivalent open class 
expressions in different word forms are employed in a way similar to (2) is “Guillermo is not a bachelor, but he is an 
unmarried man”. This example, however, does not pattern with (2) or (3). It is incredibly hard, if not impossible, to 
make sense of the statement.  
82 Also Cepollaro (2017b) notices that it is never argued for, but always assumed, that G-extending uses and other 
metaphorical language uses are parallel. 
83 See fn. 78. 
84 One might think that this data would also be compatible with an analysis of slurs in terms of conventional 
implicature (e.g., Copp, 2009; Whiting, 2013; Williamson, 2009); however, note that the conventional implicature 
analyses on offer will still predict that (2) and (3) result in contradictions.   
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(6) a. “I know that he’s not gay, but deep down, he’s a faggot.” 
      b. “I know you haven’t lied, but deep down, you’re a liar.” 
Intuitively, taking the slur usages in (4) to (6a) to be non-literal seems implausible. This point is 
strengthened if we look at the use of ‘liar’ in (6b). In (6b), which parallels (6a), what the speaker 
is literally accusing me of and is thus accountable for is being, deep down, a liar. To say that ‘liar’ 
is used in a non-literal sense therefore seems unjustified. Similarly, it is difficult to make sense of 
the claim that the speaker in (6a) labels someone with the slur in any non-literal way—after all, 
the speaker claims that this is what the targeted person, deep down, is. The intended meanings 
of (4)–(6) are furthermore directly available, even though the objects of discourse don’t belong to 
the neutral counterpart groups in question and the slurs have been combined with modifiers that 
don’t seem to call for metaphorical readings, such as ‘true’ and ‘real’. These data, while not 
absolutely decisive, seriously undermine the claim that G-extending are non-literal uses of slurs.  
 
(2) G-contracting Uses of Slurs 
In so-called “G-contracting” uses of slurs, the domain of possible targets is contracted: It 
is made explicit that the range of a slur is not the entire neutral counterpart group that is 
predominantly associated with a slur (see Jeshion, 2013a): 
(7) “I don’t have anything against feminists—in fact, I’m a feminist myself. What I hate 
are these feminazis.” 
 (8) “Although my best friend is gay, you can be sure that he’s not a faggot.” 
 (9) “Thank God! My new neighbors are lesbians, but they are not dykes.” 
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As with G-extending examples, (7)–(9) are perfectly meaningful, fairly common examples of slur 
usage.85 As before, a number of accounts predict that this type of sentence yields a semantic 
contradiction, since they subscribe to the view that slurs and their neutral counterpart are truth-
conditionally equivalent.86 Since slurs and their neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally 
equivalent, it is not possible to apply the neutral counterpart term to someone while denying that 
the target belongs to the set denoted by the slurring noun.87 According to the essentialist theory, 
the meaning of slurs and their counterparts is not equivalent. Thus, a slur user can deny that 
someone has an “essence” that causes negative properties while attributing the bare property of 
homosexual preferences to him. This is the case if the object of the discourse, in the eyes of the 
slur user, does not exhibit sufficient surface features that would license the inductive inference to 
the “gayness essence”. And this fits the intuition for (8): While the person under discussion has 
homosexual preferences, we take the sentence to mean that he will lack many features associated 
with a “gay nature”.  
 
 
 
 
85 For a selection of other G-contracting examples as evidence against co-referentialism about slurs, see Croom 
(2015). 
86 As in the last section, advocates of the hypothesis that slurs and their neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally 
equivalent can resort to the claim that the slur uses in (7)–(9) are non-literal. Again, I don’t claim that there are no 
strategies for these theories to accommodate this data point—after all, pragmatic moves are always available to 
explain any phenomenon away. However, leaving aside the reasons I gave in the last section against a pragmatic and 
in favor of a semantic analysis, I’d like to re-emphasize that the essentialist theory accommodates this phenomenon 
smoothly without relying on additional pragmatic explanations and is therefore arguably explanatorily more 
powerful.  
87 In fact, accounts under which semantic content is exhausted by truth-conditional content (e.g., Anderson & Lepore, 
2013; Nunberg, 2018) predict that G-contracting sentences are semantically identical to their G-extending 
counterpart sentences, since ⟦slur⟧ = ⟦counterpart⟧. This prediction hasn’t been made explicit in the literature to 
my knowledge, but strikes me as worrisome. 
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(3) G-referencing Uses of Slurs 
In so-called “G-referencing” uses of slurs, the slurred target belongs to the social group that is 
predominantly associated with the slur in question. These cases are commonly considered the 
most basic cases of slur usage. (10)–(12) illustrate these G-referencing uses: 
(10) “Let’s watch the movie with those cunts in it.” 
(11) “Of course, the kraut made me fail the exam.”  
(12) “The University of Southern California is full of chinks.” 
It is important to show that my theory does not only account for the tricky linguistic cases, but 
also gets the basic data right. We want to know why the application of slurs to those groups is 
“licensed”, and why the uses in question are derogatory. According to my theory, in each case, 
the targets are attributed, on the basis of some observable surface features, a Chinese, German, 
or female “essence” which causally determines a set of negative features. The attribution is 
“licensed” because members of the neutral counterpart group, in the eyes of the racist or 
homophobe, just are the paradigmatic instantiators of features that indicate the presence of the 
relevant essence. In most cases, already instantiating surface features such as +LOOKING FEMALE 
or +BEING GERMAN will have sufficient inductive power as to license the inference to the relevant 
essence for the slur user. This accounts for the meaning profile we attribute to (10)–(12). The 
slurs then generally apply to the targets that belong to the social group we call ‘neutral 
counterpart’, because, in the eyes of the racist, the mentioned surface features generally license 
application. The uses are derogatory: Making members of the social group in question subject to 
this causal-deterministic essentialization conveys to them that they don’t deserve the full respect 
we grant persons qua persons. 
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(4) Non-derogatory, Non-appropriated Uses of Slurs 
Another species of slur that is often considered problematic in the literature are non-derogatory 
examples of slur uses, sometimes termed “non-weapon” (Jeshion, 2013a) or “NDNA” uses (where 
“NDNA” stands for “non-derogatory, non-appropriated”; see Hom, 2008). One example of an 
NDNA use is (from Hom, 2008): 
(13) “Institutions that treat Chinese as chinks are morally depraved.” 
Accounts that treat slurs as truth-conditionally equivalent to their neutral counterpart terms  
predict that (13) is true exactly when (14) is: 
(14) “Institutions that treat Chinese as Chinese are morally depraved.” 
But intuitively, many speakers would assign truth to (13) while rejecting (14). In addition, many 
expressivist accounts predict that (13) is derogatory, since each assertion of a proposition 
containing a slur is an expression of contempt. However, according to some theorists—
prominently, Chris Hom—(13) is an instance of a non-derogatory (even if upsetting, triggering, 
and hence offensive) speech-act.88   
By now, it should be clear how my account explains the fact that (13) is felicitous and at 
least different in derogatory status from the examples we encountered earlier. ‘Chinese’ and 
‘chink’ are not synonymous according to my account; only the latter term is true of those 
individuals that share a “Chinese essence” which causes them to exhibit negative stereotypical 
features. The speaker of (13) thus expresses that institutions that treat the group of Chinese 
 
88 Like others, I have the intuition that even uses in intensional contexts like (13) will be upsetting or offensive, e.g., 
as a result of triggering effects. However, we might still want to agree with Hom that there is some principled 
difference in degree of derogation (as opposed to offensiveness) between non-NDNA uses and NDNA uses, and expect 
a theory to capture this difference. Alternatively, the slur might trigger an existential presupposition such that 
derogation projects out even in this intensional context, in which case the phenomenon would fall under my later 
discussion of derogatory projection.  
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people in this causally deterministic manner are morally depraved—which is evidently true and 
thus accords with our truth-intuitions.89 
 
(5) Null-extension  
We have seen that an (empirical) consequence of my framework is that most slurs—importantly, 
the ones we regard as particularly toxic—don’t have any extension in the actual world. In these 
cases, scientific discovery has revealed that nothing is such that it has a causal “nature” of a social 
group that explains and dispositionally causes the possession of stereotypically bad features. 
There is, of course, no such thing as a “Latino essence” that dispositionally causes Latin 
Americans to harass women or work in the service industry. There is no such thing as a 
“blackness essence” that dispositionally causes black people to dislike work or engage in criminal 
activities. And so on. Slur terms are not true of anything, and consequently, sentences predicating 
slurs of individuals are either meaningless or false. Thus, analogously to terms like ‘phlogiston’, 
slurs are examples of kind terms that have simply been unsuccessfully introduced. A core 
condition for successful introduction of a kind term is that it is correct that supposed similarities 
of a kind have a “single unifying explanation” (Soames, 2010, p. 89), which, for slurs, is simply 
not the case. The intuition that sentences such as  
(15) “There are dykes.” 
 
89 A reviewer pointed out to me that NDNA uses of this kind could be analyzed metalinguistically. Although I 
understand—in fact, as will become clear in the next sections, advocate—this point when applied to some cases of 
negation (as has been done, for example, in Anderson & Lepore, 2013; Bolinger, 2017; Jeshion, 2013a; and 
particularly rigorously in Cepollaro, 2017), it is hard for me to see how a metalinguistic move can be applied to (13). 
Especially in light of the fact that (a) no slur is mentioned before the occurrence of the slur that a metalinguistic use 
could pick up on and (b) no reading in which a comment on a linguistic item is made is available to me, since (c) ‘as’ 
clearly introduces an intensional context, it is unclear to me how a metalinguistic analysis for this case should work. 
But since the main focus in this part of the chapter is to motivate the essentialist theory by showing that it covers a 
wide range of data, and not so much on refuting alternative theories, I will leave this issue aside for now.  
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(16) “Jews are kikes.” 
(17) “All women are cunts.”  
strike us as obviously false is therefore easily captured by the essentialist theory.  
 One question that arises here is whether essentialism about slurs really secures null-
extension. Oppressed, socially-constructed groups can be subject to unjust practices that, given 
the world as it is, connect group membership in non-accidental ways to negative properties that 
emerge from the oppression. Since the oppressive forces converge on individuals because they 
are taken to be members of the group, the connection is causal. Since membership in the socially 
constructed kind is in part a question of whether one is taken to be or treated as a member of that 
kind, the causal connection is through group membership. If that is the case, the conditions 
specified by a slur might sometimes be satisfied and the slur can successfully refer. This is an 
important objection to the null-extension hypothesis. In response, I want to highlight certain 
assumptions that constrain our representations of “essences”: We see them as internal and intrinsic 
to the subject; a class of subjects cannot possess an essence relationally. As Haslanger (2011) puts 
it for the case of generics:  
[Generics license the inference that] the fact in question obtains by virtue of something specifically about 
the subject so described, i.e., about women, or blacks, or sagging pants. In the examples I’ve offered, however, 
this implication is unwarranted. The facts in question obtain by virtue of broad system of social relations 
within which the subjects are situated, and are not grounded in intrinsic or dispositional features of the subjects 
themselves. (my emphasis, Haslanger, 2011, p. 446) 
Similarly, the causal element of slurs presupposes that the essence is intrinsic, not extrinsic, to 
the subject. Since this condition is not satisfied in the cases I’m discussing, slurs don’t have 
extension. 
In contrast to my account, many other accounts, such as Anderson and Lepore’s 
minimalist and Jeshion’s expressivist accounts, are committed to the view that the sentences in 
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(15)–(17) are true. But also accounts that lie closer to the account I propose here differ with the 
predictions they make about slurs’ reference and, correspondingly, the truth of sentences 
containing slurs. Consider Croom’s family resemblance view of slurs (Croom, 2011; 2015). 
According to him, slurs encode a set of negatively-valenced weighted features. If a person P 
satisfies sufficiently many features of the feature list associated with a slur S, S is true of P. 
However, it is not implausible that there will be individuals that happen to exhibit the features 
associated with the slur—as a matter of structural injustices, or simply because of their very 
individual life choices. Thus, the extension of slurs will not be the empty set under Croom’s 
account. Specifically, a sentence such as  
(18) “Alberto is a spic.” 
would have to be treated as strictly true if Alberto happens to satisfy a number of features 
associated with the slur, which, according to Croom, include features such as “x is a Mexican-
American” or “x is a foreign worker or exchange student with a thick non-native accent” (Croom, 
2014b, p. 162). The essentialist account differs from Croom’s insofar as what is decisive for the 
successful reference of the slur is whether the target possesses some intrinsic “Latino essence”, 
which slur users take to unify all ‘spics’, that disposes them to exhibit negative traits. Thus, (18) 
will be false even if Alberto happens to exhibit a number of features corresponding with the 
stereotype. Again, while these accounts might be able to appeal to explanations that lie outside 
the domain of their theories to explain our falsehood and referential intuitions about slurs away,90 
the essentialist theory accounts for them directly. 
The null-extension consequence of my view also gives us the resources to deal with a 
species of NDNA uses of slurs that can be classified as “metalinguistic denial”: 
 
90 For such a strategy, see, e.g., Anderson and Lepore (2013); Camp (2018); Jeshion (2013b); or Whiting (2013). 
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(19) “There are no chinks at my university, there are only Chinese people.” 
Take this sentence to be uttered by a non-racist who, upon hearing (12), intends to express that 
the slur does not apply to Chinese people at the university, while ‘Chinese’ does. The question is 
how a non-racist person could a) negate the slur predicate while applying the ‘Chinese’ predicate, 
and, again, b) do so without derogation.91 My framework predicts that (19) has these properties. 
The non-racist and properly informed person rejects the causal connection between a 
“Chineseness essence” and the negative stereotypical properties encoded in the slur. She rightly 
thinks that nothing is in the extension of ‘chink’: It is true of nobody that they have a 
“Chineseness” nature that causally disposes them to manifest negative stereotypical features 
associated with being Chinese. By asserting the first conjunct of (19), she just rejects what she 
correctly believes to be false. Since the speaker of (19) expresses that Chinese people don’t fall 
under the extension of the slur (since no one does), we can also classify (19) as an instance of 
metalinguistic denial. 
 Before moving on, I will address an objection that Sennet and Copp (2015) raise against 
the null-extensionality thesis as defended in Hom and May (2015). If successful, it would also 
apply to my version of the thesis. Fortunately, it isn’t. Their charge is that null-extensionality of 
slurs entails that sentences of the following kind are trivially true: 
(20) “All kikes are Mormons.” 
But, contra null-extensionality, Sennet and Copp remark that (20) is intuitively false.  
A standard position in formal semantics is that we should introduce an existential domain 
condition (in other words, a lexical existential presupposition) to our semantics for universal 
 
91 See fn. 88. 
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quantifiers,92 since this would increase the descriptive accuracy of our theory of quantifiers with 
respect to sentences like (21)–(23), which would all come out as trivially true without such a 
condition. 
 (21) All mermaids live in Ohio. 
 (22)  Every unicorn admires Noam Chomsky. 
 (23) All phlogiston is located in the Pacific Ocean. 
If you agree with the position that quantifiers come with lexical existential presuppositions, then 
(20) will come out as false or truth-valueless. If you don’t agree with it, (20) will come out as 
trivially true, but so will (21)–(23)—which doesn’t lead anyone to worry about whether 
‘mermaid’, ‘unicorn’, or ‘phlogiston’ in fact have an extension. In short, the objection doesn’t pose 
any problem for null-extensionality views of slurs.  
 
(6) Derogatory Projection 
Importantly, although slurs have null-extension, slurs still carry an existential presupposition. Slur 
users presuppose that there are individuals that fall under the extension of the slurs they use.93 
This accounts for a peculiar, well-known fact about slurs’ projection behavior: Their derogatory 
effect persists in various compositional contexts, such as negations, conditionals, modals, or 
 
92 See, e.g., Diesing (1992), McCawley (1972), Strawson (1963). See Heim and Kratzer (1998, ch. 6) for an 
introductory overview of the debate. The lexical entry of ‘all’ would change to 𝜆 < 𝐴, 𝐵 > :	𝐴	 ≠ 	Ø. 𝐴	 ⊆ 	𝐵. Note 
that there is no controversy about whether sentences like (21)–(23) introduce some existential presupposition. The 
question is whether it is to be located lexically or pragmatically. 
93 The existential presupposition is (arguably) not triggered in instances of metalinguistic denial, as in (19) or in 
cases of negative existentials in contexts of the type: “He isn’t a chink, no one is”. 
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questions (Anderson & Lepore, 2013; Bolinger, 2017; Camp, 2013; 2018; Cepollaro & Stojanovic, 
2016; Hom, 2010; Jeshion, 2013b).  
(24) “He’s not a kike, he’s a Muslim.” 
(25) “How many chinks are at the University of Southern California?” 
(26) “If he’s a wop, I won’t date him.” 
(27) “She’s so bad with the wand, she might be a mudblood.” 
Take, as an example, (24). Although the speaker does not attribute a “Jewish essence” to the object 
of discourse, (24) clearly stays an instance of derogatory slur usage. Why? 
Usually, when we introduce entities into a discourse by talking about them, we signal to 
our interlocutors that we take their existence for granted: 
(28) Do you prefer cats or dogs? 
(29) This isn’t silver, it’s stainless steel. 
(30) If that’s lemonade, I want it. 
(31) The woman we met yesterday was so eloquent, she might be an English professor. 
Uttering (28)–(31) presupposes that you believe that there are cats, silver, lemonade, or English 
professors. Analogously, utterance of any sentence in (24)–(27) is only felicitous if the speaker 
presupposes that there are objects in our domain the slurs apply to. But presupposing, like the 
speaker does in (24), that there is something like a “Jewish essence”, carried predominantly by 
Jewish people that causally predisposes them to exhibit negative features, of course dehumanizes 
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and derogates the entire group of Jews.94 This explains why the derogatoriness of slurs persists 
even if the speaker does not assertively predicate a causally potent essence to a discourse object. 
And since in reality, nothing is in the extension of slurs, the informed speaker is licensed to 
respond with a denial of the presupposed content.95  
 
(7) Derogatory Variation 
Let us now turn to the last explanandum on our list. It is widely thought that some pejoratives 
are more powerful in their disparaging and derogating force than others, a phenomenon that is 
standardly listed as a central explanatory desideratum for theories of slurs (Anderson & Lepore, 
2013; Bolinger, 2017; Hom, 2008; 2010). Compare, for example, the difference in offensiveness 
between the N-word and ‘limey’—the former is substantially stronger in its derogatory effects 
than the latter.96 The same goes for ‘chink’ vs. ‘kraut’, ‘kike’ vs. ‘honky’, ‘wog’ vs. ‘yank’, and so 
on. Furthermore, the derogatory content of a slur can vary as a function of time: The derogatory 
force of ‘kraut’ or ‘commie’, for instance, was substantially stronger during the time of World 
War II and the Cold War, respectively, than it is now.  
Many theories contend that the difference in encoded negative attitudes or negative 
descriptive information is what accounts for the fact that slurs differ in their derogatory 
 
94 Note that we can successfully apply the well-known “wait a minute” test to (24)–(27), revealing the existential 
presuppositions triggered by the examples. This test is standardly employed to test the presuppositions triggered 
by a sentence (von Fintel, 2009). Consider, 
 
(32) Stephen stopped smoking.  
 
The “wait a minute” test reveals that (32) presupposes that Stephen smoked. If I am not willing to accommodate the 
common ground appropriately—because I think that Stephen never smoked—I can felicitously respond: “Wait a 
minute—Stephen never smoked!” Similarly, “Wait a minute—there are no kikes!” conveys the refusal to 
accommodate the common ground as required by the existential presupposition.  
95 Correspondingly, our earlier example (19) would be an appropriate answer to the question asked in (25), as it 
expresses refusal to accept the existential presupposition that the speaker introduces by the utterance of (15). 
96 See Mullen and Leader (2005) and Rice et al. (2010) for an empirical quantification of these differences.  
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strength.97 Prima facie, this explanation seems very plausible. For example, we often find that 
powerful slurs are also associated with very negative stereotypes. Most would agree that the 
social stereotypes associated with white people (‘honky’) are less negatively valenced than the 
stereotypes associated with people of Chinese ethnicity (‘chink’), which in turn are less negative 
than the ones associated with black persons (N-word). 98 And knowing that others think ill of or 
harbor negative attitudes against us hurts. This is true even when the agents that harbor these 
attitudes are not significant to us. Imagine you notice how a bunch of teenagers in the subway 
are snickering, making it obvious that you are the source of their amusement. These teenagers 
are complete strangers, and you will never see them again. You know that whether these 
teenagers think well of you or not has no impact whatsoever on anything you take to matter in 
your life. Still, their snicker hurts.99 Naturally, then, stronger negative attitudes will hurt more, 
and weaker negative attitudes will hurt less. 
However, this explanation can’t be the entire story. It misses out on a general, systematic 
pattern of how the derogatory force of different slurs varies. Why is it that in general, slurs that 
target someone on the basis of their race, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality are particularly toxic?100 
It is hard to imagine a slur targeting fans of, say, an opposing football team to possibly be more 
derogatory than slurs such as ‘faggot’ or ‘kike’—even if the properties associated with these fans 
were highly negative. By the same token, these slurs seem to be more diminishing than ‘lardass’, 
 
97 That holds true especially of views that are close to the view I advocate here (Croom, 2011; Hom, 2008), but is 
also a move open to expressivist views. 
98 For an empirical quantification of the negative stereotypes associated with some of the social groups referenced 
in this chapter, see, e.g., Bessenoff  & Sherman (2000); Copping et al. (2013); Cvencek, Meltzoff, and Greenwald 
(2011); Cvencek et al. (2015); Devine (1989); Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler (1986); Eberhardt et al. (2004); Gaertner 
and McLaughlin (1983); Goff et al. (2008); Wang, Brownell, and Wadden (2004); Woods, Kurtz-Costes, and Rowley 
(2005). 
99 The example is based on an example used in Bero (2017). 
100 In a similar vein, Popa-Wyatt asks in her 2016 paper: “Is it coincidence that many of the most offensive slur 
words are associated with groups we might identify as oppressed?” (Popa-Wyatt, 2016, p. 155). My answer to that 
question is “no”: group essentialism is the key variable explaining both group oppression and the derogatory 
potential encoded in slurs (see Appiah, 2018; Leslie, 2017; Livingstone Smith, 2011). 
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‘libtard’, or ‘junkie’, although the corresponding groups are, from the perspective of the users, 
associated with highly negative stereotypes. Theories that solely rely on differences in negative 
attitudes or descriptive information can’t account for this fine-grained pattern of the data. 
The essentialist theory captures this subtle pattern. The slurs we find particularly toxic—
the ones targeting someone on the basis of their race, sexuality, gender, or ethnicity—are the 
ones which, in addition to encoding profoundly negative stereotypes, are highly essentialized. In 
each case, the slur expresses that it is in someone’s very nature to have features that are bad. And 
while knowing that you think badly of me hurts, knowing that you think badly of me because of 
something in my intrinsic, inescapable nature is deep. What I do and who I am is not seen as a 
matter of my individual choices and agency, but as a deep matter of my nature. This is what it 
means to dehumanize. In chapter 4, we will explore the notion of dehumanization more 
thoroughly. 
Let us go in more detail through my semantic model and the way it explains the data. I 
maintain that the derogatory force of a slur is a direct offspring of its semantics, where the essence 
and the set of negative features are the determining factors of a slur’s meaning. The derogatory 
strength of a slur therefore is a function of these elements. The more negative the represented 
stereotype of a group is, the more demeaning the corresponding slur should come out.101 The 
more a category is essentialized, the stronger the diminishing effects of the slur should be. When 
the two of them come together, the derogatory force of slurs is explosive.102 Thus, holding the 
 
101 Of course, the represented stereotype must also conventionally govern the slur in question. However, we can say 
that our representation of the stereotype of the social group most associated with the slur is a rough measure of the 
stereotype convention that governs the slur. 
102 Interestingly, high level of essentialism towards a social group has often been found to predict negative 
stereotyping and prejudice (see Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Howell, 
Weikum, & Dyck,  2011; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Pauker et al., 2010; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Williams & Eberhardt, 
2008). See also Leslie (2017) for a discussion of our tendency to attribute features to an essence of a basic-level 
category when these features are negative. 
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level of essentialism (largely) fixed, slurs for groups with stronger negative stereotypes are more 
derogatory. Holding the degree of negative stereotyping fixed, slurs for groups which are more 
essentialized will be more derogatory.103 When a category is both strongly essentialized and the 
associated stereotypes are highly negative, the diminishing force of a slur culminates. 
While it is evident that the negative stereotypes we associate with a group can be more 
or less pronounced, it has also long been established that there are differences in the degrees to 
which we essentialize social groups (see Prentice & Miller, 2007, p. 202). In chapter 1, I already 
presented an important study by Nick Haslam and his colleagues (2000). They developed a set of 
questions that assessed different dimensions along which we essentialize groups. Specifically, 
they tested whether participants essentialized social groups along the dimensions of naturalness, 
stability, discreteness of category boundaries, immutability of category membership, and 
necessity of category features.104 Within the 40 social categories that were rated,105 the categories 
of gender, ethnicity, and race as well as Jews and homosexuals received particularly high ratings, and 
the categories associated with interests, politics, appearance, and social class received the lowest 
 
103 These comparisons are not completely clean—it proves hard to keep the essentialist or stereotype dimensions 
fixed when making comparisons. It is very plausible, for example, that the social category of communists was more 
essentialized during the Cold War than it is now. Similarly, although “race” receives generally the highest 
essentialism ratings, essentialism for the category “black” is still more marked than essentialism for “white” (see 
Haslam et al., 2000). 
104 They took these to be the dimensions “that are commonly invoked in psychological, philosophical and social 
scientific writings” (Haslam et al., 2000). In the study, they asked participants to rate, on a scale from 1 to 9, to which 
extent one of the listed dimensions applies to a category. The dimension of discreteness, for example, was described 
to the participants as follows: “[s]ome categories have sharper boundaries than others. For some, membership is 
clear-cut, definite, and of an ‘either/or’ variety; people either belong to the category or they do not. For others, 
membership is more ‘fuzzy’; people belong to the category in varying degrees”. To give another example, the 
dimension of naturalness was described to the participants as “some categories are more natural than others, whereas 
others are more artificial”. 
105 The aim of the study was to cover as many categories as possible; among many others, some of the assessed 
categories were, e.g., diseases (AIDS patients, cancer patients), dietary groups (meat eaters, vegetarians), intelligence 
groups (smart people, people of average intelligence), races (black, white), religions (Catholics, Jews), political groups 
(liberals, Republicans). 
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ratings.106 And if we bring to our minds the slurs that are the derogatorily deepest, we will 
directly see that they fall under one of those social categories. 
Note also that the essentialist theory gives us a natural way to accommodate the 
theoretical difficulty of finding a clear demarcating criterion distinguishing slurs from non-slurs. 
Many theorists draw a distinction between slurs, which target individuals based on their 
membership in a group, and individual pejoratives, which target individuals based on some 
(temporary) behavior or “personal qualities”. While everyone can point at paradigmatic examples 
of slurs, and paradigmatic cases of individual pejoratives (‘jerk’, ‘asshole’, ‘dickhead’), and most 
feel the intuitive pull to theoretically distinguish between these two classes (although see Jeshion, 
2013a for a criticism of this distinction), there are many pejorative terms that have proven to be 
quite difficult to classify in one way or the other. Consider, 
(33) “Hey fatso!” 
Popa-Wyatt (2016) notices that (33)—like ‘lardass’, ‘druggie’, ‘junkie’, ‘bum’, or ‘commie’— 
sits in the middle ground between [slurs] and [individual pejoratives] […]. Like pejoratives targeted at 
individuals, they identify the targeted individual on the basis of specific properties that s/he has. But like 
slurs, they express contempt not only about the particular individual but also about other people who 
have similar features, and so may be identified as part of a group. (p. 152) 
Essentialism about slurs explains why it is difficult to find a clear line distinguishing slurs from 
individual pejoratives. Just as essentialism ratings are on a continuum, our judgements about 
whether something is a slur or not will be on a continuum, rather than an all-or-nothing affair. 
People are less sure about whether people with higher body weight or communist attitudes are 
 
106 It is important to clarify that the categories Jews and homosexuals received extremely high ratings for dimensions 
that Haslam et al. describe as indexing a group’s entitativity. Entitativity is a subtype of our general essentialist bias, 
and can be described as the belief that members of a group are very similar to one another, such that membership in 
a group is very informative about the nature of its members—in other words, the group is seen as entitative. 
Essentialism, as entitativity, has been found to predict prejudice and negative stereotyping towards groups such as 
homosexuals (Haslam & Levy, 2006). 
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describable by having some “group essence” that determines their behavior, traits, and unifies 
them, or whether they should be characterized simply as having mutable, individual properties. 
Hence, in these cases, subjects will be reluctant, unsure, or in disagreement about whether to call 
a term ‘slur’ or an ‘individual pejorative’, just as predicted by the essentialist theory.  
In sum, theories that appeal to differences between descriptive or expressive attitudes 
towards different social groups only can account for derogatory variation if we carve up the data 
in a very coarse-grained, one-dimensional way. To account for the subtle pattern we find in the 
data, we need another parameter. The essentialist theory delivers this level by adding another 
dimension to the derogatory potential of a slur: The derogatory force of a slur is a function not 
only of the negative stereotypes it encodes, but its stereotypes and the degree to which it 
essentializes. The essentialist theory, then, uniquely captures the systematic patterns we find in 
the data and explains why slurs that are particularly deep in their offensiveness tend to fall under 
specific categories; categories that are strongly essentialized. 
 
4. Slurs and the Psychology of Social Kinds 
4.1 Experimental Evidence for the Essentialist Theory 
Thus far, I have motivated my theory by showing that an essentialist semantics for slurs can 
account for their main linguistic properties. I now present converging evidence from cognitive 
psychology for the existence of the cognitive structures postulated by my theory of slurs, some 
of which I’ve already presented in chapter 1. As I indicated earlier, I here assume an intimate link 
between linguistic meaning and mental concepts. More specifically, according to the background 
view I take for granted in this chapter, terms inherit their linguistic meaning directly from 
internally individuated lexical concepts, which I understand as the smallest constituents of 
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thought and primary bearers of meaning. From this perspective, studying the structure and 
information encoded in lexical concepts can directly inform our semantic theory.  We will review 
evidence in favor of the two central components of my essentialist analysis: (1) Slurs are 
semantically structured in an essentialist way, and (2) slurs are uniquely associated with negative 
stereotypes.107  
 Let us start with component (1). In chapter 1, we have learned that psychologists have 
documented that certain categories—especially natural kind categories such as animals, minerals, 
and chemicals—are cognitively represented in a highly essentialized way. We act as if members 
of certain categories have immutable, enduring, and natural essences which make them what they 
are (for an overview, see Gelman, 2003; 2004; chapter 1 of this dissertation). Furthermore, as we 
have already seen in the last section, we now know that we also think of many human or social 
categories in this exact same, highly essentialized, way.108 More concretely, we behave as if social 
groups are real kinds: They have sharp category boundaries, are somewhat “natural”, historically 
stable, “real” and not constructed, and allow for rich inductive inferences about physical and 
behavioral traits of their members.109 In particular, social categories such as race and ethnicity 
(Allport, 1954; Gil-White, 2001; Haslam et al., 2000; Hirschfeld, 1996; Ho, Roberts, & Gelman, 
2015; Pauker et al., 2016; Verkuyten, 2003), gender (Gelman, 2003; Gelman, Collman, & 
 
107 Remember that I also showed, in chapter 1, that essentialism and stereotyping are importantly connected. 
108 Remember from chapter 1 that there is wide-ranging evidence that we hold essentialist beliefs from early 
childhood on, which has been documented by psychologists—prominently, Susan A. Gelman—throughout the past 
30 years. For example, preschool children believe that a baby kangaroo raised among goats will grow up to hop and 
have a pouch (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; cf. Gelman, 2003). They also expect that something that has turtle insides 
will still be a turtle even if it doesn’t look like one (Gelman & Wellman, 1991), suggesting that they don’t rely on 
observable surface features to determine kind membership. For our tendency to essentialize social categories, see, 
e.g., Gelman (2003); Gil-White (2001); Haslam (2000) Haslam & Levy (2006); Haslam et al. (2000); Hirschfeld (1995; 
1996); Prentice & Miller, (2007). For a general overview of the evidence tracking children’s essentialist belief 
structure, see Gelman (2003).  
109 See, e.g., Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt (2006); Gelman (2003); Haslam et al. (2000). As I mentioned earlier, it is 
important to keep in mind that these markers are characteristic features of our representation of essences, and do not 
constitute necessary conditions for something to be represented as an essence. This conception of essences also 
doesn’t completely correspond to the philosopher’s as “that intrinsic aspect of a thing that grounds all and only the 
intrinsic metaphysical necessities that hold of the thing” (Leslie, 2017, p. 406).  
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Maccoby, 1986; Prentice & Miller, 2006; 2007), caste (Mahalingam, 2003), sexual orientation 
(Haslam & Levy, 2006), religion (Chalik et al., 2017; Toosi & Ambady, 2011), and mental illness 
(Haslam, 2000; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Howell et al., 2011)—in short, the categories that are 
central to human slurring practices—have been found to be cognitively represented in a highly 
essentialized way.110 
For illustration, consider the case of race: This category is certainly among the most 
relevant for slurs, given both the prevalence and deep offensiveness of epithets that target 
subjects on the basis of their race. In a series of pivotal experiments, psychologist Lawrence 
Hirschfeld documented essentialist thinking about race in both adults and preschoolers as young 
as three years  (Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996; see also Pauker et al., 2010). In one paradigm, he asked 
preschoolers whether a racial property class—hair and skin color—or a physical property class—
clothing style and color—would remain unchanged as a person grows up. Even 3-year-olds 
judged that the properties connected with race were more constant than sartorial properties.111 
He obtained the same preference for race as the dominant factor compared to other physical 
features for inheritance judgements: When children were asked which properties they would 
inherit from their parents, they predominantly picked racial properties. In a switched-at-birth 
paradigm, children were asked which racial properties a child that was adopted by parents of 
another skin color would develop. 5-year olds outweighingly decided in favor of the birth parents’ 
racial properties (Hirschfeld, 1996; see chapter 1 for a discussion of the experiment). 
To sum up, reasoning about social categories often follows typical essentialist dimensions. 
Thus, my proposed structure of slurs neatly corresponds to the essentialist structure of social 
 
110 See also Prentice and Miller (2007) for an overview. 
111 This effect can’t be accounted for by the explanation that children represent body features as more stable than 
non-body features. When 4-years olds were asked to choose whether body build vs. hair and skin color would remain 
the same over life span, they too judged significantly more often in favor of racial properties. 
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categories that is being uncovered in cognitive psychology for the past 30 years. If we take these 
findings at face value, we must, in any case, accept that many social concepts have an essentialist 
structure. Accordingly, to assume that also slur terms are associated with essentialistically 
structured concepts is not only descriptively plausible but also theoretically parsimonious. 
Let us now turn to the second key component of my semantics, namely, that slurs encode 
negatively valenced stereotypes. Recently, the phenomenon of slurring language has begun to be 
empirically investigated by psycholinguists. These studies revealed that slurs, in contrast to their 
neutral counterpart terms, are uniquely associated with negative features. Since these studies 
used implicit paradigms in some of their studies, we have good reasons to think that these negative 
features belong to the semantic representation of slurs.112 
In an experiment using a free association paradigm, Carnaghi and Maass (2008) delivered 
primary evidence for the negative stereotypes encoded in slurs. They presented participants with 
derogatory words (‘fag’) or their neutral counterparts (‘gay’). When presented with the slurs, the 
first three words participants mentioned were significantly more negatively-valenced than when 
presented with their neutral counterparts. However, since this experiment used an explicit 
paradigm, we cannot make strong inferences about the semantic structure of slurs on the basis 
of it.113 For this reason, in a follow up study, Carnaghi and Maass used a semantic priming task. 
They presented participants subliminally with a prime word that was either a neutral term (‘gay’), 
 
112 There are many ways to carve up the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Here, I assume the psychology-based 
framework according to which semantics includes those representations that enter into and are the result of 
immediate composition by our linguistic competence, and pragmatics includes all post-compositional 
representations that have been subject to general reasoning processing from central cognition. 
113 The most important limitation of explicit tasks is that they do not impose any constraints controlling for response 
modifications by conscious reasoning and voluntary control. For example, the negative association could as well be 
a post-semantic, pragmatic-inferential phenomenon and would thus not constitute evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that stereotypes are semantically encoded in slurs. To reveal the “bare” linguistic representations behind 
slurring words, it is more appropriate to employ a paradigm whose task outcomes are not influenced or distorted by 
other non-semantic cognitive operations. Implicit tasks are ideal to unveil the semantic representations behind 
slurring words, since their task outcomes are less prone to be a result of intermixed high and low-level processes. 
This requirement was satisfied in Carnaghi and Maass’ follow up study. 
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a derogatory counterpart term (‘fag’), or a nonsense term (‘secadftg’). Hence, the participants 
never consciously noticed with which word they were primed. This is important, as it eliminates 
the risk of task interventions by conscious higher-level pragmatic processes. Following the 
prime, the participants were to engage in a lexical decision task. They saw a target word that 
was either a trait stereotypical of the prime word (e.g., ‘elegant’ or ‘effeminate’), 
counterstereotypical (e.g., ‘energetic’ or ‘intolerant’), or completely unrelated (‘honest’ or 
‘stingy’). Importantly, half of the traits were positively valenced, while the other half of the target 
words was negatively valenced. The participants’ task was to make a lexical word/nonword 
decision as fast as possible. The study had two key results. First, the participants reacted 
significantly faster to stereotypical targets than to counterstereotypical or unrelated targets, 
regardless of whether the prime was neutral or derogatory. This means that both neutral and 
derogatory category representations immediately and automatically activate representations of the 
related stereotype features. Second, the authors found that derogatory labels were again 
significantly less likely to activate flattering associations of the social group. As a matter of fact, 
derogatory labels resulted in the suppression of any positively-valenced stereotype, giving way for 
the negatively valenced associations related to a group.114 
In sum, these experiments show that a) slur terms encode the stereotype associated with 
a social group,115 and that b) this stereotype differs in valence from the stereotype encoded in the 
neutral counterpart, which confirms, experimentally, that there is a major semantic difference 
 
114 In a later study (Carnaghi & Maass, 2007), the authors successfully replicated the results, speaking to the 
robustness of their findings. 
115 Needless to say, this research, together with the abundant amount of research on typicality effects originating in 
Eleanor Rosch’s research program (Rosch, 1988), supports that typicality effects are robust and thus relatively stable 
among subjects. Even critics of prototype theory often describe this stability as the most attractive feature of 
prototype theory (Fodor, 1998). 
  134 
between neutral category labels and their corresponding epithets. In similar vein, the authors of 
the studies conclude that 
[t]ogether, these results suggest that derogatory group labels differ from category group labels mainly 
with respect to the valence of the associations they elicit. Thus, it is not so much the ability to activate 
stereotypical content than the tendency to activate less-flattering associations that distinguishes 
derogatory from category group labels. (Carnaghi & Maass, 2007, p. 147) 
We saw in the last section that my view explains the central linguistic data involving 
slurs, and I have now shown that it receives additional, converging evidence from cognitive 
psychology. Specifically, we have seen that social concepts associated with social terms are 
organized essentialistically, and that slurs are uniquely associated with negatively valenced 
stereotypes. As a result, my semantic theory converges with an independently plausible research 
program on the view that social concepts have essentialist structure, and is directly supported by 
experimental research on slurring words. 
 
4.2 Nomen est Omen: The Important Role of Nouns  
If you go through a mental list of slurs that you are familiar with, you will probably notice that 
all of them belong to the syntactic category of nouns. This is peculiar, given that most of slurs’ 
neutral counterparts come in both nominal and adjectival form (e.g., ‘a 
homosexual’/‘homosexual’; ‘a Jew’/‘Jewish’; notice also prepositional constructions such as 
‘someone with homosexual preferences’, ‘someone from Mexico’, etc.). A complete linguistic 
theory of slurs should be able to explain this systematic pattern, and not treat it as a mere 
accident. Interestingly, this syntactic inflexibility of slurs is, too, directly predicted by the 
essentialist theory.  That is, in contrast to other available theories, the essentialist theory is not 
only compatible with, but makes sense of the fact that nouns are the primary linguistic vehicle 
through which we communicate the semantic information of slurs.  
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There are a variety of different linguistic devices by means of which we can assign an 
individual to a category. Borrowing an example from Wierzbicka (1986), consider the difference 
between the sentences “Anna is blond” and “Anna is a blonde”. In both cases, we predicate a 
property (blondness) to Anna, and thereby include her in the set of things that instantiate 
blondness. But although the set-theoretic operations of both predicates are prima facie identical, 
a closer look reveals that there are big disparities in the information conveyed by the adjective 
and the noun. Whereas the former predicate ‘blond’ simply refers to a quality—a specific hair 
color—the latter predicate, ‘a blonde’, is a sortal that refers to an object, or, rather, a person that 
can have a whole bunch of other qualities. Normally, we even feel compelled to make a number 
of inferences about which these other qualities are that Anna, being a blonde, has. By using the 
noun rather than the adjective, the speaker conveys that Anna is sexy or not particularly bright. 
 Another example, adopted from Gelman (2003), is a case in point. The Atlanta baseball 
player John Rocker was criticized for making a racist comment in an interview. When an ABC 
News reporter asked him directly, “Are you a racist?”, he answered: “Absolutely not…. You hit 
one home run in the big leagues, it doesn’t make you a home run hitter. … To make one [racist] 
comment like this doesn’t make you a racist”. Although Rocker’s argument structure seems 
disputable (to say the least), it does tell us something about the underlying conceptual difference 
connected to a noun (‘a homerun hitter’, ‘a racist’) and a verb phrase (‘to hit a home run’, ‘to make 
a racist comment’). Importantly, Rocker himself seems to take for granted that the verbal choice 
he makes directly conveys the difference in meaning between ‘to hit a home run’ and to be ‘a 
homerun hitter’. Whereas the first choice of syntactic category conveys a temporary state that 
does not originate in any identifying property of the person, the latter noun form (‘a homerun 
hitter’, ‘a racist’) implicates an enduring, stable state that is central to the person’s identity and 
reliably causes a number of other properties of the person (Gelman, 2003, p. 188). In short, nouns 
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intuitively (‘a racist’, ‘a schizophrenic’, ‘a blonde’, ‘a liar’, ‘a homerun hitter’, etc.) impart a form 
of essentialism: The property that is nominalized is vital to the person’s identity and allows for a 
variety of inductions. Other grammatical forms, such as adjectives and verb constructions (‘have 
schizophrenia’/’schizophrenic’, ‘to have blond hair’/’to be blond’, etc.) rather convey mutable, 
temporal qualities of an individual.  
 That nouns are much stronger in their essentialist-communicative potential than other 
word forms has received much empirical support. In one study, Susan Gelman and Gail Heyman 
compared the inductive potential children infer from noun and verb labels (Gelman & Heyman, 
1999). They either heard a story that contained “a carrot eater” (noun phrase; NP), or a story 
that talked about someone who “eats carrots whenever she can” (verb phrase; VP). In the critical 
part, the children answered a set of questions that tested the stability of the properties: e.g., “Will 
Rose eat a lot of carrots when she is grown up”, or “Would Rose eat a lot of carrots if she grew 
up in a family where no one liked carrots?” Children in the NP condition predicted significantly 
more often that the property in question would be more stable over time and in adverse 
environmental conditions than children in the VP condition. Thus, the grammatical form of a 
noun seems to suggest to a child that a category is to be thought of as a kind (Gelman & Heyman, 
1999). 
Carnaghi et al. (2008) replicated and developed the experiments initiated by Gelman and 
Heyman. In six experiments testing adults, they compared the inductive potential of nouns and 
adjectives which assign individuals to the same categories (e.g., ‘an athlete’ vs. ‘athletic’). They 
found that describing a person by a noun triggers significantly more stereotypical inferences as 
compared to an adjectival description. Remarkably, nouns also inhibit inferences about behaviors 
or habits that are associatively rather incongruent with the descriptors. For example, a person 
that is homosexual (adjective) was estimated to attend the church more often than a homosexual 
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(noun). Moreover, nouns but not adjectives inhibit the possibility of alternative classifications 
altogether (i.e., not only incongruent ones). Once someone is categorized as belonging to one social 
category, e.g., ‘artist’, participants are not very willing to assign them to a second one, e.g., 
‘athlete’. These results did not hold for adjective conditions, because nouns as opposed to 
adjectives tend to convey discrete category boundaries which do not intersect with other 
categories. Finally, when Carnaghi et al. primed subjects with an essentialist scenario, 
participants would even themselves be more likely to use a noun to describe a person.  
In sum, nouns, adjectives, and verb phrases do not only categorize individuals, but also tell 
us something about the particular way in which the individuals are categorized (see also chapter 
4). In the case of adjectives, the individual is assigned to one qualitative category among many 
potential others. In the case of nouns, the individual is assigned to one category that identifies the 
individual in question in a rather all-or-nothing way and allows for rich inferences with regard 
to qualities that (allegedly) come along with the stable category in question.  
At this point, it should be clear why my essentialist theory explains that nouns are the 
main syntactic vehicle of slurs. According to my theory, slurs encode essentialist information. 
We have now seen that nouns are the primary linguistic device we use to convey that a category 
is essentialized. So if the semantics of slurs is essentialist, nouns should be the primary linguistic 
vehicles for communicating the meaning of slurs. Thus, the essentialist account uniquely predicts 
and explains this striking syntactic pattern of slurs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The closing scene of I Am Not Your Negro shows James Baldwin issuing a powerful, penetrating 
diagnosis of White America: 
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What white people have to do, is try to find out in their hearts why it was necessary for them to have a 
nigger in the first place. Because I am not a nigger. I’m a man. If I’m not the nigger here, and if you 
invented him, you the white people invented him, then you have to find out why. And the future of the 
country depends on that. Whether or not it is able to ask that question. (Baldwin, 1963)116  
This chapter was an attempt to contribute to the task assigned so poignantly by Baldwin, and 
come a step closer to an answer to his question. I have argued that the central mechanism of slurs 
is one of essentialization; slurs are akin to kind terms that denote an essence of a social category 
which nomologically connects to a set of negative stereotypical features. In effect, by using slurs, 
or even having them in our public lexicon, we commit to a way of carving up the social world in 
a way that is dehumanizing and gives groups with the dominant share of social power a tool to 
rationalize and maintain the oppressive hierarchies that keep down marginalized groups.  
To illustrate the plausibility of the advanced hypothesis, and show that it does interesting, 
multi-layered explanatory work, I argued that, first, essentialism about slurs explains their 
recognized linguistic properties; second, that the essentialist theory receives convergent evidence 
from cognitive psychology; and third, that the essentialist theory has unique resources to explain 
why slurs occur predominantly as nouns. Importantly, the goal of this chapter has been to make 
a cumulative case for the essentialist theory and motivate it as a novel, interesting framework that 
takes seriously the challenge of linking racist language to cognition and explains its relation to 
social oppression. Although one might disagree with the assessment of some of the data, it is 
important to note that my view does not stand or fall on the basis of a single piece of evidence. 
Good theories should predict and account for a wide range of data. This chapter shows that the 
essentialist theory does precisely that. 
 
 
116 Raoul Peck’s documentary film I Am Not Your Negro is a collage based on the unfinished manuscripts of Remember 
this House, immersed with interview excerpts by Baldwin, and a variety of other material (Peck, 2016). The final 
scene the quote is based on is originally from a 1963 interview of Baldwin with Kenneth Clar. Note that the invention 
of the ‘nigger’ by the white world is a re-occurring theme employed by Baldwin (see, e.g., Baldwin, 1963; 1969). 
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Chapter 4 
Pornography and Dehumanization: The Essentialist Dimension 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this chapter is to show that pornography dehumanizes women through essentialization. 
First, I argue that certain acts of subject-essentialization are acts of subject-dehumanization. Second, I 
demonstrate, by reviewing evidence about the linguistic material we find in and around pornography, that 
pornography systematically deploys content that essentializes women in the ways identified as 
problematic. It follows that pornography dehumanizes women. 
 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to shed light on one central mechanism through which 
pornography dehumanizes women. I will show that pornography essentializes women—roughly, 
that it represents them as belonging to certain kinds, breeds, or species whose behavior is 
constrained by laws governing the kind—and that the essentialist picture of women depicted in 
pornography is one key element of its dehumanizing machinery.117  
The simple argument to be defended in this chapter can be stated as follows:118 
1. For any x and y, if y essentializes x in a way that treats x as having significantly reduced 
capacities for self-determination, y dehumanizes x. 
 
117 The idea that pornography essentializes women can be found, to different degrees, in work such as Dines (2010); 
Haslanger (2012); Langton (2011); MacKinnon (1987; 1989). For a criticism of an analysis of pornography’s wrongs 
in terms of dehumanization, see Manne (2017).  
118 Some technical details about the argument: First, x ranges over persons. Second, premise 2 is formulated as a 
generic, and, as is well-known, generics are not equivalent to universally quantified sentences (see Leslie, 2008). 
Specifically, this premise is compatible with the possibility that certain subtypes or instances of pornography, such 
as feminist pornography, do not essentialize women. 
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2. Pornography essentializes women in a way that treats them as having significantly reduced 
capacities for self-determination. 
Therefore, pornography dehumanizes women. 
Later in the chapter, I’ll explain in more detail what I mean by “essentializing someone in a way 
that denies their capacity for self-determination”. For now, it will suffice to say that there are 
certain acts of essentialization that deny someone’s capacity for self-determination, and others 
that don’t, and only the first ones are acts I take to be dehumanizing. I also want to emphasize 
that in defending premises 1 and 2, I do not wish to commit myself to the claim that essentialism 
towards women is the only or the main element responsible for the dehumanizing power of 
pornography. In fact, I believe that pornography dehumanizes through a variety of practices. The 
claim I am making here is merely that essentializing women is one of the main mechanisms 
through which pornography dehumanizes women.119 An investigation of this essentialist aspect 
of pornography can prove extremely fruitful—both to further our understanding of the ideology 
of and wrongs done through pornography, and also to shed light on the interactions between 
human cognition, moral psychology, language, and social ideology. 
 In what follows, I’ll defend the two premises in turn. To defend the first premise, I’ll 
introduce the notion of essentialism I operate with in more detail, argue for the connection 
between acts of essentialization and dehumanization, and defend the premise against potential 
counterexamples. To defend premise 2—which is partly empirical—I attend to the linguistic 
 
119 That doesn’t mean that only women are essentialized in pornography—also, e.g., men can be essentialized along, 
e.g., racial or gender dimensions.  
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material used in and around pornography, and argue that it represents women in essentialist 
ways.120   
 
2. What’s Wrong with Essentialism? 
That something is wrong with essentializing persons is a common presupposition in psychology, 
philosophy, and related fields. For example, presentations of psychological findings that reveal 
our essentialist biases towards certain groups usually carry a morally charged flavor. This is 
hardly surprising, since essentialist biases towards social groups strongly correlate with 
practices such as prejudice and negative stereotyping. However, merely pointing to a correlation 
is unsatisfying as an answer to the question of this section. We want to know how and why 
essentialist beliefs are causally connected to, or even constitutive of, racist, sexist, and other 
bigoted mindsets and behaviors. I will give an answer to this question by defending premise 1: 
By essentializing a person P in a way that denies their capacity for self-determination, we 
dehumanize P.  
 To set up the defense for this premise, we must understand the practice of essentializing. 
What do we do when we essentialize someone? Since essentializing is an act that reflects or 
produces essentialist attitudes and representations, it is useful to look at insights from cognitive 
psychology for an answer. Remember, again, some of the things we learned in chapter 1. 
Cognitive essentialism is “the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that 
one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity, and is responsible for other 
 
120 Notice that I am not claiming that language is the only way through which pornography essentializes or that 
pornography essentializes necessarily through language. I am not even claiming that it is in the nature of 
pornography to essentialize. I am simply claiming that actual pornography essentializes women, and it does so 
(partly) through language.  
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similarities that category members share” (Gelman, 2004, p. 404). The ‘essence’ doesn’t have to 
(although it can) be represented as being biologically grounded; nor does it have to be 
represented as anything in particular at all. Essentialism can be thought of as “a ‘placeholder’ 
notion: one can believe that a category possesses an essence without knowing what the essence 
is” (Gelman, 2004, p. 404). What is crucial is that the ‘essence’ occupies a causally deep role in 
our representation of a category: It is the intrinsic feature that purportedly individuates entities 
qua members of the category, and causally determines their observable features and behavior. 
While it is not necessary for a member of an essentialized category to display the traits that are 
typical of the category, in virtue of bearing the causally potent essence, the bearer will always be 
disposed to do so. 
The paradigmatic categories that even preschoolers represent in an essentialized way are 
natural kinds such as chemicals (water, gold), animals (cat, kangaroo) and plants (rose, apple tree) 
(Gelman, 2003). However, we also represent a number of social categories—for instance, races, 
ethnicities, genders and sexualities—as kinds that share a common essence and are grounded in 
the ‘basic ontology’ of the world.121 Thus, when essentializing someone on the basis of 
membership in a social group, we act as if they bear an intrinsic, deep, causally potent nature, 
which is responsible for what the person is and does.  
What does this psychological practice amount to morally? Thinking through the 
psychological mechanism behind essentialism already suggests what the central wronging 
element of essentialism is: the autonomy, self-determination and agency-denying aspect of the 
heuristic. We already touched on this when analyzing the dehumanizing elements of slurs. When 
we essentialize someone, we act as if they have the ‘true reality or nature’ of a group that is 
 
121 See, e.g., Allport (1954); Gelman (2003); Prentice and Miller (2006, 2007).   
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responsible for their behavior, character, and outward traits. We further treat them as always 
being disposed to exhibit a number of features or behaviors, even if they actually don’t exhibit 
them. This results in a certain kind of determinism regarding the fate of the person we essentialize: 
In virtue of bearing the essence of an essentialized group, it is not your choice which behavioral or 
personal traits you possess; your essences imposes inherent constrains on what you can or will 
be and do.  
Insofar as essentializing thoughts are agency-denying thoughts, they are exactly the 
kinds of acts that fall under a widely-accepted conception of dehumanization. In his discussion of 
the term “dehumanization”, Livingstone Smith (2014) observes that one of the core ways in which 
we can dehumanize is through “[d]enial of the subjectivity, individuality, agency, or distinctively 
human attributes of others” (p. 816).122 This conception of dehumanization is a well-known theme 
from the Kantian tradition, according to which there is a distinction between things that fall 
under the laws of nature and are thus un-free; and persons, who are self-legislating, endowed with 
rationality, and whose free actions are not subsumable under the laws of nature (Kant, 1997; see 
also Langton, 2009). These properties are essential to our humanity, and we are thus required to 
respect them. Failure to recognize and respect someone’s humanity by denying their capacity for 
self-determination then constitutes a form of dehumanization.123 Crucially, dehumanization 
understood in this way is exactly what acts of essentialization amount to: For as we have just 
seen, essentializing an individual on the basis of group membership represents them as being 
significantly constrained in their autonomy, agency, and capacity for self-determination. 
 
122 This sense also parallels two of the senses that Martha Nussbaum (1995) assigns to the meaning of 
“objectification”. For the purposes of this chapter, the distinction (if any) between dehumanization and objectification 
is not too important. As I see it, “dehumanization” is the more general term the extension of which is a set with 
objectification as its subset: whereas I can dehumanize someone by treating them like an animal, I can dehumanize 
or objectify someone by treating them object-like. Insofar as treating someone in a way that reduces their agency 
portrays them as more object-like, we could also formulate the first premise in the more committed way and say that 
essentialization implies objectification.  
123 For an anti-Kantian analysis of dehumanization, see Mikkola (2016). 
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Derivatively, it also denies their subjectivity, individuality, and other distinctively human 
attributes, because we only see a human as a generic instance of a kind, and thus ‘look past’ the 
person’s individuality. 
 Does every form of essentialization constrain your agency, capacity for self-
determination, or autonomy? No. As we just saw, we can conceptualize someone as essentially 
human, free, rational, or autonomous. This way of essentializing them doesn’t constrain their 
capacity for self-determination. To the contrary, it increases it.124 So when we represent someone 
in this way, we don’t dehumanize them. The purpose of the qualification in premise 1 is to 
distinguish this kind of essentialization from essentialization that is dehumanizing: We 
dehumanize someone when essentializing them in a way that represents them with reduced 
capacity for self-determination. For example, representing someone as having an essence that 
makes them criminal, a banker, submissive, or a nurse substantially constrains their capacity for 
self-determination. If you are naturally disposed to be a criminal, you are substantially 
constrained in the things you can be. It is this kind of essentialism that is dehumanizing. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will refer to this qualified sense of “essentialism” when using the 
term.125  
 
124 The same point holds for cognitive capacities related to our humanity, such as the essentialization of memory or 
language competencies. 
125 Note that it is possible to essentialize a person in a positive way. For example, I can essentialize you as belonging 
to the kind genius, whose nature it is to be extremely intelligent and creative. What, if anything, is the wrong 
committed through essentialization in ‘positive’ cases? I believe that they still fall under my generalization in premise 
1, but intuitions about these cases may diverge from more paradigmatic cases due to two main factors. First, the 
features associated with the kinds in question are positive and often advantageous to us. For example, all things 
equal, it is to my advantage if someone essentializes me as naturally intelligent and creative. The felt benefit of this 
essentialization might sometimes override the feeling of harm done through the dehumanization. Second, the kind 
of essentialism incurred in these ‘positive’ cases is substantially less constraining of our agency or self-determination 
than paradigmatic cases of essentialism. In cases of positive essentialization, we sometimes even represent someone 
with an increased ability for self-determination. All things equal, although thinking of you as naturally intelligent 
‘constrains’ you in so far as you will always be disposed to be intelligent, it also increases your potential for agency 
and self-determination substantially in some domains: you are free to choose whatever occupation and subject of 
study you like. Thus, the dehumanization incurred here can differ in degree from the dehumanization incurred by 
appealing to more constraining kinds. 
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We have seen that the mechanism behind essentialism explains why it is dehumanizing—
people are represented as having severely constrained capacities for agency. Still, someone might 
resist premise 1, and wonder whether we really deny someone’s agency or autonomy when 
representing or treating them in essentialist ways. To fuel the intuition behind the premise 
further, consider the following scenario. Suppose you are a member of society S and have 
ethnicity E. In S, the characteristic being lazy is seen as highly correlated with E. You have 
background E, but, as a result of volitional decisions, don’t exhibit this characteristic. Suppose 
further that your potential employer knows about your ethnicity, and that he sees ‘ethnicity E’ 
as an essentialized category. He correspondingly attributes an E-essence to you, thus assuming 
that it is in your nature to be lazy. Hence, although not exhibiting this characteristic that, in S, 
is associated with membership in E, your potential employer forms the judgement that you 
possess a disposition to be lazy. Intuitively, the potential employer refrains from acknowledging 
the control and agency you have over this personality trait, thus dehumanizing you.126 
That essentializing diminishes our perception of agency is also supported by many 
experiments. For example, when smokers are given an essentialist explanation of their addiction, 
they report having less control about the inhibition and initiation of smoking behavior, 
suggesting that the essentialist explanation influences their evaluation of choice and agency (A. 
J. Wright et al., 2007). Similar findings were obtained for a variety of other categories, such as 
 
126 What is the relationship between wrongs incurred through essentialism and wrongs incurred through 
stereotyping? We might link coming from a low-income background with having a low education level, although 
we don’t think it is in the nature of people with a low-income background to have a low education level. It might 
merely be a stereotype that we justify by appealing to structural-societal factors. Nevertheless, although not 
essentializing me, a potential employer that refrains from hiring me based on this stereotype seems to commit a 
wrong. One natural diagnosis of the source of this wrong is the denial of individuality—since the employer does not 
consider me individually but ascribes a property to me by way of a group I happen to belong to, even though 
individualized information about me are available—and, in this context, the denial of agency I have over the form 
my life takes—since the employer disregards information about behaviors and traits that are under the influence of 
my agency. If this diagnosis is roughly correct, essentialization is, unsurprisingly, not the only way in which we can 
dehumanize someone through the denial of agency and individuality. For analyses of the wrongs of stereotyping, 
see Beeghly (2015) or Blum (2004).  
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the female gender, mental illness, obesity, and other eating disorders.127 Also the explicit 
justifications observed when psychologists asked children why a girl or boy has certain gender-
associated behavioral preferences immediately reveal the agency-overwriting potential of 
essentialist representations at a very young age: 
A girl raised with only boys and men […] Likes to play with a tea set rather than a toy truck: “Because 
usually since she has a girl brain, she’d like to play with a tea set” (Boy, age 10) 
A boy raised with only girls and women […] Goes fishing rather than puts on make up: “‘Cause that’s 
the boy instinct” (Girl, age 10) (Gelman, 2003, p. 96)  
Experimental evidence then also shows that thinking of someone under an essentialist 
guise reduces our willingness to conceive of them as agents with full capacity for autonomy and 
self-determination. Psychologist Ilan Dar-Nimrod, whose research investigates the effects of 
essentializing on attributions of agency and evaluations of personal choice, similarly contends 
that essentialist belief “leads people to view the outcome as immutable and determined” (Dar-
Nimrod & Lisandrelli, 2012, p. 189), and to a strong devaluation of etiological explanations of 
outcomes that make reference to environmental factors, experience, or personal choice. When an 
essentialist explanation for a behavioral trait is accepted, the essence trumps any potential 
alternative factors behind a given outcome. Indeed, we have seen before that to essentialize is 
just to have representations that are agency and autonomy-denying. When we attribute an 
essence to someone, we think that it is this essence that determines who the person in question is 
and why they have the properties they do. The whole ‘point’ of the essentialist heuristic is that it 
allows stable and fixed inductive inferences from an essence to a set of traits. If these traits were 
controllable by an autonomous agent, of course, it would strongly diminish this very inductive 
potential.  
 
127 For an overview, see Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011). 
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So far, I have argued that essentializing someone is dehumanizing because it represents 
them as having diminished capacities for agency, autonomy and self-determination. Some might 
object that there are clear counterexamples to this generalization; specifically, cases in which we 
can, intuitively, essentialize someone without thereby doing anything wrong. Some such 
examples are diagnoses of psychological conditions, such as schizophrenia or Asperger 
syndrome, or classifications of people as belonging to a physical disability group, such as 
D/deafness or blindness. If someone is diagnosed with schizophrenia, it seems correct, rational, 
and morally justified to hold the belief that the person has, due to some aspect of the person’s nature, 
certain physical and behavioral dispositions associated with schizophrenia: for example, to have 
distorted perceptions of reality or problems with executive functioning. Moreover, we believe 
that the person does not have control over, and is not responsible for, associated symptoms, and 
that we have a duty to accommodate the symptoms in question. 
However, even if the alleged counterexamples seem like cases in which we essentialize 
someone in an unobjectionable way, a closer look reveals that these cases (a) either don’t 
constitute instances of essentialization or (b) constitute cases of essentialization that are morally 
problematic. Take, first, the lack of responsibility for the effects of disability symptoms and our 
duty to accommodate them. There is a better way to conceptualize cases of this sort which 
undermines the objection. This way has it that we see a disability not as someone’s essence or 
nature, but rather as an essence-external disabler that does not determine the nature of the person 
in question.128 After all, we all are subject to a variety of disabling conditions that can impede our 
autonomy and agency: if I am not provided with food or oxygen, I won’t be able to do the things 
I can do qua essentially autonomous, free, rational agent. Thus, lack of food and oxygen constitute 
 
128 I’m not claiming here that the relevant physical properties of people with disabilities are negative or of 
intrinsically different valence than the physical or mental properties of people without disabilities (see Brown, 2016; 
Silvers, 2003 for discussion). 
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disabling conditions to our inherent capacity for autonomy, rationality and free agency; eating and 
breathing enable the capacity.129 I propose that this is the correct way to understand contexts of 
accommodation. We conceptualize the person in question as a fully autonomous agent, but 
recognize that there are certain external disablers to a person’s autonomy that we must 
accommodate for—just like lack of food can be disabling to the realization of anyone’s 
autonomy.130 This provides us with an independently plausible explanation of why we don’t 
object to cases of alleged essentialization in accommodation or responsibility attributions. It is 
not essentialism that makes us accommodate and refrain from responsibility attributions, but the 
realization that we must remove external disablers, or provide external enablers, in order for us 
to be in a position to do the things we do qua autonomous, free agent.  
In contrast, when we conceptualize people with, for example, a disability in a truly 
essentialized way, reports from group members, disability scholars, and disability rights 
advocates give us reason to believe that we thereby often do actual moral harm. As a first pass, 
it is clear that we would intuitively wrong any person when confronting them with something 
along the following lines: “You have constrained capacities for self-determination because you 
have a disability”. Correspondingly, many disability advocates and scholars explicitly criticize 
 
129 Following Wygoda Cohen, we will treat the relationship between enablers and disablers as follows: “the absence 
of an enabler is a disabler, and the absence of a disabler is an enabler” (Wygoda Cohen, 2018, p. 4). 
130 See also Wygoda Cohen (2018) and Dancy (2004) for a discussion of the conceptual and metaphysical distinction 
between enablers and grounds. Wygoda Cohen gives the following example to make clear the intuitive difference 
between both (p. 3):  
 
Scenario A: A police officer is chasing a criminal. The criminal runs in Frida’s direction. The police officer 
calls out to Frida to help in catching the criminal and law abiding, virtuous Frida catches the criminal (her 
karate training finally pays off). 
 
Scenario B: A police officer is chasing a criminal. The criminal enters a narrow alley where Alex happens 
to be standing. The criminal bumps into Alex, thereby slowing down. This slowing down enables the police 
officer to catch the criminal. 
 
While in scenario A, Frida actually made it the case that the criminal is caught, while in scenario B, Alex simply 
enabled this fact to be brought about.  
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both explicit and implicit essentialist narratives about disability, which lead to a view of disabled 
persons as ‘abnormal’, tragic, inferior, deficient, homogeneous, and dependent, and of their 
impairment as identity-determining, agency-robbing, and stigmatizing (Cameron, 2011; 
Loughman & Haslam, 2018; McDougall, 2006).131 That the essentialist lens through which 
certain disabilities are seen has a negative impact on the life and feelings of people can also be 
seen in first-hand reports by affected individuals: 
Having a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome (AS) as a child means that, as an adult, you can never interact 
normally with anyone ever again. It’s because you know that, if they know, they will view everything you do 
through their knowledge that you have a diagnosis of AS. (my emphasis; from Martin, 2012, p. 15,  describing 
a personal communication with a research participant)  
Every few hours I run up against people who feel free to remind me that I‘m their inferior and that I 
should conform to whatever they’ve decided ‘people like [me]’ are supposed to be like. (Montgomery, 
2016, unpaged)132 
These examples bring out how essentialism about groups strongly biases in favor of essentialist 
explanations of behavior. For example, the first research participant reports that all of their 
behavior—presumably, even behavior that has nothing to do with AS—is explained through a 
causally-powerful, identity-determining essence, not through their individual decisions and 
volitions. They furthermore communicate that they don’t want to be seen through this 
essentialist mindset, because it both affects the way they are expected to act, and attributes 
inaccurate, all-encompassing explanations to their behavior. The same point holds for the second 
example. If this is true, essentializing is harmful in these cases.133 
 
131 Correspondingly, it is well-known that various disability advocacy groups oppose the essentializing language 
they encounter (“autists”, “schizophrenics”, “hearing-impaired”), a sentiment that now is mirrored by new linguistic 
standards in scientific journals. 
132 The example is from Cameron (2011). 
133 The wide-spread rejection of the ‘medical model’ in favor of the ‘social model’ of disability also suggests that 
essentialist views on disability are commonly regarded as inadequate and potentially harmful by disability scholars 
and activists. According to the medical model, a disability is a physical or biological property of a person—e.g., a 
biological property of your visual system—and its social and personal effects—e.g., your resulting inability to see 
and resulting incapacity to work in certain occupations of perform certain activities. According to the social model, 
in contrast, a disability is a relational property between a person and their social environment. It is due to this 
relationship—and not this or that physical property of a person—that they are excluded from participation of various 
domains of life. So according to the social model, it’s not due to the person’s ‘nature’ that they face particular limiting 
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Taking stock, the alleged counterexamples are either not really instances of 
essentialization, or they are cases of essentialization that are morally problematic. In either case, 
they don’t pose a threat to the truth of the first premise. 
  
3. “Bitches” and “Breeds” in Pornography 
My second premise is that pornography essentializes women. Which women? Much research on 
pornography and feminist philosophy more broadly investigates how intersectional issues relate 
to normative questions about pornographic material (Bettcher, 2017; Mayall & Russell, 1993; 
Nash, 2008; Patel, 2009; Walker, 1980; Zheng, 2017). Indeed, literature on pornography and 
feminism has also been criticized for not taking seriously enough intersectional concerns 
(Bernardi, 2006; Collins, 2002; Gardner, 1980; Harris, 1990). My answer to this question is, 
however, simple and general. My claim is that all women are depicted in essentialist ways in 
pornography. In other words, my claim that pornography essentializes women extends to various 
intersectional identities, such as ethnicity, body weight, sexual preference, religion, age, race, 
assigned sex at birth, and so on. While women might be essentialized in different ways—
someone, for example, might be depicted as belonging to the ‘fat woman breed’; of being of a 
special ‘nature’ which makes them enjoy certain treatments—all women, I argue, are 
systematically essentialized in pornography. 
 
consequences; the limitation is rather caused by and contingent on their physical and especially social environment. 
Many disability scholars and activists see the roots of many social injustices towards disabled people in the medical 
model and its associated essentialism. Locating the cause of the negative aspects associated with a disability, such as 
limited life opportunities, in the person’s biology and not in the particular way they are situated relative to the 
external world, inaccurately legitimizes and rationalizes the exclusion of disabled people and the organization of the 
external world as to exclusively cater the majority (see Martin, 2012; Silvers, 2002). So instead of realizing and 
amending the way external structural factors, caused by a majority group, constrain individuals’ opportunities, we 
then deploy essentialist thoughts to rationalize forms the exclusion of people with a different physical or 
psychological make-up by framing the differences in opportunities as ‘naturally ordained’ and immutable. 
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 Let us now turn to the central question of whether, and if so, how and why pornography 
essentializes women. While explicit speech acts are not the dominant form of interaction in porn, 
there is still a vast amount of explicit language in and around pornographic material, including 
titles, content descriptions, or exclamations in screenplays. Sociologist Gail Dines argues that 
the verbal choice that is made in and around pornography serves an important purpose. Consider 
one of the dominant pornographic genres, gonzo porn, which focusses on depicting “hard-core, 
body-punishing sex” (Dines, 2010, p. xi).134 Since this form of pornography is especially extreme 
and violent, the industry must use special methods to make it morally justifiable or at least 
palatable for consumers to watch human beings be demeaned and debased. And this, according 
to Dines, can be achieved by the help of particular linguistic cues: 
The first and most important way pornographers get men to buy into gonzo sex is by depicting and 
describing women as fuck objects who are deserving of sexual use and abuse. It is especially important for 
pornographers to shred the humanity of the women in the images, as many porn users have sustained and 
intimate relationships with women in the real world […] the porn needs to construct porn women in 
ways that clearly demarcate them from the women men know and love. The most obvious technique that 
the pornographers employ here is to verbally segregate this group of women by calling them cunts, whores, sluts, 
cumdumpsters, beavers, and so on. (my emphasis; Dines, 2010, pp. 63–64)  
The pornography literature refers to this process as grooming: the act of silencing the potential 
ethical concerns of consumers by providing them with material that rationalizes the enjoyment 
of morally unacceptable acts (see Dines, 2010; Whisnant, 2010). 
My view is that essentializing women can fulfill exactly this purpose, and I argue that the 
essentialization in pornography is often achieved via language: by making the explicit verbal 
choice of calling women depicted in porn “cunt”, “cumdumpster”, or “beaver”, the pornographers 
communicate to the consumer that he is dealing with an entity of a certain kind—i.e., an entity with 
 
134 Gonzo porn seems to be distinguishable through its focus on the first-person camera perspective, and its tendency 
towards extreme, hard-core contents (Amis, 2001; Dines, 2010; Olson, 2016; Purcell, 2012). E.g., P. Weasels notices 
in their article “The Quick and Dirty Guide to Gonzo” on the pornography site GameLink—always turned on: “The 
definition of gonzo is coming to connote more extreme action than the strict “camera as observer” interpretation”.  
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a certain essence. But while Dines holds that language mainly serves to separate the women men 
see in porn from the women they love and respect, I think pornography can, but doesn’t have to, 
serve this purpose.135 What is most important for my argument is that the language activates 
implicit or explicit representations that the women they see have a certain nature that makes them 
enjoy certain acts, behave in certain ways, look certain ways. Thus, in the world of pornography, 
women belong to certain ‘species’ and have a natural, deep inclination to enjoy and long for 
virtually any sex act. This has the desired grooming effects on the consumer’s moral psychology. 
The grooming hypothesis is then a plausible explanation for why pornography essentializes 
women. 
The function of essentialist language in processes of moral grooming outside of porn is 
well-known—just think of the linguistic portrayal of Jewish people as “rats”, “insects”, “crows” 
or “sows” in German national-socialist propaganda.136 It would then be unsurprising if also the 
pornography industry used this manipulation tool to help consumers engage with more extreme 
and immoral material. So by essentializing women through labels and essentialist descriptions, 
the porn consumer can legitimize his pleasure in dehumanizing acts: it is just in the inescapable 
nature of these species of women to enjoy mistreatment, and neither he, the consumer, nor anyone 
else can do anything against it. If the grooming process succeeds, women’s systematic 
subordination and our enjoyment of it seem normatively justified. As Haslam and colleagues put 
it, “essentialist beliefs […] make the subordination of some kind of people seem inevitable or 
naturally ordained. Essentialist beliefs, i.e., are seen to have an ideological or system-justifying 
function” (my emphasis; Haslam et al., 2004, p. 64). 
 
135 At any rate, essentializing always fulfills one demarcating effect: the one of demarcating the essentialized elements 
from the Kantian human—i.e., person—kind. 
136 See also Livingstone Smith (2011) and Tirrell (2012) for insightful philosophical analyses of the power of 
language for grooming purposes especially in genocidal contexts. 
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So far, I’ve simply claimed that pornography essentializes women through language. But 
I have yet to show that this is true. So next, I’ll demonstrate how pornography essentializes 
women through three linguistic media: nouns, slurs, and descriptions.   
 First, as indicated in Dines’ quote, pornographers can make use of the essentializing 
power of nouns. As we saw in the last chapter, an increasing amount of research shows that the 
syntactic category of nouns is especially suited for conveying to our interlocutors the identity, 
nature, or essence of a person or thing (Carnaghi et al., 2008; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; 
Wierzbicka, 1986). Remember, for example, the experiments by Carnaghi et al. (2008), who 
compared the inductive potential of nouns and adjectives which assign individuals to the same 
set (e.g., “an athlete” vs. “athletic”). They found that categorizing a person with a noun as opposed 
to an adjective leads to significantly more stereotypical inferences, and that nouns rather than 
adjectives inhibit inferences about behaviors that are incongruent with the descriptors. For 
example, a homosexual (noun) was estimated to go to church less often than someone who was 
homosexual (adjective). Participants would themselves also be more likely to use a noun to 
describe a person after the researchers used an essentialist scenario to prime them.  
These findings support the idea that by using nouns with a distinctive kind-like flavor, 
pornographers reinforce their desired effect of conveying that we see certain ‘kinds’ or ‘breeds’. 
The categories of a typical pornography internet site include multiple nominalized social 
categories: “Latina”, “Ebony”, “European”, “MILF”, “Teen”, “Asian”, “BBW”, and so on.137 In her 
study on racism in pornography, Alice Mayall documented the titles she found on pornographic 
book and magazine covers, many of which used extremely essentialist and degrading 
nominalizations: “The Talking Pussy”, “Jungle Babies”, “Seductive Black Bitch”, “Sluts of S.S”, 
 
137 In line with this, Mayall reported that if a race is depicted on the cover of a pornographic medium, in 77%, the 
race is identified in the title (Mayall & Russell, 1993). 
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“Bawdy Tales of Wu Wu Wang”, or “Oriental Pussy”, to name only a few (Mayall & Russell, 
1993). And although we will treat slurs as a special category, calling women “bitch”, “whore”, 
“slut”, or “cunt” is all too common—and normal—in the world of pornography. 
 Crucially, the viewer also knows what to expect when choosing a category in the internet 
or bookshelf, or when a noun is used in a pornographic scene. Belonging to a given ‘breed’ will 
just make the women in question have some sexually defined properties. The ‘Teen woman kind’ 
is sexually innocent (Dines, 2010), the ‘Asian woman kind’ is sexually docile and obedient 
(Tajima, 1989; Zhou & Paul, 2016), the ‘black woman kind’ is sexually uncivilized and aggressive, 
(Collins, 2002; hooks, 1992), and so on. Usage of nouns can be an effective tool to trigger precisely 
these associations; to communicate to viewers that it is in the nature of the women in question to 
have the displayed sexual properties. In all these cases, the pornographers also provide cognitive 
tools to rationalize mistreatment, the enjoyment of the mistreatment, and the sexualization of 
racist, sexist, and other social ideologies. 
Second, as already indicated, pornographers can help themselves by using a special class 
of nouns—slurs. The usage of slurs in pornography is ubiquitous. For example, in her 
aforementioned study, Mayall found 245 usages of the N-word in the 180-page book “Soul Slave” 
(Mayall & Russell, 1993). In one scene the protagonist describes how a white man has tied ropes 
around her wrist, and reflects: “I was just a n— bitch, and this white man knew just how a n— 
bitch should be treated” (my censorship; recited from Russell, 1998, p. 54). In similar fashion, it 
is well-known that the porn industry plays a major role in coining and disseminating derogatory 
slurs aimed at trans women (Serano, 2016). And I’ve already pointed out that describing a woman 
as ‘cunt’, ‘bitch’, or ‘whore’ is common courtesy in pornography. These are just a few of many 
examples illustrating pornography’s practice of applying dehumanizing slurs to women. In 
chapter 3, I have argued that slurs are a species of natural kind terms: By applying a slur to 
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someone, we express that that person bears the essence of that social group, which is 
nomologically connected to a set of negative stereotypical features.138 As a result, the slur-user 
conveys that the target is of a special ‘nature’ which makes them disposed to act in certain 
negative ways, whether the target wants so or not. If this account of slurs is correct, the 
omnipresent usage of slurs in pornography is an instance of systematic essentialization. Women 
that belong to the “cunt” kind, for example, just ‘need’ certain sexual treatments—it is in them, 
even if they pretend otherwise.  
Thirdly, pornographers can give descriptions that convey that the women seen in 
pornography belong to a special kind, species, or breed. This gives them the opportunity to 
describe which kind these women belong to, i.e., which special ‘essence’ female pornography 
protagonists have that distinguishes them from free persons and makes them naturally inclined 
to enjoy certain treatments. Consider, for illustration, this description from the page ‘Ass 
Plundering’:  
Gauge gives a new meaning to the word whore. Any less than 2 guys at once means she won’t be satisfied. 
Her tight holes need to be ravaged by big cocks at the same time for her to have fun. (recited from Dines, 
2010, p. 64) 
Discussing this example, Dines further observes that 
The images surrounding this text show Gauge being orally, vaginally, and anally penetrated by three 
men at the same time. One of the images shows a red, raw, and swollen anus while others show her face 
contorted as she is supposedly having an orgasm. The images and the written text together, as well as 
the movie, which presents her begging for more, collude to seduce the viewer into believing that no matter 
how cruelly her body is being treated, she belongs to a special breed of women that enjoy sexual 
mistreatment. (Dines, 2010, p. 64) 
 
138 In the same chapter, I also argued that there is a distinctive connection between slurs and nouns. It is no accident 
that slurs occur predominantly as nouns—evidence shows that nouns are the primary vehicles we use to essentialize 
others, and since slurs have an essentialist semantics, we should use nouns to communicate their content. 
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Examples like this are increasingly present in mainstream pornography, through which they can 
channel into our representation and treatment of women in everyday life.139 In another example 
from the novel ‘Easy Office Girl’, a successful manager woman is described in the following 
way—after being bound, gagged, whipped, and urinated on by her boss: 
All she had gone through had turned her on! […] He knew women. He knew what turned them on […] 
He could humiliate her and make her love every second of it. She was humiliated, degraded, made to feel 
less than human. He was using her. Just like she had used all the other men to get to this point. And the 
hell of it was, she enjoyed it! She needed to be abused, to be humiliated. […] when Morgan showed her that 
a man could make her do whatever he wanted, she found her true self. She needed to be used by this man in 
whatever fashion his mind could conjure up. It was necessary for her. (my emphasis, recited from Jensen & 
Dines, 1988, p. 99) 
This example communicates, quite explicitly, an extremely essentialist view of the nature of 
women. It is necessary for them to be humiliated or used. They love it, since it corresponds to their 
true self—or in other words, their essence. Examples like these make explicit, through 
descriptions, which ‘kinds’, or, as Dines puts it, ‘breeds’, women belong to.140 They don’t have a 
human essence, but belong to a kind whose nature it is to enjoy being abused, submitted, hurt, 
ravaged. 
To some, the listed examples might amount to no more than anecdotal evidence for sex-
negative views of pornography. Pornographic content is diverse, the objection goes, thus claims 
about the subordinating contents of pornography do not generalize; examples like the ones 
presented here are merely cherry-picked to fuel anti-porn propaganda. I do not see the force of 
the objection: for the point of this chapter (and much feminist philosophy) to hold, it is not 
necessary that a large proportion of pornographic content must show dehumanizing content. A 
small percentage suffices to generate a pattern. Imagine that every 20th time you see a show on Netflix, 
you see explicitly racist content that is depicted in a context of absolute normality (and not, say, 
 
139 For example, a study by Wright, Sun and Tokunaga (2014) found that watching mainstream pornography is 
associated with men’s desire to engage or having already engaged in a set of degrading sexual activities such as 
name-calling (e.g. “slut” or “whore”).  
140 For many more explicit examples, see Mayall and Russell (1993), Dines and Jensen (1998), and Dines (2010). 
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in a documenting way or as a moral lesson). This would certainly suffice to warrant harsh 
criticism of the show. If the pattern is distributed over a genre, it would suffice to warrant harsh 
criticism of the genre.  
Furthermore, quantitative evidence of mainstream pornographic material does document a 
high number of dehumanizing depictions in pornography; in particular, we find evidence of how 
wide-spread linguistic acts with essentializing connotations are in pornography. In a rigorous 
content-analysis of best-selling pornography videos—thus, of mainstream pornographic 
material—Ana Bridges and her colleagues found that 48.7% of their analyzed 304 scenes 
contained verbal aggression.141 Importantly, the majority (97.2%) of these acts of verbal 
aggression were acts of name-calling, i.e., the usage of words such as “bitch” and “slut”  (Bridges, 
Wosnitzer, Scharrer, Sun, & Liberman, 2010). They also found that the perpetrators of (all, 
including physical) aggression were usually male (70.3%), while the recipients were female 
(94.4%).142 And as expected, the targets of the aggression in most cases either responded with 
pleasure or neutrally to the received aggression.143 This gives special weight to the claim I made 
above: In porn, slurring a woman is normal and corresponds to the way she wants to be called, 
since this is just what the women, in the world of porn, are. Aggressive physical behavior is met 
with approval by the women, since this is how this ‘breed’ is to be treated. 
That the language employed in pornography also arrives at pornography’s recipients has 
been demonstrated in another, interesting study. Davis, Carrotte, Hellard and Lim (2018) 
 
141 The total aggression rate of the study was 89.8%. The results about the overall aggression rates in pornographic 
material vary; however, some studies finding lower aggression rates (Klaassen & Peter, 2015; McKee, 2005) use 
questionable operationalizations of “aggression” or “dehumanization”, where it is coded as an actor’s displayed lack 
of consent. In effect, these results are useless for my present purposes. 
142 Even when women were the perpetrators, the targets were usually other women. 
143 Also in their study of racism and sexism in pornography, Cowan and Campbell (1994) found that male actors 
were significantly more likely to be verbally aggressive. A meta-analysis of 22 studies in 7 countries found a positive 
association between pornography consumption and sexual aggression, with an even higher association for verbal 
aggression (P. J. Wright, Tokunaga, & Kraus, 2016). 
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investigated what behavior 517 young heterosexual Australian participants perceive when they 
watch pornography. In order to do so, they asked the participants how frequently they saw each 
of 17 behaviors of a given list in the past 12 months. Thus, the study didn’t focus on the content 
actually depicted in pornographic material, but tried to assess the representations activated and 
stored in the recipients of pornographic material. This can yield important insights about 
pornography’s immediate and long-term cognitive effects in its recipients with respect to the 
representation of women. Apart from asking many other questions—e.g., how often participants 
saw violence towards a woman that appeared consensual (35% reported to see it half or more 
than half of the time)—they also asked how often they have seen a woman being slurred or called 
a name in pornography in the last 12 months. 35.5% reported having seen a woman being slurred 
within pornography half the time or more in the past 12 months. This differed substantially from 
the number of participants that reported having seen a man being slurred or called names half 
the time or more in the past 12 months (6.5%). Taken together, we have empirical evidence 
substantiating that essentialist language is widespread within the world of pornography, and that 
this is registered by its consumers.  
Pornography then systematically essentializes women, and, if the first premise is correct, 
thereby dehumanizes women. By depicting women in an essentialist way, current pornographic 
material assigns a non-autonomous essence to women, and robs them of some of the 
distinguishing features we associate with full-fledged personhood. This systematic 
essentialization of women, I hypothesize, serves to justify the enjoyment of acts of violence and 
humiliation. After all, these women belong to a special kind that is just made to be treated this 
way, so consumers are merely following the order of nature.  
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter tried to uncover and understand one of the central mechanisms through which 
pornography dehumanizes women. I argued that pornography essentializes women, and by doing 
so, dehumanizes. The aim of this chapter was neither to claim that essentialism is the only, or the 
main element responsible for the dehumanizing power of pornography. However, I have shown 
that essentialism is one of the most powerful ways in which pornography dehumanizes women. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation defends a theory of concepts according to which they encode causal structures 
and explores its philosophical applications. Special attention is given to essentialist causal 
structures, i.e., concepts that encode ‘mini-theories’ in which the essence of a category is 
represented as causally responsible for the observable properties shared amongst members of the 
target category. The first chapter (“Cognitive Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts”) gives 
a detailed overview of the current empirical and theoretical literature on essentialist theories of 
concepts. The second chapter (“Meaning Externalism and Causal Model Theory”) implements 
the framework of causal graphical models to model causal theories of concepts, and shows that it 
can be used to correctly predict Putnam-Kripke intuitions about natural kind terms. The third 
and fourth chapter apply the framework to phenomena at the interface of social philosophy and 
philosophy of language. 
 The last two chapters highlight that while for many categories, essentialist or causal ways 
of organizing our knowledge are innocuous and potentially beneficial for everyday reasoning and 
simple categorization tasks—even if the relevant tacit theories are not fully accurate—for many 
social categories, organizing our knowledge in terms of mini-theories can be quite pernicious. For 
example, we can try to ‘explain’ some perceived negative property of a social group by assuming 
that it is the effect of some other underlying, causally ‘deep’ property of the group, as opposed to 
an effect of an external social condition. The third chapter (“An Essentialist Theory of the 
Meaning of Slurs”) argues that slurs rely on erroneous theories of precisely this kind. They 
express that members of certain groups have some underlying, causally powerful ‘essence’ which 
is causally responsible for negative stereotypes associated with a social group. This account 
doesn’t only predict slurs’ linguistic behavior correctly; it also gives a straightforward 
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explanation of why it is they dehumanize. According to the mini-theory encoded in a slur, it is 
just in the ‘nature’ of members of some social group to exhibit certain negative properties. These 
mini-theories deny the target’s capacities for autonomy and self-determination. The last chapter 
(“Pornography and Dehumanization: The Essentialist Dimension”) makes use of this insight and 
extends it to the domain of pornography, arguing that it exploits essentialist mini-theories of 
women, according to which they have a certain ‘nature’ that causes them to be, for example, 
sexually submissive, thus dehumanizing them.   
 The dissertation shows that the defended theory of concepts can be successfully put to 
use in various philosophical domains. However, many new questions emerge from the advanced 
hypotheses that the dissertation leaves unanswered. In closing, I want to call attention to some 
of these questions and thereby highlight important avenues for future research.  
In cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, there has been a long-standing debate 
between rationalists and empiricists about conceptual learning. Roughly, empiricists about 
concepts claim that we gain our concepts from experience, while rationalists deny this claim for 
most or all concepts—instead, concepts simply come as part of our innate cognitive machinery. 
The hypothesis that concepts have causal structures might bear in important ways on this debate 
(see also Carey, 2009; Fodor, 1998). As Hume taught us, it doesn’t seem possible to derive causal 
conceptual structures from purely perceptual input, as the input itself doesn’t contain causal 
information—pre-existing conceptual biases seem to be required for that. Thus, the hypothesis 
that concepts encode causal information seems to pair most naturally with concept rationalism. 
If this is correct, the question arises which, if any, problems of concept rationalism apply similarly 
to a causal-structure account of concepts, and which, if any, problems of concept rationalism can 
be solved with the help of the defended account. 
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The developed account of concepts will also be of relevance for the debate on 
compositionality. According to the (strict version of the) principle of compositionality, the meaning 
of a complex expression is determined from the meaning of its immediate constituents, the way 
they are combined, and nothing else besides. It has classically been argued that (a) the principle 
of compositionality is indispensable, and (b) that it can only be paired with an account of concepts 
according to which they are atomic—i.e., according to which they do not contain any internal 
structure (Fodor, 1998, 2005). Insofar as (b) is correct, someone who defends a causal theory of 
conceptual structure must reject (a). The burden would then fall on them to show that the (strict 
version of the) principle of compositionality is dispensable, and to develop an alternative, 
psychologically realistic account of conceptual and linguistic combinatorics.  
The social aspects of the dissertation also raise a number of interesting questions. The 
focus in chapters 3 and 4 is on the negative elements of social essentialism. However, it seems that 
social essentialism can often be put to positive use. Various examples from pop culture, social 
movements, and intellectual history demonstrate how social essentialism is employed to promote 
positive group identity, pride, solidarity, and empowerment. This illustrates the need for an 
explanation of how social essentialism, especially social self-essentialism, can be applied in the 
positive ways just mentioned, especially when it has, as chapters 3 and 4 argue, autonomy-
denying and thus dehumanizing effects in other contexts. Optimally, such an account would 
provide an explanation of how the essentialist theory of slurs can accommodate the phenomenon 
of appropriated uses of slurs. It has been argued these uses often serve to promote the same values 
cited above in cases of positive essentialism: solidarity, positive group identity, and empowerment 
between members of socially marginalized groups (Cepollaro, 2017a; Jeshion, 2020; Ritchie, 
2017). Thus, an account of how social essentialism can generally be applied in ways that are 
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empowering might directly help explain how slurs, whose semantics are usually essentialist, can 
be employed in this way, too.  
These are but a few of the questions that my dissertation leaves open. They illustrate the 
many interesting avenues for future research on causal and essentialist theories of concepts. 
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